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Abstract
The threat of a rising China to the U.S. led international system has resulted in the increase in  
competition and tension between the two states. The disputed South China Sea (SCS) is one of the 
theatres in which this developing competition takes place. Utilizing Offensive Realism theory as a 
framework, the SCS is examined as a potential  flashpoint for the escalation of an international 
incident into conflict between the U.S. and China. The political/security context in which Sino-U.S. 
relations  occur  is  established through an  analysis  of  the  law of  claims at  sea and the  disputes 
claimants. The theoretical framework provides a means to interpret the actions of both China and 
the  U.S.  in  the context  of  a  competition  for  power,  by establishing the  causes  of  war  and the 
strategies utilized by rising and status quo powers against each other. The conduct of China and the 
U.S. both generally and regionally are then examined on three levels: national opinion, strategy and 
tactics. The results of each level are then juxtaposed to determine their effect on tension and thus 
the likelihood of conflict occurring. It is determined that the national opinion and strategy levels 
have a net effect of decreasing tension, whilst the tactical level dramatically increases tension within 
the region. The tension in the region is therefore moderated by the national opinion and strategy 
levels,  limiting the potential  of an international incident acting as a flashpoint for conflict,  but 
ensuring the likelihood of a prolonged stalemate and the emergence of a new Cold War.
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1. Introduction
The  People's  Republic  of  China  (PRC or  China)  has  developed an  Anti-Ship  Ballistic  Missile 
(ASBM) specially designed to sink the aircraft carriers of the United States of America (U.S.A. or 
U.S.). Deployed in 2010 the Dong Feng 21D ASBM has a range of 1500 km and is designed to 
limit the effectiveness of U.S. power projection capabilities in the South and East China Seas by 
targeting aircraft  carriers.  In response the U.S. has developed the Aegis/Standard Missile  ABM 
(Anti-Ballistic  Missile)  to  defend  ships  at  sea  from  ASBM  strikes  (Hoyler  2010:  85).  This 
aggressive and incendiary competition by China and the U.S. over operational access and Anti-
Access/Area Denial (A2AD) tactics forms only one part of a broader security competition dynamic, 
that  includes  further  policy  and strategy  based initiatives,  between  the  U.S.  and China  that  is 
currently being played out in the South China Sea (SCS). This regional tension if left unchecked 
could potentially lead to future conflict between the two states or the beginning of a new Cold War.
The relationship between the U.S. and China is both complex and multifaceted, where they are 
neither allies nor enemies, and where the U.S. has defined its relationship with China as being 
competitive  as  opposed to  adversarial  (CFR 2013a).  This  “competition”,  which generally  takes 
place in the economic and security spheres, has resulted at varying times in the heightening and 
cooling of tensions between the U.S. and China. As the world's largest economy and only regional 
hegemon the U.S. has been in a position of leadership within the international system since the end 
of World War II (WWII) and has been the dominant actor since the end of the Cold War. The rise of 
China, with a population in excess of one billion represents a challenge to this status quo, as China's 
potential for growth far exceeds that of the U.S. in both economic and military terms. The last 
challenge  to  U.S.  leadership  resulted  in  a  forty  four  year  (1947 to  1991)  “cold  war”  with  the 
communist Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The future of the Sino-U.S. relationship, 
whether defined by peaceful coexistence or hostility and animosity, is therefore likely to play a 
significant role in defining the nature of the international environment.
Determining  the  potential  for  conflict  is  more  than  the  sum of  a  series  of  policy  interactions 
between two states. The causes of conflict are complicated and varied, being the combination of 
various factors including the accumulated tension that exists between two states and is articulated 
through public opinion, national and governmental debate and finds release through the strategic 
and tactical decision making of its leadership. When tensions are high the risk of an international 
incident  escalating  and  ultimately  leading  to  the  outbreak  of  war  substantially  increases. 
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Historically the animosity between the Central European states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and 
Germany and the Eastern European state of Russia found its flashpoint1 in the Balkans. A region in 
which Austria was an active participant, with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and which 
contained a Russian ally, Serbia. The tension in this region had already led to two localized wars 2. 
But the international incident that ultimately ignited the flashpoint that started World War I (WWI) 
was the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. 
The geopolitical backdrop to Sino-U.S. security competition is the Asia-Pacific region, specifically 
the  Korean peninsular,  the  Republic  of  China (ROC or  Taiwan) and the SCS.  Whilst  both  the 
Korean peninsular and particularly Taiwan have existed as potential flashpoints for conflict between 
the U.S. and China since the end of the Chinese Revolution in 1950, the SCS is a relatively new 
addition  to  the  calculus  of  policy-makers  in  Washington  and  Beijing,  having  only  come  to 
prominence  following  the  “Impeccable  Incident”3 of  2009.  However  the  region  itself,  like  the 
Balkans before it, has experienced significant security competition, military clashes and the forced 
occupation of territory in the region. 
The region4 is strategically significant in that it acts as the main maritime link between the Pacific 
and  Indian  oceans,  giving  it  enormous  trade  and  military  value.  Most  of  the  seaborne  trade, 
including of oil and gas, between Europe and the Middle East and East Asia pass through the sea.  
The presence of major unexploited oil and gas deposits believed to lie under the seabed further 
complicates tensions. The sea is also home to some of world's largest coral reefs and, with marine 
life being depleted near the coasts, it is becoming increasingly important as a source of fish to feed 
growing populations, causing the coastal inhabitants of all the states to periodically clash. China, 
Taiwan and Vietnam claim nearly all of the sea, while the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei each 
have overlapping claims to parts of it. China's claim is based on a historical map of "nine dashes" 
that approaches the coast of other countries. With China being an active participant in the region 
and the Philippines, an ally of the U.S., being a co-belligerent, the heightened security competition 
between the U.S.  and China and the confluence of  irredentist  claims,  resource wealth,  and the 
strategic importance of the region, the SCS possesses significant potential to act as a flashpoint for 
1 The Oxford English Dictionary definition of “flashpoint” is adopted here: “a place, event, or time at which violence 
or hostility flares up.” Example: the conflict reached a flashpoint last year. 
Source: <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/flashpoint> 
2 The First Balkan War (1912-1913) and the Second Balkan War (1913).
3 The “Impeccable Incident” is an international incident that involved a confrontation between the U.S. Navy ocean 
surveillance ship the USNS Impeccable and Chinese civilian law enforcement vessels that led to heightened tension 
between Beijing and Washington. This incident is explained in great detail below.
4 Refer to Map 1: South China Sea Detailed Map.
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conflict between the U.S. and China.
The historical incarnation of Sino-U.S. relations occurred within the context of U.S. rivalry with the 
USSR, however the modern incarnation of Sino-U.S. relations occurs within the context of China 
itself existing as a potential threat to U.S hegemony, raising important questions as to how the U.S. 
will react to the rise of China. It was John J. Mearsheimer in his seminal work  The Tragedy of  
Great Power Politics (2001) that defined China as Washington's next significant adversary. Whilst 
several authors both prior to and following this work had indicated the significance of the rise of 
China to the world economy and international relations more generally5, it was Mearsheimer that 
poignantly argued of the threat that China poses to world peace and a U.S. led international system 
through his theory of Offensive Realism. 
Research on Sino-U.S. relations has consequently proliferated with the general aim of determining 
the effect of the rise of China on the international system. This research covers a range of areas 
relating to Sino-U.S. competition and cooperation including the political and security aspects of 
influence  in  Asia,  military  spending  and  planning,  cyber-hacking  and  espionage,  and  counter-
terrorism  efforts.  Economically:  China's  market  potential  and  access  to  U.S.  goods,  Chinese 
ownership of U.S. debt, the Sino-U.S. trade imbalances and currency distortions6. Furthermore the 
work of Mearsheimer and the assumptions of Offensive Realism, specifically with regard to China, 
have bean debated exhaustively. The most notable occurrence of which was an actual debate called 
the  Clash  of  the  Titans between  Mearsheimer  and  Brzezinski  in  2005.  Relating  to  Sino-U.S. 
interaction in the SCS significant research has also been completed, a notable example being the 
Special Focus Edition: The SCS Dispute of the journal Contemporary Southeast Asia in which the 
role of the claimants, China's strategy and the role of the U.S. are all examined. 
However a distinct lack of focus has been applied to the analysis of the SCS dispute as a flashpoint 
for conflict within the context that Mearsheimer laid out, that of Offensive Realism. According to 
the theory the primary goal of great powers is survival within an anarchic world where all states 
5 See:
• Bijian, Z. 2005. China's “Peaceful Rise” to Great Power Status. In Foreign   Affairs , 84(5): 18-24.
• Kristof, N.D. 1993. The Rise of China. In Foreign Affairs, 72(5): 59-74.
• Roy, D. 1994. Hegemon on the Horizon?: China's Threat to East Asian Security. In  International Security, 
19(1): 149-168.
6 Note that the list of works relating to this subject is exhaustive, however two highly recommend sources are:
• Ross, R.S. & Feng, Z. 2008.  China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics. New 
York: Cornell University Press.
• Finn, J.D. 2007. China-U.S. Economic and Geopolitical Relations. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
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inherently possess some military capability. This goal is the overriding factor that defines all great 
power relations. Whilst other goals exist, they are only supportive of and secondary to the primary 
goal. The role of robust economic relations, resources in conflict and non-state actors are variables 
with uncertain importance in the decision making processes of states. These variables have overly 
complicated the analyses undertaken elsewhere, creating flawed impressions of security based on 
flawed concepts of the nature and aims of states. Offensive Realism enables an efficient and clear 
understanding of  the  state  and its  core  aims.  Thus an analysis  based on an Offensive Realism 
framework provides a clear unambiguous understanding of the potential for conflict.
Utilizing Offensive Realism as a framework, this paper examines the SCS as a  potential flashpoint 
for the escalation of an international incident into conflict between the U.S. and China. The exact 
role and contribution of tension to the region on the national opinion, strategic and tactical level of 
either state and the Offensive Realism interpretation of these variables are used in determining the 
role that the SCS region has on escalating Sino-U.S. tensions. Offensive Realism defines the scope 
and framework of the study undertaken with a clear focus on latent and actual power dynamics 
within an anarchic international system. Where the study deviates from the framework of Offensive 
Realism it is to account for those variables which enhance the conclusions reached by the theory in 
terms  of  the  threat  rating  that  exists  between  states.  This  is  done through  the  examination  of 
national opinion and related debates. Although Offensive Realism does not distinguish between 
“imminent” and “general” threat types, in determining the potential of a region as a flashpoint this 
distinction becomes integral. A tentative prediction of the future of  Sino-U.S. relations in general 
and in the region is then made with the aim of informing policy discourse and to test the validity of  
the analysis made here.
The report proceeds with an historical overview of the SCS dispute that establishes the context in 
which Sino-U.S. relations in the SCS occur. In particular the complexities of the law of claims 
established  by  the  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea  (UNCLOS)  and  its 
contribution towards tension in the region, followed by a detailed historical review of the SCS 
dispute and how the U.S. came to be involved. The evolution of the dispute is then laid out in three 
stages that serve to indicate the limitations of each party's claim. The resultant analysis indicates the 
political,  as opposed to legal, nature of the dispute and the role of the U.S. with respect to the 
claimants.
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The  key  features  of  Offensive  Realism are  next  established with  the  central  aim to  provide  a 
framework to understand and interpret the behaviour of the U.S. and China. To this end the basic 
assumptions  of  Offensive  Realism  and  the  differences  between  latent  and  actual  power  are 
explained with a view towards establishing a framework for understanding the relative threats that 
China, with its preponderance of latent power, and the U.S., with its significant actual power, pose 
to each other. The archetypal strategies of war, buck-passing and balancing employed by rising and 
status quo powers are next set forth as a tool of reference for understanding the behaviour of China 
and the U.S. respectively. According to Offensive Realism the structure of the system determines 
the likelihood of war, this is examined as a means to establish whether the U.S. and China meet this 
criteria. The relevancy of Offensive Realism in the twenty-first century is then established against 
counter arguments that claim it to be an outmoded theory, thus arguing for its continued relevancy 
and usage here; and as an extension of this argument the prediction made by Mearsheimer of the 
future of Sino-U.S. relations in the twenty-first century is explained in detail to provide a cross 
reference for the conclusions of this report.
The rise of China and the U.S. reaction are then analysed in two separate sections respectively, both 
sections proceed to examine three points of interaction that will be used in determining the potential 
of the SCS to act as a flashpoint for conflict: (1) the “national opinion” and debate regarding each 
other in the SCS, (2) the “strategies” being employed by either side regarding the SCS and the 
relationship generally, and (3) the “tactics” being employed in the SCS specifically. For China this 
means an investigation of: its national leadership and opinion and the position of its most vocal 
actor the PLA on the U.S. involvement in the SCS, China's latent power and actual power, its tactics 
of Zonal defence and A2AD in the SCS and its relationship to its regional neighbours. For the U.S. 
an investigation of: U.S. domestic politics and the “Pivot” to Asia, the state declared strategy of 
“constructive engagement,” and the validity of the inferred tactic of “containment” and the U.S. 
relationship to the potential power balancers in the region. 
These three points of interaction are then juxtaposed, in a separate section, at the national opinion, 
strategic and tactical level in order to determine their effect on tension. The relationship between the 
three levels is established utilizing a supportive top-down method starting from the high-level of 
national debate, to the mid-level of government strategy and policy and finally to the low-level or 
tactics employed in the theatre. The failure of one level to promote peace leads to dependence upon 
the next level, until the tactical level is reached in which the highest potential for conflict exists.  
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Therefore the failure to promote peace at one level may be compensated for at another level. Hence 
the  likelihood  of  conflict  occurring  in  the  SCS  and  thus  the  region  acting  as  a  flashpoint  is  
established utilizing three levels of state engagement. The findings reached are reinforced through 
interviews with prominent academics in related fields and researchers at  premier security research 
institutes in the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia. 
The  conclusion  proceeds  to  interpret  these  findings  utilizing  the  precepts  established  by  the 
theoretical framework in terms of the general relationship between the U.S. and China and their 
specific  interaction  in  the  SCS.  The  contribution  of  “imminent”  and  “general”  threats  to  this 
analysis and Offensive Realism in general is established and the potential for conflict in the region 
between the U.S. and China is thereby determined.
2. Regional Context
2.1. The Law of claims
The law of claims is defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
The law as it stands and its effect upon the SCS claimants actions and national policies is addressed 
here. As all states involved in the dispute are signatories to UNCLOS, all base their claims either 
partly or entirely on it. As Alice D. Ba (2011: 271) points out UNCLOS has mixed effects on the 
dispute. On the one hand, it provides a common legal framework and referent as all states involved 
in the SCS dispute are now signatories and base their claims either partly or entirely on it. On the 
other, UNCLOS has also been a source of new claims, as well as a precipitating driver of disputes 
in recent years, as states seek to establish and consolidate their maritime holdings and jurisdictions 
under this relatively new maritime regime. 
Further, the nature of international law demands that states actively maintain their claims, especially 
when challenged by other states (Fravel 2011: 300). The effect of this measure is that for every 
claim there must be a counter claim. To not submit a counter claim would be tantamount to tacit  
acknowledgement or recognition of an opposing party's claims. The bases for this point being Part 
V, Article 59 of UNCLOS (1994) Basis for the resolution of conflicts regarding the attribution of  
rights  and jurisdiction  in  the  exclusive  economic  zone,  which  states  that  “in  cases  where  this 
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Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal State or to other States within the 
exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises between the interests of the coastal State and any 
other State or States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all the  
relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the interests involved to 
the  parties as  well  as  to  the  international  community  as  a  whole.”  As  Womack  (2011:  374) 
indicates the method of establishing territorial claims in international law has the pernicious effect 
of maximizing confrontation and hostility. Each state claims more than it occupies, and given the 
absence of population, unchallenged occupation is nine-tenths of the law. Thus he concludes that 
each party has an incentive to increase its presence and to protest the occupation by others.
Womack (2011: 374) cites the 4 March 2011 as an example. The Philippines claimed that Chinese 
patrol boats harassed a Filipino oil exploration vessel in waters off Reed Bank near Palawan Island. 
The Philippines scrambled military aircraft, but no violence occurred. To China this appeared to be 
Philippine trespassing, and to the Philippines it appeared to be China flexing its muscles, but in fact 
the actions of both were dictated by their claims. If the Philippines never acted as if its territorial 
claims  were  genuine,  their  claims  would  be  dismissed  as  hollow.  If  China  did  not  challenge 
Philippine oil exploration, that could be taken as an implicit admission of the legitimacy of the 
Philippine claim and abandonment of it's own.
Thus  when  understanding  the  action  of  a  claimant,  in  particular  the  PRC  as  relates  to  U.S. 
involvement,  this  being  the  concern  of  this  paper,  due  consideration  must  be  given  to  policy 
decisions undertaken to maintain or strengthen a claim and policy decisions designed as a response 
to U.S. pressure. In other words, is the policy decision in question targeted at strengthening or 
maintaining the PRC's regional dynamics as relating to the South East Asian region and its member 
states or directed at a broader international question of the PRC's regional hegemony relative to the 
U.S. and the rise of China as a global hegemon. Either of which actions may influence either or 
both of these spheres of policy concern. And in Womack's words “Law, not ambition, drives the 
petty crises” (2011: 374).
2.2. Region and Claimants
The  SCS dispute  is  a  regional  dispute  occurring  between  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  the 
Republic of China (Taiwan), Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei; otherwise known as 
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the SCS Conflict7. It is a territorial dispute over the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the SCS 
and its accompanying rights and jurisdictions, and the ownership of the Islands and Islets located 
within the sea.
The SCS is defined by the International Hydrographic Bureau (Global Security 2011) as the body of 
water stretching in a Southwest to Northeast direction, whose southern border is 3 degrees South 
latitude between South Sumatra and Kalimantan (Karimata Straits), and whose northern border is 
the Strait of Taiwan from the northern tip of Taiwan to the Fukien coast of China8. The area includes 
more than 200 small islands, rocks, and reefs, with the majority located in the Paracel and Spratly 
Island chains. The Spratlys link the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. All its islands are coral, 
low and small, about 5 to 6 meters above water, spread over 160,000 to 180,000 square kilometres 
of sea zone (or 12 times that of the Paracels), with a total land area of 10 square kilometres only. 
The Paracels also has a total land area of 10 square kilometres spread over a sea zone of 15,000 to 
16,000 square kilometres 
The SCS region is the world's second busiest international sea lane. More than half of the world's 
supertanker traffic passes through the region's waters. In addition, the SCS region contains oil and 
gas resources strategically located near large energy-consuming countries.  Many of these islands 
are partially submerged islets, rocks, and reefs that are little more than shipping hazards not suitable 
for  habitation.  The  islands  are  important,  however,  for  strategic  and political  reasons,  because 
ownership claims to them are used to bolster claims to the surrounding sea and its resources. 
The SCS is rich in natural resources such as oil and natural gas. These resources have garnered 
attention throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Until recently, East Asia's economic growth rates had 
been among the highest in the world, and despite the current economic crisis, economic growth 
prospects in  the long-term remain among the best in  the world.  This economic growth will  be 
accompanied by an increasing demand for energy. Over the next 20 years, oil consumption among 
developing Asian countries is expected to rise by 4% annually on average, with about half of this 
increase coming from China. If this growth rate is maintained, oil demand by these nations will 
reach 25 million barrels per day, more than double current consumption levels, by 2020 (Xu 2013).
Almost of all of this additional Asian oil demand, as well as Japan's oil needs, will need to be 
7 Refer to Map 2: Claims and Occupied Features in the South China Sea.
8 Refer to Map 1: The South China Sea Detailed Map.
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imported from the Middle East and Africa, and to pass through the strategic Strait of Malacca into 
the SCS. Countries in the Asia-Pacific region depend on seaborne trade to fuel  their  economic 
growth, and this has led to the sea's transformation into one of the world's busiest shipping lanes. 
Over  half  of  the  world's  merchant  fleet  (by  tonnage)  sails  through  the  SCS  every  year.  The 
economic  potential  and geopolitical  importance  of  the  SCS region  has  resulted  in  “jockeying” 
between the surrounding nations to claim this sea and its resources for themselves (Global Security 
2011).
Military skirmishes have occurred numerous times in  the past  three decades.  The most  serious 
occurred in 1976, when China invaded and captured the Paracel Islands from Vietnam, and in 1988, 
when Chinese and Vietnamese navies clashed at Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands, sinking several 
Vietnamese boats and killing over 70 sailors. With more recent confrontations occurring between 
China and the U.S.A., particularly the April 2001 EP-3 surveillance aircraft incident in which one 
Chinese pilot was killed and a U.S. flight crew endangered, and the March of 2009 “Impeccable 
Incident” in which a U.S. hydrographic vessel was surrounded and harassed by five Chinese vessels 
(Goldstein 2011: 322). This event garnered significant international attention and arguably caused 
the region to rise on the U.S.A.'s list of priorities as a potential conflict region.
The disputed regions can be divided as follows between the three archipelagos and the Macclesfield 
and Scarborough Shoal that lie within the SCS9:
• The  Spratly  Islands,  disputed  between  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  the  Republic  of 
China,  and  Vietnam,  with  Malaysia,  Brunei,  and  the  Philippines  claiming  part  of  the 
archipelago.
• The  Paracel  Islands,  disputed  between  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  the  Republic  of 
China, and Vietnam. 
• The Pratas Islands,  dispute between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of 
China 
• The Macclesfield Bank, disputed between the People's Republic of China, the Republic of 
China, the Philippines, and Vietnam. 
• The Scarborough Shoal, disputed between the People's Republic of China, the Philippines, 
and the Republic of China 
9 Refer to Map 2: Claims and Occupied Features in the South China Sea
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2.3. History
Dependant  upon  the  source,  an  historical  account  of  the  conflict  in  the  SCS  is  potentially 
significantly varied. However three generalized stages to the development of the SCS Conflict can 
be determined in the development of this history, in aid of analysis. The first stage is the record of  
claims  and  territorial  delineations  made  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  a  regional  dispute  within 
international law, generally occurring post WWII (1945) towards the beginning of the 1970s. The 
second stage marks the commencement of an international dispute in which cross-jurisdictional 
claims are made and are defended politically and militarily, constituting the initiation/beginning of 
what is now referred to as the SCS Dispute, this period being defined from the 1970s towards the 
start of the increased activism of the U.S. in 2009/10. The third stage, which forms the central 
concern of this paper, is the “centralization of Sino-U.S. tensions” as to the outcome of the regional 
dispute. This is opposed to alternative lexicons which prioritize the US as forming a party to the 
dispute, or as reorienting the conflict to be that of an international conflict between China and the 
U.S. (a superpower struggle)10. 
Whilst each claimant to the region indicates their claim to be an integral and historically contiguous 
part of the state, due to the nature of the law of claims; the actual evolution of the claims can be 
delineated  via  the  associated  international  treaties  post-independence,  initial  government 
declarations of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and Continental Shelves, and the official dates 
on which respective claims were forwarded11
2.3.1. The First Stage
The first stage of the conflict, or pre-conflict period, is defined by five sets of government and inter-
governmental  documents  that  indicate  the  status  of  the  concerned  states  claims  and  more 
specifically that no territorial dispute was yet readily apparent until the 1970s, with the singular 
exception of the Paracel and Spratly Islands between China and South Vietnam. These documents 
10 Note that this sectional account of the SCS conflict is an analytical tool utilized by the author, which whilst may 
contain factual episodic events, does not in itself reference any salient and agreed to stage of development in the  
conflict between the parties.
11 These documents do not necessarily indicate legitimacy of claims, but rather the chronological order in which 
claims were brought to the attention of the international community;with the concession that prior to these dates 
legitimate, though not official claims according to international law, did potentially exist.
10
include the 1947 9-dash line map of the PRC and ROC, the Treaty of Paris  (1898),  Treaty of  
Washington (1900) and the  1973 Philippine  Constitution,  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Vietnam 
(North Vietnam) Prime Minister Pham Van Dong's  Diplomatic Note of 1958 to China,  and the 
continental shelf map published by the Malaysian Government prior to 1978.
The 9-dash line (or dotted-line) is a demarcation line used by China for its claim to territories and 
waters in the SCS, in particular over the Scarborough Shoal and the Paracel and Spratly Islands 
issued by the Kuomintang ROC government in 1947, which the PRC revised and adopted in 1949 
upon it coming to power and which the ROC continues to use as the basis for its claims till today 
(Xu  2013).  The  historical  legitimacy  of  the  line  is  claimed  by  China  to  be  based  on  survey 
expeditions, fishing activities and navel patrols dating as far back as the fifteenth century. The 9-
dash line serves as the basis for China's claim and the maximum extent of those claims. However 
the integrity of this  line as a basis  for China's  territorial  claim is  tenuous on two counts.  First 
relating to the practical application of the line, the dotted-line is vague as to what it denotes in terms 
of  the exact  area claimed or what  the area in question is  being claimed as.  Leaving questions 
unanswered regarding the area claimed were the lines to be joined in one continuous boundary, and 
whether the line refers to an inviolable border to China's sovereignty or a maritime boundary. China 
has yet to provide any clarity regarding any of these issues. Second relating to the legal context, the 
9-dash  line  was  only  officially  submitted  to  the  UN  on  7  May  2009;  following  which  the 
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia all issued official protests stating the claim to 
the whole of the SCS to be illegal. Further, dispute has arisen over whether historical claims are 
considered a legal basis for claims of sovereignty in UNCLOS (Vietnam.net Bridge 2011); and 
whether the 9-dash line fits the description of a national boundary found in international law, that of 
a defined line with specific geographic coordinates.
The territorial  limits  and boundaries  of  the  Philippines  were delineated  by the  Treaty  of  Paris 
(1898), the Treaty of Washington (1900) and the Treaty between Great Britain and the United States 
(1930) which effectively defined the Philippine Archipelago, which excluded the Spratly Islands 
from  the  Philippines  (Hisona  2012).  Post  independence,  the  Philippines  ratified  the  1973 
Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, both of which adhere to the “Archipelagic Doctrine” which 
according to  Article  1,  Section 1 provided that  “the  national  territory comprises  the Philippine 
archipelago...” (The Philippines 1987: 1). Of note in 1971 the Philippines officially claimed eight 
islands that it refers to as the Kalayaan, partly on the basis that these islands did not form part of the 
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Spratly Islands and were open to being claimed for lack of ownership (Global Security 2011). These 
were designated as part of the Palawan Province in 1972.
Vietnam inherited its claim to the Paracel and Spratly Island Archipelagos from the 1930s claim 
made  on  behalf  of  then  French  Indochina,  a  colony  of  France.  From  1954  to  1975  Vietnam 
effectively existed as the two separate states of North and South Vietnam. During this period South 
Vietnam continuously upheld its claim to these territories. However on 4 September 1958, after 
occupying the Amphitrite Group in the eastern Paracel Islands, China issued a statement on its 
twelve-nautical-mile territorial waters, including around both the Paracel and Spratly Islands (Linh 
& Huy 2012). Prime Minister Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam affirmed this declaration from 
China regarding Chinese ownership of the archipelagos in the Eastern Sea (SCS). The diplomatic 
note was written on September 14 and was publicized on Nhan Dan newspaper on September 22, 
1958 (VietNam Bridge  2011)12.  Whilst  the  authenticity  of  the  letter  is  universally  accepted,  its 
context and legal legitimacy is disputed. In either case until 1975, North Vietnam was mute upon its  
claim to the SCS archipelagos and only South Vietnam openly claimed the Spratly Islands, after 
which  the  state  of  South  Vietnam  ceased  to  exist.  Therefore  Vietnam's  claim,  in  its  modern 
incarnation, only came into being in 197513.
Malaysia's  claims are based upon the continental  shelf  principle,  with clearly defined boarders, 
consequently occupying three islands that its considers to be within its continental shelf. However 
prior to 1978 the Malaysian government's defined continental shelf did not include any part of the 
Spratly Archipelago (Officer of the Geographer 2013: 2-3). Interestingly Malaysia has tried to build 
up one atoll by brining soil from the mainland and has built a hotel on this location (Global Security 
2011).
12 A copy of the letter may be found at  http://english.vietnamnet.vn/en/special-report/10961/diplomatic-note-1958-
with-vietnam-s-sovereignty-over-paracel—spratly-islands.html.
13 Note, as above indicated,  the discussion here presented does not in itself reference any salient and agreed to stage 
of development in the conflict between the parties; but rather indicates the transition from inactive claims to active  
claims.
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2.3.2. The Second Stage
The second stage of the conflict can rightly be indicated as beginning in the 1970s during which the 
claims by China, the ROC, the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam became active and assertive. 
China seized the entire Paracel Island group from South Vietnam in 1974; and as indicated above 
the  Philippines  in  1971  incorporated  the  8  Spratly  Islands  (or  the  Kalayaan)  into  its  Palawan 
Province; Vietnam after 1975 renewed its claim to the entire Paracel and Spratly Archipelago based 
upon historical and continental shelf claims; and Malaysia in 1978 adjusted its continental shelf to 
include three islands. However three seminal events define this stage in the development of the 
dispute: (1) the 1988 entrance of China into the Spratly Archipelago; (2) the "Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zones" Law passed by China on 25 February 1992; and (3) in 2002 ASEAN and China 
agreed to a code of conduct in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DoC). 
By the late 1970s Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Philippines had occupied almost twenty islands and 
reefs between them. Whilst in contrast, despite its 1951 and 1958 claims to the Spratly Islands,  
China did not occupy any of these features; and its position in the SCS remained weak even after 
consolidating its control over the Paracels. With the occupation of the Spratly Archipelago features 
continuing  unabated  into  the  1980s,  there  came  a  subsequent  increase  in  interest  concerning 
maritime  rights  in  Asia.  Consequently  China's  leaders  decided  in  early  1987  to  establish  a 
permanent position in the region by occupying nine vacant features (Fravel 2011: 298). This plan 
was executed in January of 1988 with the occupation of Fiery Cross (Yongshu) Reef by a People's  
Liberation Army (PLA) Navy task force. This action sparked a race to seize unoccupied reefs in the 
area, culminating on 14 March 1988 in a clash over Johnson (Chigua) Reef, which saw seventy-four 
Vietnamese killed and China in control of six of the nine features in the original plan. The race to 
occupy additional features and increase military presence between rival claimant states continued 
unabated into the 1990s, which culminated with China's occupation of Mischief (Meiji) Reef in late 
1994. After which China, and the rival claimants, began a process to consolidate it's position in the 
Spratly Archipelago; and manage the diplomatic consequences of the occupations.
The process of consolidation and managing the diplomatic damage of this period led ultimately to 
two processes:  the  passing  of  the   Territorial  Sea and Contiguous  Zone Law by  China  on 25 
February 1992; and of signing, in 2002, a code of conduct between the Association of South East 
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Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China called the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS. 
The Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Law claimed all the islands in the SCS as belonging to 
China, specifically the Diaoyu Islands (Pratas Islands), the Penghu Islands, the Dongsha Islands, the 
Xisha Islands (Paracel Islands), the Zhongsha Islands (Macclesfield Bank) and the Nansha Islands 
(Spratly  Islands)14 (China  Military  Online  2006).  At  the  time  of  the  law passing  China  was  a 
signatory to UNCLOS III, without ratification. In particular regards to this paper, Article 615 of the 
1992 law is  inconsistent  with  UNCLOS,  stating:  “Foreign  ships  for  military  purposes  shall  be 
subject to approval by the Government of the People's Republic of China for entering the territorial 
sea of  the People's  Republic  of  China”.  In contrast  UNCLOS states  that  “innocent  passage” is 
defined  as  passing  through  waters  in  an  expeditious  and  continuous  manner,  which  is  not 
"prejudicial to the peace, good order or the security" of the coastal state; and makes no mention of 
ships of a particular class being exempt from the rule of innocent passage, including military class 
ships  (Kim  1994:  902).  Fishing,  polluting,  weapons  practice,  and  spying  are  not  considered 
"innocent". China ratified UNCLOS III on 6 June 1996, and has hitherto failed to amend the 1992 
law on Territorial Seas to make it consistent with the convention.
In 2002  ASEAN and China agreed to a code of conduct in the  Declaration on the Conduct of  
Parties in the SCS16;  which was the result of a decade of managing the diplomatic costs of its 
assertiveness in the Spratly Archipelago. The  Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS 
provides  for  an  amicable  environment  in  which  parties  to  the  dispute  may  cooperate,  this  is 
according to Article 6 which allows for activities such as marine environmental protection, marine 
scientific research, safety of navigation and communication at sea, search and rescue operations and 
combating transnational crime including but not limited to trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy and 
armed  robbery  at  sea,  and  illegal  traffic  in  arms.  Moreover,  Article  5  commits  the  parties  to 
“refrain” from inhabiting currently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals and cays. The code of conduct 
develops  further  and  makes  formal  (de  jure)  what  had  been  a  de  facto diplomatic  peace  and 
understanding. Thus  whilst  confrontations  involving  opposing  government  naval  patrol  and 
enforcement  agencies  or  “white  hulls”  may continue to  occur  on a  regular  basis,  especially  in 
regards  to  fishing  rights;  skirmishes  between  military  vessels  or  “grey  hulls”  have  become 
14 See Maps 1 and 2
15 Copy of the 1992  Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Law can be found at 
http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2006-04/20/content_460094.htm 
16 Copy  of  the  2002   Declaration  on  the  Conduct  of  Parties  in  the  SCS can  be  found  at 
http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-
sea.
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somewhat less common, with a preference towards joint military exercises between parties to the 
dispute and the U.S.A. In contrast, the code of conduct, whilst stabilizing the situation does not 
provide for a forum for negotiation or a road forward to resolving the dispute. 
2.3.3. The Third Stage
The transition to the third stage in the development of the conflict, defined as the “centralization of 
Sino-U.S. tensions” was initiated by the events of the (1) 1 April 2001 (Hainan Island incident) and 
March  2009  (Impeccable  Incident).  This  stage  further  developed  when,  following  the  recent 
increase in tensions, (2) there emerged the “core interest” and the “national interest” statements 
concerning the SCS from China and the U.S. respectively.  Note that despite Sino-U.S. tensions 
receiving preferential attention in the dispute, relations between the claimants have continued to 
develop, particularly with the signing of the July 2011 guidelines for implementing the 2002 DoC.
On 1 April 2001 an American EP-3 surveillance aircraft was operating 110 km from the PRC island  
province of Hainan and about 160 km from the Chinese military installation in the Paracel Islands, 
when it was intercepted by two J-8 fighters. A collision between the EP-3 and one of the J-8s caused 
the death of the PRC pilot and the EP-3 was forced to make an emergency landing in Hainan. The 
24 crew members were detained and interrogated by the Chinese authorities until an intentionally 
ambiguous statement was delivered by the U.S. government regarding the incident, allowing both 
countries to save face whilst simultaneously defusing a potentially volatile situation. 
Of note here is not the actual repercussions of the event, but rather that it was a clear demonstration  
of contrasting interpretations of UNCLOS17. Part V, Article 58 in relation to Exclusive Economic 
Zones (EEZs) states: “all States... enjoy... the freedoms... of navigation and overflight," but notes 
that "States... shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State...in so far as  
they  are  not  incompatible  with  this  Part."  (United  Nations  1982).  The  PRC  interprets  the 
Convention as allowing it to preclude other nations' military operations within this area, while the 
United States maintains that the Convention grants free navigation for all countries' aircraft and 
ships, including military aircraft and ships, within a country's exclusive economic zone.
17 The U.S.A is a signatory of the treaty, but has yet to ratify it. However it operates within the provisions of 
UNCLOS.
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On 5 March 2009 the USNS Impeccable was in the SCS monitoring submarine activity when it was 
approached by a PLA Navy Chinese Intelligence frigate which proceeded to harass it. By 7 March 
the Intelligence ship contacted the Impeccable informing it  that  its  operations  were illegal  and 
instructed  the  Impeccable  to  leave  the  area  or  “suffer  the  consequences”.  By the  8 March the 
Impeccable was being shadowed and harassed by five ships (a Bureau of Maritime Fisheries Patrol 
Vessel, a State Oceanographic Administration patrol vessel, a People's Liberation Army Navy ocean 
surveillance ship, and two Chinese-flagged naval trawlers). During this incident the Impeccable 
indicated its intention to leave the area, and requested safe passage to do so. During its attempt to 
leave it  was further  harassed by attempts to  grapple its  towed sonar array.  By 12 March 2009 
President Obama directed the guided missile destroyer the USS Chung-Hoon to the SCS to protect 
the Impeccable while operating in that area. This incident further strained relations between the two 
countries over the SCS, and further entrenched and contrasted the countries' differing interpretations 
of UNCLOS over Freedom of Navigation (FON).
In April of 2010 the New York Times reported that China had described the SCS as a “core interest” 
equivalent to Tibet and Taiwan. It related that during a visit by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State 
James Steinberg and National Security Council Advisor Jeffrey Bader to Beijing in March 2010 
they were told that “China would not tolerate any interference in the SCS, now part of China's 'core 
interest' of sovereignty” (Goldstein 2011: 322). The Chinese officials making these assertions were 
Assistant minister for Foreign Affairs Cui Tiankai and State Councillor Dai Bingguo. Beijing claims 
that  Steinberg  and  Bader  misinterpreted  these  remarks.  These  encounters  constitute  private 
meetings,  and to  date  no senior  Chinese leader  has ever  publicly described the SCS as  a core 
interest (Swaine 2011: 11).
The second statement was made on 23 July 2010 at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi, 
Vietnam by then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (Clinton 2010): 
I’d like to briefly outline our perspective on this issue [the SCS]. The United States, like every  
nation, has a national interest in Freedom of Navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons,  
and  respect  for  international  law  in  the  SCS.  We  share  these  interests  not  only  with  ASEAN  
members or ASEAN Regional Forum participants, but with other maritime nations and the broader  
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international community.
The statement conveyed a similar message as the “core interest” statement had from China, i.e. that 
the  SCS was a  National  Interest  concern  for  the  U.S.  According to  Goldstein  (2011:  322)  the 
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi was supposedly furious. Following the ARF the PLA Chief of 
the General Staff Chen Bingde was quoted as saying: “We must pay close attention to changes in 
[regional]  situations  and  the  development  of  our  mission  [and]  prepare  ourselves  for  military 
struggle”. Thus Sino-U.S. relations became somewhat inflamed with specifically concerning the 
SCS, with both having now committed themselves to the region.
2.4. The U.S. position
Whilst the Chinese concerns in the SCS are well understood, even if its specific claims and their 
legitimacy are not; the U.S. position in the SCS lacks clarity. Since Barack Obama assumed office  
in  2008 Asia has assumed the top priority  for U.S.  foreign policy.  The President  proceeded to 
participate in the U.S.-ASEAN dialogue and the East Asian Summit in Indonesia, and hosted the 
APEC meeting in Hawaii. Further the U.S. signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation prior to 
participating in the East Asia Summit and ties have been strengthened with almost every Southeast 
Asian state (Percival 2012).
The recent clashes with China in the SCS only added impetus to the new U.S. position, where 
defending FON now ranks with “countering the proliferation efforts of North Korea, or ensuring 
transparency in the military activities of the region's key players” (Clinton 2011). FON, according 
to  Goldstein  (2011:  380),  has  become the  symbol  of  the  new U.S.  concern  regarding  China's 
military  strength.  Which  he  points  out  that  even  though  it  is  not  identical  to  Southeast  Asian 
concerns, China is the common focus, with both the U.S. and the regional states desiring the other's  
support, as concerns grow over China's capacity to become a regional hegemon beyond the reach of 
global intervention. As Goldstein (2011: 381) aptly states “The United States does not want to be a 
global power minus one region, and Southeast Asia does not want to be alone in China's backyard”.  
This historical overview demonstrates that no clear solution exists in law, that no party's claim is 
stronger than another's  and ultimately that the conflict  is purely a political  one concerned with 
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geostrategic, political and potential economic concerns.
3. Theoretical Framework
Offensive  Realism,  as  developed  by  John  J.  Mearsheimer,  represents  a  significant  yet  highly 
controversial structural theory that explains state behaviour in international politics. Mearsheimer 
extrapolates Offensive realism in his seminal work The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), in 
which he explains how the structure of the international political system creates a context in which 
states, as sovereign entities, compete within an anarchic system in which they are forced to struggle 
for power. He proceeds to elaborate on the impact of wealth (latent power) and power (military 
capacity) in the decision making processes of states and how this translates into the strategies that 
great powers utilize in attaining and maintaining regional hegemony through such methods as war, 
balancing and buck-passing. As the pre-eminent theory in the study of power politics, realism is the 
best descriptor of state behaviour as relates to balancing and buck-passing in great powers' pursuit 
and  maintenance  of  regional  hegemony.  Within  realism  three  major  schools  of  thought  exist: 
Human  Nature  Realism  (Morgenthau18),  Defensive  Realism  (Waltz19)  and  Offensive  Realism 
(Mearsheimer20).  And as  relates  to  the  post-Cold  War  inter-state  paradigm,  it  is  Mearsheimer's 
Offensive Realism that has most advanced the development of the theory.  
Whilst being heavily criticized, its constituent parts remain highly resilient. In particular the core 
assumptions upon which Offensive Realism is based (Mearsheimer 2001: 30): (1) the international 
system is anarchic; (2) great powers inherently possess some military capability;  (3) States can 
never be certain about other states' intentions; (4) survival is the primary goal of great powers; and 
(5) great powers are rational actors. In fact the theory is still utilized, if reluctantly, unknowingly or 
without acknowledgement, as the core discourse that analysts and intellectuals alike project their 
theories and postulations in favour of or against. Prominent examples of which that debate the role 
of Realist theory in specific regard to U.S./China relations include, but are not limited to, Paul et al 
(2004) Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, Ross and Johnston (2006) New 
Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy, Ross and Nathan (1998) The Great Wall and the  
Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security,  Kissinger (2005)  China: Containment won't work, 
Logan (2013) China, America and the Pivot to Asia, and Kaplan (2011) The SCS is the Future of  
18 Hans Morgenthau in Politics Among Nations (1948)
19 Kenneth Waltz in Theory of International Politics (1979)
20 John J. Mearsheimer in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001)
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Conflict21. The mere fact that the current discourse concerning the “Rise of China” proceeds along 
the lines of whether the U.S. should balance against China or if in fact whether the U.S. is already 
successfully balancing against China and whether this  may either be a prudent or ill-conceived 
strategy to  adopt  further  illustrates  the  centrality  of  realist  themes  to  the  public  discourse  and 
academic analysis in international politics. 
From  the  perspective  of  this  author  the  prominence  and  continued  resilience  of  realism  as  a 
descriptor of international politics, despite the negative view it portrays of the position in which 
humanity finds itself, and despite the significant discomfort felt by most students of the subject (a 
discomfort that even prompted Mearsheimer himself to label his work “The Great Tragedy...”), is 
the postulation of the obvious made tangible. That is it describes, with the logic of Occam's Razor22, 
the basis for great power behaviour. It is the simplification of theory down to its finite principles 
and basic logic, without extenuating factors. Thereby forming the bases upon which the logic of 
international relations theory as whole works off of. As few can deny its basic principles, it is this 
dimension to Realism that grants it its undeniable resilience in the face of unrelenting opposition. A 
theory  that  speaks  to  the  basest  needs  of  survival23,  and thereby offends our  highest  needs  for 
aestheticism, human edification and enlightenment. 
In  terms of great  power conflict  Realism and in particular  Offensive Realism remains  the best 
descriptor for the general rise in tensions between great powers as they begin to challenge the global 
power distribution24. The aim here is not to provide an in-depth analysis and criticism of Offensive 
Realism that has been engaged in by Paul et al (2004), Peter Toft (2003), Jonathan Kirshner (2012) 
and Yuan-Kang Wang (2004), but rather to utilize the value that the theory, as set out, contributes to 
the current international anarchy that prevails. Whilst the contributions made by these authors are 
acknowledged, their focus on analysing and criticizing Offensive Realism only serves to emphasize 
21 This does not imply agreement between these authors, only that realist precepts are placed either in juxtaposition to 
or in support of their arguments. 
22 Among competing hypotheses, the hypothesis with the fewest assumptions should be selected – The razor states  
that one should proceed to simpler theories until simplicity can be traded for greater explanatory power. However  
the simplest available theory need not be the most accurate.
23 A superficial analysis of the development of realism from Morgenthau through Waltz and to Mearsheimer may 
illustrate a continuing narrative to identify, defend and own the unfortunate situation that sovereign states (and 
ultimately their citizens) find themselves in.
24 Alternative  theories  considered  inappropriate,  in  addition  to  Waltz's  Defensive  Realism  and  Morgenthau's 
Classical/Human realism,  include:  Liberalism (including  Liberal  Internationalism,  Liberal  Institutionalism,  and 
their  subordinate/dependent  theories  of  Complex  Interdependence  Theory,  Globalisation  theory,  Pluralism, 
Rationalism and in particular the Neoliberalism as defined by Joseph Nye and Robert  Keohane in  Power and 
Interdependence and Keohane's  After Hegemony) which does not fit  the framework of the study; and Realism 
subordinate/dependent theories such as: Hegemonic Stability Theory, Balance of Power Theory, Game Theory and 
Power Transition Theory; which core and relevant principles are encompassed within Offensive Realism.
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the impact of the theory itself and its centrality to the public discourse. Thus the theory of Offensive 
Realism as proposed by Mearsheimer is utilized as a framework for understanding the SCS as a 
flashpoint for conflict. 
3.1.1. Offensive Realism explained
Mearsheimer summarizes his theory as follows “The ultimate aim of [of great powers] is to be the 
hegemon – that is, the only great power in the system. Great powers are rarely content with the 
current distribution of power; on the contrary, they face a constant incentive to change it in their 
favour. They almost always have revisionist intentions and they will use force to alter the balance of 
power if they think it can be done at a reasonable price. At times, the costs and risks of trying to 
shift  the  balance  of  power  are  too  great,  forcing  great  powers  to  wait  for  more  favourable 
circumstances. But the desire for more power does not go away, unless a state achieves the ultimate 
goal of hegemony” (Mearsheimer 2001: 2). “This unrelenting pursuit of power means that great 
powers are inclined to look for opportunities to alter the distribution of world power in their favour. 
They will seize these opportunities if they have the necessary capability. Simply put great powers 
are primed for offence. But not only does a great power seek to gain power at the expense of other  
states, it also tries to thwart rivals bent on gaining power at its expense. Thus, a great power will 
defend  the  balance  of  power  when  looming  change  favours  another  state,  and  it  will  try  to 
undermine the balance when the direction of change is in its own favour” (Mearsheimer 2001: 3).
Why do great powers behave this  way? The structure of the international system forces states, 
which seek only to be secure, to nonetheless act aggressively toward each other. As a structuralist 
theory Offensive Realism is based upon five assumptions, enumerated above, regarding the basis of 
the  structure  of  the  international  system  (Mearsheimer  2001:  30).  The  first  three  of  these 
assumptions combine to cause states to fear one another. Given this fear – which can never be 
wholly eliminated – states recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the 
better their chances of survival. Indeed, the guarantee of survival is to be a hegemon, because no 
other state can seriously threaten such a mighty power (Mearsheimer 2001: 3).
Three general patterns of behaviour result (Mearsheimer 2001: 32): (1) fear, (2) self-help and (3) 
power maximization in terms of relative power25. That states maximize relative power is tantamount 
25 States are concerned with the relative distribution of power between states, as opposed to the absolute accumulation 
of power.
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to  arguing  that  states  are  disposed  to  think  offensively  toward  other  states,  even  though  their 
ultimate motive is simply to survive. In short, great powers have aggressive intentions due to the 
zero-sum  competition  for  power  required  to  survive  (Mearsheimer  2001:  34).  However  great 
powers are not mindless aggressors so bent on gaining power that they charge headlong into losing 
wars  or  pursue  Pyrrhic  victories.  Instead  states  display  calculated  aggression,  whereby  despite 
possessing  the  capability  to  gain  advantage  over  a  rival  power,  nevertheless  decides  that  the 
perceived costs of offence are too high and do not justify the expected benefits (Mearsheimer 2001: 
37).
States  that  achieve  regional  hegemony  seek  to  prevent  great  powers  in  other  regions  from 
duplicating their feat. Regional hegemons, in other words, do not want peers (Mearsheimer 2001: 
41). Regional hegemons attempt to check aspiring hegemons in other regions because they fear that 
a  rival  great  power  that  dominates  its  own  region  will  be  an  especially  powerful  foe  that  is  
essentially free to cause trouble in the fearful great power's backyard. Regional hegemons prefer 
that there be at least two great powers located together in other regions, because their proximity will 
force  them  to  concentrate  their  attention  on  each  other  rather  than  on  the  distant  hegemon. 
Furthermore, if a potential hegemon emerges among them, the other great powers in that region 
might be able to contain it by themselves, allowing the distant hegemon to remain safely on the 
sidelines.  If  the  local  great  powers  are  unable  to  the  job,  the  distant  hegemon would  take  the 
appropriate  measures  to  deal  with  the  threatening  state.  (Mearsheimer  2001:  42).  Making  the 
regional  hegemon an offshore balancer.  Note that  the U.S.  acts  as an offshore balancer26,  as  it 
displays no indication that wishes to expand its territory and become a global hegemon and as such 
great powers (such as Germany and Japan) particularly in Europe and East Asia are not threatened 
by its  presence and do not balance against  the U.S. In contrast  great  powers that are potential 
hegemons, against which the U.S. balances, are threatened.
The more profound the fear is, the more intense is the security competition, and the more likely war 
is (Mearsheimer 2001: 42). The capability that states have to threaten each other, however, varies 
from case to case, and it is this key factor that drives fear levels up and down. Specifically, the more 
power a state possesses, the more fear it generates amongst its rivals (Mearsheimer 2001: 43).
26 An “Offshore Balancer” is a regional hegemon that blocks the rise of a peer competitor in distant areas of the globe. 
Note that states do not balance against an Offshore Balancer, as they possess no further imperial motives in the  
distant land. Offshore Balancers act as balancers of last resort should “Buck-passing” fail (Mearsheimer 2001: 236).
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3.1.2. Latent Power and Actual Power
Two forms of power play a role in Offensive Realism27. A state's latent power is based on the size of 
its population and the level of its wealth. A state's actual power is embedded primarily in its army 
and the air and naval forces that directly support it (Mearsheimer 2001: 43). Great powers balance 
against capabilities, not intentions. When a state surveys its environment to determine which states 
pose a threat to its survival, it focuses mainly on the offensive capabilities of potential rivals or 
actual power. Intentions are ultimately unknowable so states, that are worried about their survival, 
must make worst-case assumptions about their rivals'  intentions. In contrast capabilities can not 
only be measured, but also determine whether or not a rival state is a serious threat (Mearsheimer 
2001: 45).  
Whilst great powers pay significant attention to actual power in the form of the threat posed by 
existing military forces, careful attention is also paid to how much latent power rival states control, 
because rich and populous states usually can and do build powerful armies. Thus great powers tend 
to fear states with large populations and rapidly expanding economies, even if these states have not 
yet  translated their  wealth into military might  (Mearsheimer 2001: 45).  Latent  power therefore 
refers to the socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power and is largely based on 
a state's wealth and the overall size of its population. Population size matters because great powers 
require big armies, which can be raised only in countries with large populations. A country like 
Switzerland with a population of 7.9 million or Israel 7.7 million cannot achieve great power status 
in a world in which the U.S.A. with 311 million, India with 1.2 billion and China with 1.3 billion 
exist28 (World Bank 2013). Populations also have an important economic consequence, as larger 
populations can produce greater wealth. 
Wealth, in turn, is important because a state cannot build a powerful military if it does not have the 
money and technology to equip,  train,  and continually modernize its  fighting forces,  especially 
since the cost of waging great power wars is enormous (Mearsheimer 2001: 61). Great powers need 
money, technology, and personnel to build military forces and to fight wars, and a state's latent 
power refers to the raw potential it can draw on when competing with rival states (Mearsheimer 
2001: 55). Therefore the pursuit of economic growth is an extension of the primary goal of survival  
for great powers.
27 Power refers here to material capabilities rather than outcomes.
28 World bank statistics detail population numbers for 2011.
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3.2.1. Strategies for gaining power
Mearsheimer indicates that there are four strategies available to a potential regional hegemony to 
gain  power  (Mearsheimer  2001:  147,  153,  154):  (1)War,  (2)Blackmail,  (3)Bait  and Bleed,  and 
(4)Bloodletting.  Through  (1)  war  a  great  power  may  improve  its  relative  power  position  by 
defeating its potential rivals and further by exacting war reparations. Through (2) blackmail a state 
can gain power at a rival's expense without going to war by threatening to use military force against 
its opponent. This tactic is unlikely to achieve a marked shift in the balance of power between great 
powers which have formidable military power relative to each other. However blackmail is more 
likely to succeed against  minor  powers that  have no great  power ally.  (3) Bait  and Bleed is  a 
strategy that involves causing two rivals to engage in a protracted war, so that they “bleed” each 
other “white” while the “baiter” remains on the sidelines, with its military intact. However few 
cases of Bait and Bleed exist due to the difficulty of the “baiter” to not get exposed. The aim of (4) 
Bloodletting is to make sure that any war between one's rivals turns into a long and costly conflict 
that  saps  their  strength.  There  is  no  baiting  in  this  version,  the  rivals  have  gone  to  war 
independently, and the “bloodletter” is mainly concerned with causing its rivals to bleed each other 
white, while it stays out of the fighting.
War as a strategy for increasing a state's relative power became highly controversial in the post-
WWII era29. The criticism takes on three primary forms30: (1) that the risk of mutual annihilation in 
a nuclear war is too great, and that successful wars lead to Pyrrhic victories through either the (2) 
cost of war being too great or the (3) benefits being too limited. Whilst nuclear weapons do indeed 
act as a deterrent, making great power war less likely. They do not eliminate the potential for war 
altogether (Mearsheimer 2001: 147). Evidence for this can be taken from the Cold War, due to 
which  numerous  proxy wars  were  fought  between the  great  powers  of  the  U.S.  and U.S.S.R.,  
including the South African/Angola border war, the Vietnam War, Korean War, the Afghan-Soviet 
War, the Guatemalan and Nicaraguan Civil Wars and the Cuban Revolution which ultimately led to 
the Cuban Missile Crises. Thus illustrating not only that war is still a possibility, but that a proxy 
war may inadvertently spill over into a great power war.
The costs  and benefits  arguments  are invariably linked, as states contemplating aggression will 
29 The utility of war is an expansive subject in itself, whilst it will be briefly covered here, it is taken for the sake of  
this paper as still a viable strategy available to states.
30 Mearsheimer  includes  a  fourth:  that  aggressors  almost  always  lose.  He counters  by  indicating  that  states  that 
initiated war win 60 percent of the time. This conclusion is subject to Mearsheimer's particular analysis, of which  
there is not enough space here to verify.
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invariably weigh the expected costs and benefits. Undoubtedly there are circumstances in which the 
cost of aggression is high and the expected benefits small. In such cases it makes no sense to start a  
war  (Mearsheimer  2001:  148).  But  the  general  claim  that  war  almost  always  bankrupts  the 
aggressor and provides no tangible benefits holds little validity, as the modest list of wars above 
indicates, otherwise war as a means to an end would truly cease to exist.  Furthermore the cost 
versus benefit argument presumes that states will have a full working knowledge and understanding 
of the costs and potential benefits of a war prior to its outbreak, instead of an estimate, which would 
necessarily  include the exact  duration of  each stage of  the war,  the military capability  of each 
participant and the strategy and tactics that will be employed by the respective parties, in addition to 
unpredictable factors such as weather, disease and resolve. Thus granting all states contemplating 
aggression near omniscience, and in a twist of self defeating logic, such comprehensive knowledge 
would ultimately lead to a virtual stalemate31, and would reduce the courses of war to a lack of 
knowledge. Suffice to say that the variables that determine the costs and benefits of war are in flux, 
and open to different interpretations by different states. Within the twentieth century alone there 
have been wars that proved longer than expected (WWI – 1914 to 1918), wars that were costlier 
than expected (South African War 1899 to 1902), wars that were quicker and cheaper than expected 
(German Invasion of France 1940 and the First Gulf War (1990 to 1991), and wars that were longer 
and more costly than expected that did not bankrupt the aggressor (the Vietnam War). 
War in particular as a strategy requires significant preparation and force parity with the enemy to be 
engaged with. A rising power would need to be tangibly increasing its actual power through either 
converting its latent power into actual power, an essentially internal process which entails increased 
military expenditure and production; or through a third party, an essentially external process which 
includes technology acquisition through either coercive or legitimate means. As such the process 
whereby a state develops its military capacity should leave tell tale signs of a military build-up as a 
state's readiness and capacity for war increases.
3.2.2. Strategies for Checking Aggressors
There  are  essentially  two  strategies  available  to  a  regional  hegemon  to  check  the  rise  of  an 
aggressor: Balancing and Buck-passing. With balancing, a great power assumes direct responsibility 
for preventing an aggressor from upsetting the balance of power. The initial goal is to deter the 
31 Mearsheimer further provides a series of examples of wars in which the cost was limited and a series of methods in  
which to extract greater benefits from the defeated power (Mearsheimer 2001: 148-152). Their relevancy to this 
paper though is limited. It is enough to demonstrate that war as a possibility still exists.
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aggressor, but if that fails, the balancing state will fight the ensuing war. Threatened states can take 
three measures to make balancing work (Mearsheimer 2001: 156 & 157):
1. They can send a clear signal to the aggressor through diplomatic channels that they are 
firmly committed to maintaining the balance of power, even if it means going to war
2. Threatened  states  can  work  to  create  a  defensive  alliance  to  help  them  contain  their 
dangerous opponent. (downside: often slow and inefficient)
3. Threatened states can balance against an aggressor by mobilizing additional resources of 
their own – defence spending might be increased or conscription might be implemented – 
internal balancing
Buck-passing is the main alternative to balancing. A buck-passer attempts to get another state to 
bear the burden of deterring or possibly fighting an aggressor, while it remains on the side-lines.  
(Mearsheimer  2001:  157).  Threatened  states  can  take  four  measures  to  facilitate  buck-passing 
(Mearsheimer 2001: 158 & 159):
1. They can seek good diplomatic relations with the aggressor, or at least not do anything to 
provoke it, in the hope that it will concentrate its attention on the intended “buck-catcher.”
2. Buck-passers  usually  maintain  cool  relations  with  the  intended  buck-catcher.  Not  just 
because this diplomatic distancing might help foster good relations with the aggressor, but 
also because the buck-passer does not want to get dragged into ta war on the side of the 
buck-catcher.
3. Great powers can mobilize additional resources of their own to make buck-passing work – 
gives the aggressor an incentive to focus on the intended buck-catcher.
4. It sometimes makes sense for a buck-passer to allow or even facilitate the growth in power 
of  the  intended  buck-catcher.  That  burden-bearer  would  then  have  a  better  chance  of 
containing  the  aggressor  state,  which  would  increase  the  buck-passer's  prospects  if 
remaining on the sidelines.
There  is  a  however  a  strong  tendency  to  buck-pass  or  “free-ride”  inside  balancing  coalitions, 
although the danger that buck-passing will wreck the alliance is a powerful countervailing force 
(Mearsheimer 2001: 159). The core principle here is that buck-passing is essentially “defence on the 
cheap” that allow changes in the relative power advantage in favour of the buck-passer. However 
this is premised on the scenario that the buck-catcher does not fail to check the aggressor.
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3.2.3. The Theory of Balancing verse Buck-passing
According to Mearsheimer (2001: 265) the choice of buck-passing versus balancing is mainly a 
function of the structure of the international system. A threatened great power operating in a bipolar 
system must balance against its rival because there is no other great power to catch the buck. It is in  
multipolar systems that threatened states can – and often do – buck-pass. The amount of buck-
passing that takes place depends largely on the magnitude of the threat and on geography. Buck-
passing tends to be widespread in multipolarity when there is no potential hegemon to contend with, 
and when the threatened states do not share a common border with the aggressor. In general, the 
more relative power the potential hegemon controls, the more likely it is that all of the threatened 
states in the system will forgo buck-passing and form a balancing coalition  (Mearsheimer 2001: 
265).
When  an  aggressor  comes  on  the  scene,  at  least  one  other  state  will  eventually  take  direct 
responsibility  for  checking  it.  Balancing  almost  always  happens,  although  it  is  not  always 
successful. This point is consistent with the logic of buck-passing, which is essentially about who 
does  the  balancing,  not  whether  it  gets  done.  Therefore  balancing  ALWAYS  takes  place. 
(Mearsheimer 2001: 269). The prospects for the Buck to be passed is a function of the particular 
architecture of the system. The distribution of Power and Geography matter most. Power indicates 
how much  buck-passing  is  likely.  Geography helps  indicate  the  likely  buck-passers  and  buck-
catchers  in  multipolar  systems.  Common borders  promote  balancing.  Barriers  encourage  buck-
passing (Mearsheimer 2001: 271).
Power  may  be  distributed  among  great  powers  in  three  ways:  Bipolar,  unbalanced  multipolar,  
balanced multipolar systems. In a bipolar distribution no buck-passing takes place among the great 
powers because there is no third party to catch the buck. The threatened power has to rely mainly on 
its own resources and maybe alliances with smaller states. In balanced multipolarity, where power is 
distributed rather evenly among the major states, balancing coalitions are unlikely to form against 
an aggressor and therefore Buck-passing will be more likely. In unbalanced multipolarity buck-
passing is  less likely because the threatened states have a strong incentive to  work together to 
prevent the potential hegemon from dominating their region. Therefore balancing is more likely 
(Mearsheimer  2001: 270). The more powerful the dominant state is relative to its foes, the less 
likely it is that the potential victims will be able to pass the buck among themselves, and the more  
likely it is that they will be forced to form a balancing coalition against the aggressor.
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3.3. The Causes of War
The prediction of an exact cause of the breakout of war is a challenging task for any theory to 
determine, with most failing spectacularly32 33. Instead the environment that is created is the best 
predictor of the likelihood of war. Whether a great power is trying to emerge as a regional hegemon 
and is therefore developing its military might, or whether an existing regional hegemon is trying to 
maintain the status quo and prevent the emergence of a peer competitor through balancing and 
buck-passing. The likelihood of war is determined by the structure of the system and its cause by 
the responses to potential changes in the system that take place in a particular geography.
As a  structural  theory  “anarchy” is  the  constant  variable  in  Offensive  Realism.  As a  constant,  
“anarchy” cannot account for why security competition sometimes leads to war but sometimes does 
not. Alternatively as a dependent variable “distribution of power” determines the stability of the 
system, with bipolar systems being the most peaceful, unbalanced multipolar systems being prone 
to conflict and balanced multipolar systems occupying the middle ground (Mearsheimer 2001: 335). 
However  Offensive  Realism cannot  predict  exact  dates  on  generally  if  and when a  war  might 
breakout.
The main causes of war are located in the architecture of the international system. What matters 
most is the number of great powers and how much power each controls (Mearsheimer 2001: 337). 
War is more likely in multipolarity than bipolarity for three reasons (Mearsheimer 2001: 338):
1. There are more opportunities for war, because there are more potential conflict dyads in a 
multipolar system. Specifically there are more “great-minor power” and “great-great power” 
dyads  in  multipolarity.  And  further  bipolarity  is  far  more  rigidly  structured  than 
multipolarity
2. Imbalances of power are more commonplace in a multipolar world, and thus great powers 
are more likely to have the capability to win a war, making deterrence more difficult and 
war more likely.
3. The potential for miscalculation is greater in multipolarity: states might think they have the 
capability. To coerce or conquer another state when, in fact, they do not. “Simplicity breeds 
32 Within the school of International Relations the theories that explain the outbreak of war are generally structural in 
nature. They include economic theories that detail the competition for markets, resources and wealth as the primary 
causes of war, with Marxism being the most prominent. Alternatively Information Theories credit the start of war to 
a lack of information. However none of these theories provide an exact formula for the outbreak of war.
33 The far more extensive sociological attempts at explaining the origin of war have found no single variable that has a 
strong correlation to the occurrence of war.
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certainty; certainty bolsters peace.”
Unbalanced multipolar systems are especially war-prone for two reasons:
1. The potential hegemons, which are the defining features of this kind of system, have an 
appreciable power advantage over the other great powers, which means that they have good 
prospects of winning wars against their weaker rivals
2. Potential hegemons also invite war by increasing the level of fear among the great powers.
Because a state's intentions are difficult to discern, and because they can change quickly, rival great 
powers  will  be  inclined  to  assume  the  worst  about  the  potential  hegemon's  intentions,  further 
reinforcing the threatened states' incentive to contain it and maybe even weaken it if the opportunity 
presents  itself.  The target  of this  containment  strategy,  however,  is  sure to  view any balancing 
coalition  forming against  it  as  encirclement  by its  rivals  (Mearsheimer  2001:  344-5).  In  short, 
potential hegemons generate spirals of fear that are hard to control. This problem is compounded by 
the fact  that  they possess  considerable power and thus are  likely to  think they can solve their 
security problems by going to war (Mearsheimer 2001: 346).
It should be noted, as a response to Liberal Institutionalism and the potential for inter-governmental 
organizations and inter-state cooperation to ensure peace, states do pursue non-security goals as 
well, however always with an eye towards security and power maximization. Security trumps non-
security goals (Mearsheimer 2001: 46, 47 and 48). Taking this into consideration great powers do 
not work together to promote world order for its own sake. Instead, each seeks to maximize its own 
share  of  world  power,  which  is  likely  to  clash with  the  goal  of  creating  and sustaining  stable 
international orders. This is not to mean that great powers never aim to prevent wars and keep the 
peace. On the contrary, they work hard to deter wars in which they would be the likely victims. In  
such cases, however, state behaviour is driven largely by narrow calculations about relative power, 
not by a commitment to build a world order independent of a state's own interests (Mearsheimer 
2001: 49). 
Of course, the states that stand to lose power will work to deter aggression and preserve the existing 
order.  But  their  motives  will  be  selfish,  revolving  around  balance-of-power  logic,  not  some 
commitment to world peace (Mearsheimer 2001: 50). Cooperation takes place in a world that is 
competitive at its core – one where states have powerful incentives to take advantage of other states
(Mearsheimer 2001: 53).
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3.4.1. Realism in the Twenty-first Century
Due to claims that  International  Politics  changed,  or  is  about  to  change in  essential  ways,  the 
assumptions  of  Realism  have  been  challenged  in  the  twenty-first  century.  In  particular:  the 
persistence of anarchy, whether the state is still the main actor in international politics, whether 
states still have offensive military capability due to prohibitively high costs and nuclear deterrence, 
whether other states have hostile intentions, and whether the central of aim of states is still survival. 
Due to space limitations, the nature of the topic and the above discussions, the basic assumptions 
that the international system is still defined as anarchic, that the state is still the main actor, that 
states still possess offensive capability and whether states still have hostile intentions will be taken 
as  prima  facie,  that  these  assumptions  are  evident  from  facts  and  do  not  require  further 
explanation34.  However the claim that “survival is  no longer the central  aim of states” requires 
further explanation, in particular regard to economic interdependence as a deterrent to war and is of 
particular relevancy to Sino-U.S. relations.
Proponents  of  globalisation  often  argue  that  states  today  are  concerned  more  with  achieving 
prosperity than with worrying about their survival. Getting rich is the main goal of post-industrial 
states, maybe even the all-consuming goal. The basic logic here is that if all the great powers are 
prospering, none has any incentive to start a war, because conflict in today's interdependent world 
economy would  redound to  every  state's  disadvantage  (Mearsheimer  2001:370).  “Why kill  the 
goose that lays the golden egg35.” The problem with this perspective is that a serious economic 
crises in some region, or the world at large, will undermine the prosperity that this theory needs to 
work. The recent and on-going global recession that began 2008 demonstrates the impact that an 
economic crises may have on global peace and stability.  Ranging from the Occupy Wall Street 
movements in the U.S. and Anti-Austerity Protests in Europe in 2011 to the 2010-2012 violent 
Greek Protests to the 2010-present Arab Spring36, it is clear that international peace and stability 
were largely undermined. 
Even in the absence of a major economic crises, one or more states might not be prospering, such 
34 For a more detailed defence of these assumptions refer to: Mearsheimer 2001: 362-372
35 From Aesop's Fables:  Killing the Goose that Laid the Golden Eggs. Meaning: To commit an unprofitable action, 
motivated by greed.
36 Though the Arab Spring was purportedly caused by dissatisfaction with the ruling governments, the fact that these 
have been in place for decades with relatively limited reaction, the economic crises was undoubtedly an instigating  
factor  as social  issues  relating to  income inequality,  unemployment  and extreme poverty contributed to social  
unrest.
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states would have little to lose economically, and may even have something to gain, by starting a 
war. States that do go to war usually go to war against a single rival and aim to achieve a quick and  
decisive victory, and they invariably seek to discourage other states from joining with the other side 
in the fight. But a war against one or even two opponents is unlikely to do much damage to a state's 
economy,  because  typically  only  a  tiny  percentage  of  a  state's  wealth  is  tied  up  in  economic 
intercourse  with  any  other  state  (Mearsheimer  2001:  371).  With  the  case  in  point,  despite  its 
significant trade with China, the U.S.'s largest trading partner is Canada making up 16.8 percent of 
total trade, followed by China with 13.5 percent and Mexico with 13.3 percent for the year 2013 to 
present37 38(United States Census Bureau 2013). Furthermore China holds only 7.2 percent of total 
U.S. debt, worth around US$1 Trillion, in contrast to Japan which holds 7 percent and the U.S. local 
and state governments, companies and investors that hold approximately two thirds (U.S. China 
Business Council 2013). It should be noted that between 1900 and 1914 there was about as much 
economic interdependence in Europe as there was at the turn of the twenty-first century, less now 
following the 2008-present economic crises, yet World War I still broke out (Copeland 1996).
3.4.2. Mearsheimer's Prediction
John J. Mearsheimer warns of the future threat to peace that the rise of China represents. Following 
the complete extrapolation of his theory Mearsheimer makes a tentative prediction regarding the 
future of peace and stability, with particular regard to the rise of China (Mearsheimer 2001: 400). 
Mearsheimer predicts that if China's economy continues growing at a robust pace it will eventually 
become a potential hegemon. The United States, eager to prevent competition, would make sure 
that  China  does  not  become  a  peer  competitor.  Japan  and  Russia  are  unlikely  to  have  the 
wherewithal to contain China, even if India, South Korea, and Vietnam were to join the balancing 
coalition. Not only would China be much wealthier than any of its Asian rivals in this scenario, but 
its huge population advantage would allow it to build a far more powerful army than either Japan or 
Russia  could.  China  would  also  have  the  resources  to  acquire  an  impressive  nuclear  arsenal. 
Northeast Asia would become an unbalanced multipolar system if China threatened to dominate the 
entire region; as such it would be a far more dangerous place than it is now (Mearsheimer 2001: 
400).
Accordingly China is likely to follow the American example, in which it will attempt to dominate 
37 Value of trade calculated as imports + exports.
38 Percentages accurate to June 2013.
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the Asia-Pacific region much as the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. For good 
strategic  reasons,  China  will  seek  to  maximize  the  power  gap  between  itself  and  potentially 
dangerous neighbours like India,  Japan, and Russia.  China will  want to make sure that it  is so 
powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. It is unlikely that China will pursue 
military superiority so that it can go on the war path and conquer other countries in the region, 
although that is always a possibility. Instead, it is more likely that Beijing will want to dictate the 
boundaries of acceptable behaviour to neighbouring countries,  much the way the United States 
makes it clear to other states in the Americas that it is the “boss” (Mearsheimer 2010: 389).
A much more powerful China can also be expected to try to push the United States out of the Asia-
Pacific  region,  much  the  way the  United  States  pushed the  European great  powers  out  of  the 
Western Hemisphere in the 19th century. We should expect China to come up with its own version 
of the Monroe Doctrine, as Imperial Japan did in the 1930s (Mearsheimer 2010: 389). In fact, we 
are already seeing inklings of that policy. Chinese officials allegedly, in March 2010, told two high-
ranking American policy-makers that the United States was no longer allowed to interfere in the 
SCS, which China views as a “core interest” like Taiwan and Tibet. And it seems that China feels 
the same way about the Yellow Sea (Campbell et al 2013: 4). Just as the U.S. would perceive the 
military forces of a distant great power in the Western Hemisphere as a potential threat, so China 
will assuredly apply the same logic and demand that the American military pull out of the Asia-
pacific region.
The U.S. response is likely to be tailored towards maintaining the existing world order through U.S. 
leadership  and  supremacy,  and  thus  will  be  determined  to  remain  the  world's  only  regional 
hegemon. Therefore, the United States can be expected to go to great lengths to contain China and 
ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer a threat to rule the roost in Asia. In essence, 
the United States is likely to act toward China similarly to the way it behaved toward the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War (Mearsheimer 2010: 390). 
China's neighbours in the Asia-Pacific region are certain to fear its rise as well, and they too will do 
whatever  they  can  to  prevent  it  from  achieving  regional  hegemony.  Indeed,  there  is  already 
substantial evidence that countries like India, Japan, and Russia, as well as smaller powers like 
Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam, are worried about China’s ascendancy and are looking for 
ways to contain it. India and Japan, for example, signed a ‘Joint Security Declaration’ in October 
2008, in good part because they are worried about China’s growing power. India and the United 
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States, which had testy relations at best during the Cold War, have become good friends over the 
past decade, in large part because they both fear China (Mearsheimer 2010: 390).
The argument that China's continued pursuit of economic growth makes conflict with the United 
States  unlikely  is  flawed.  One  of  the  principal  reasons  that  China  has  been  so  successful 
economically over the past 20 years is that it has not picked a fight with the United States. But that 
logic should have applied to Germany before World War I and to Germany and Japan before World 
War II. By 1939, the German economy was growing strongly, yet Hitler started World War II. Japan 
started  conflict  in  Asia  despite  its  impressive  economic  growth.  Clearly  there  are  factors  that 
sometimes override economic considerations and cause great powers to start wars, even when it 
hurts them economically (Brzezinski & Mearsheimer 2005: 5). Equally a policy of engagement 
aimed at creating a wealthy and democratic China that would promote peace around the world is 
doomed to failure. If China becomes an economic powerhouse it will translate its economic might 
into military might and make a run at dominating Northeast Asia. Whether China is democratic and 
deeply enmeshed in the global economy or autocratic and autarkic will  have little effect on its 
behaviour, because democracies care about security as much as non-democracies do, and hegemony 
is the best way for any state to guarantee its own survival (Mearsheimer 2001: 4).
According to Thomas J. Christensen (1996: 37), “China may well be the high church of Realpolitik 
in  the  post-Cold  War  world.  Its  analysts  certainly  think  more  like  traditional  balance-of-power 
theorists than do most contemporary Western leaders and policy analysts” and “they are also much 
less likely than their Western counterparts to emphasize political, cultural, or ideological differences 
with foreign countries.”
Therefore in investigating the SCS as a flashpoint for Sino-U.S. conflict the following questions 
relating to the general context in which Offensive Theory operates need to be answered: (1) is 
China's potential versus current power cause for concern and (2) does the U.S. aim to maintain its 
leadership and hegemony in the face of a potential peer competitor? And the following questions 
relating specifically to the SCS need to be answered: (3) is China engaging in strategies to gain 
power (i.e. war and coercion) and (4) is the U.S. engaging in strategies to maintain power (i.e. 
balancing and buck-passing)?
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4. The Rise of China
The rise of China can be understood as the “natural” process that a state may take on its path 
towards becoming a great power. In China's particular case several factors influence its perspective, 
including hindsight.  China,  as any rising great power would,  fears the end that  Germany's  and 
Japan's rise culminated in, that of their defeats in WWII, prompting caution and weariness towards 
great  powers  that  may  represent  a  threat.  However  balancing  this  caution  is  the  increased 
assertiveness caused by China's development as a great power, and therefore increased capabilities. 
The SCS serves as a potential locus for this dichotomy of influences, where China is exercising 
both caution and assertiveness in varying degrees.
It  is  within this  context  that  the rise  of China is  analysed,  with particular  regards  to  the SCS. 
Domestic politics is examined to determine the perspectives that are prevalent in China regarding 
the SCS, i.e. what is the psychological attachment to the region and to what degree may that policy 
vary. This will allow for a long term evaluation of policy continuity later on. This is then contrasted 
with  an  analysis  of  China's  latent  and  future  potential39 latent40 power,  as  well  as  China's 
development41 of its actual military power, thereby establishing the actual “threat” China poses in 
terms of  its  future capabilities,  as well  as  providing insight  into its  intentions.  Finally  a  direct 
evaluation is made of China's presence in the SCS and its projected strategy, thus determining its 
level of aggressiveness and allowing for a later contrast with U.S. capabilities in the region. Finally 
China's interaction with other states in the region is looked at and its effect on the balance of power.
4.1. Domestic Politics and National Opinion
An  in-depth  analysis  of  the  domestic  politics  of  China  is  difficult  for  two  reasons:  lack  of 
transparency in government decision making processes and the structure of government and hence 
decision making authority outlined in the PRC constitution42. However an analysis of the domestic 
39 Speculative, and therefore open to significant divergence.
40 As a state's population and economic activity increases, so does its latent power. 
41 China's actual military power is examined in the next chapter, alongside that of U.S. military power.
42 The implication and practical application of this form of government in China is that whilst significant debate does 
occur within and between party  structures and usually behind closed doors, once a final decision is taken by the 
central authorities it  becomes the party line and government policy. Therefore a complete understanding of the  
means and influencing factors by which a decision is reached is difficult to come by.  Chapter 1 Article 3 of the 
constitution indicates that the state organs of the People's Republic of China apply the principle of democratic 
centralism (People's Daily Online 2013). Democratic centralism is an “organizing and decision making principle of 
Communist Parties” wherein “the centralist aspect [is] asserted via the subordination of all lower bodies to the 
decisions taken by the higher ones” and “democracy consists in the fact that the highest body of the party is its  
congress to which delegates are elected to by local organizations”(McLean & McMillan 2003: 141). Article 3,  
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politics of China demonstrates: (1) that the leadership/administration change is likely to not impact 
meaningfully  on  SCS  policy,  (2)  that  the  debate  that  occurs  below  the  top  leadership  may 
significantly influence policy decisions43, and (3) that this debate is significantly diverse and varied, 
particularly within the PLA44, on what the potential response by China should be to the U.S. Finally, 
whilst all states have intentions that are unknowable and thus must be guarded against as a self-help 
measure in an anarchic system, a state that shows obvious signs of aggressive behaviour should 
immediately  raise  a  “red  flag”  as  an  imminent  threat.  Thus  prompting  an  analysis  of  national 
opinion.
4.1.1. Government Leadership
The ascent of Xi Jinping to the position of “Paramount Leader”45 of China with his election to 
General Secretary of the Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission on 15 
November 2012 and President on 17 March 2013 has created much speculation over future Chinese 
policy  towards  the  SCS  and  Chinese  foreign  policy  in  general.  Touted  as  a  reformer  by  his 
supporters,  Xi  Jinping  in  his  visit  to  Moscow on  28 March  2013 “called  on  the  international 
community to build a new type of international relations with win-win cooperation at the core” 
(Chinese Embassy in Norway 2013). And stated in a visit to the U.S. in February of 2012 that “The 
Pacific Ocean is wide enough to accommodate the two major countries of China and the US,” and 
emphasized that “one cannot rely too much on military power regarding Asia-Pacific diplomacy” 
(Feng 2012). Founding father and Prime-Minister of Singapore Lee Kwan Yew said of Xi Jinping 
that he was “a thoughtful man who has gone through many trials and tribulations." and "I would put 
him in the Nelson Mandela class” (Kuhn 2011).
states: “The division of functions and powers between the central and local state organs is guided by the principle 
of giving full play to the initiative and enthusiasm of the local authorities under the unified leadership of the central  
authorities.”
43 The importance of this relationship is tied up with the actual or perceived autonomous decision making authority  
and policy formulation of the Central Military Commission. The potential degree of autonomy is accentuated by the 
fact that most of the members of both the Party and the State Central Military Commission are uniformed senior 
generals. Moreover this must be understood in the context that as Goldstein (2011: 321) points out a certain amount  
of ambiguity appears to be intentionally built into present Chinese policies given the competing national priorities, 
contending bureaucratic agendas in Beijing, and the nature of China's new status as a global power.
44 As Lyle Goldstein (2011: 328) points out the stereotypical view of the PLA in the West and especially in the United 
States  is  of  a  group inclined,  whether  by professional  disposition,  nationalist  inclination,  or  bureaucratic  self-
interest to favour aggressive naval expansion.
45 The “Paramount Leader” of China is an unofficial title for the Political Leader of China. It typically comprises three 
official titles: President of China (ceremonial head of state), Secretary General of the Communist Party (leader and 
highest ranking party official), Chairman of the Central Military Commission (Commander-in-Chief of the PLA). 
Whilst the General Secretary will hold all three of these positions, they are divisible. Hu Jintou became General  
Secretary on 15 November 2002, President 15 March 2003 and Chairman of CPC Central Military Commission on 
19 September 2004. Moreover Deng Xiaoping was Paramount Leader from 1978 to 1992 without holding the posts 
of President, Premier or Secretary General. 
34
Conversely,  in  more  ambiguous  statements,  Xi  Jinping  has  said  “We are  firm in  safeguarding 
China's  sovereignty,  security and territorial  integrity and are committed to resolving differences 
with  neighbours  concerning  territorial  land,  territorial  sea  and  maritime  rights  and  interests 
peacefully and through friendly negotiations”46(Ramen 2012). Xi Jinping has, during his short term 
in office, repeatedly advocated for the continued “rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation that consists 
of a rich country and a strong army. Showing little or no inclination to negotiate with regional  
neighbours over territorial disputes, Xi Jinping asserted in his first speech as president that China's 
military must improve its ability to “win battles and... protect national sovereignty and security" and 
has  stressed  continuity  with  previous  Chinese  leaders  (BBC News  China  2013).  Whilst  a  far 
reaching examination on China's policy towards the SCS may appear pre-emptive considering the 
relatively short term Xi Jinping has enjoyed as leader of the Communist Party, it is  worth noting 
that he held the leadership of the Leading Small Group on the SCS within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Leading Small Groups, formed under Chapter 9 of the constitution, are supra-ministerial 
coordinating  and  consulting  bodies  that  try  to  build  consensus  on  issues  and  cut  across  the 
government,  party and military systems.  The Leading Small  Group on the  SCS was given the 
authority  to approve the actions of other  actors,  under  a  system of “one action,  one approval” 
(International Crises Group 2012: 33). Therefore a high degree of policy continuity emanating from 
the party structures is likely to be carried over with the ascendancy of Xi Jinping.
4.1.2. National Opinion
With a new leader at the helm, and policy consistency across the senior administration likely to 
remain constant, the question is which government actors are the influencing bodies on SCS policy. 
According to the International Crises Group (2012: 8) “the proliferation of domestic actors and the 
complicated  bureaucratic  structure  behind  Chinese  management  of  the  issue  has  often  been 
described with a reference to the traditional myth of nine dragons stirring up the sea”. The most 
common accounts are of “five dragons” referring to the five law enforcement agencies, while the 
“nine dragons” include the law enforcement agencies as well as the foreign ministry, the PLA, the 
environment  ministry  and  state-owned  oil  companies.  This  excludes  the  role  played  by  local 
governments and the national tourism administration. According to Chen Wei, a scholar with the 
public security administration the nine dragons include PLA, Customs Law enforcement (General 
46 Opening ceremony of the China-ASEAN Business and Investment Summit and Forum in Nanning, capital city of 
the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.
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Administration of Customs), China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (agriculture ministry), 
Marine Safety Administration (transport ministry), Search and Rescue Centre (transport ministry), 
Maritime Police (public security ministry), border police (public security ministry), China Marine 
Surveillance (State Oceanic Administration), and maritime environmental protection. However due 
to limited political transparency, to quote Lyle Goldstein (2011: 321), “Regional analysts have little 
beyond a few rather vacuous official pronouncements to try to parse the nature of Chinese national 
interests,  corresponding objectives  and plans  to  realize those objectives.”  Therefore in  order  to 
explore  the  broader  foreign  and maritime policy  thinking in  Chinese  assessments,  opinions  on 
Chinese strategy of the SCS will be taken from the popular Chinese media, major Chinese academic 
journals and the most vocal of the nine dragons, the PLA.
Opinions are divided between the more hawkish positions and those that are more moderate and 
non-confrontational. In 2008 a team of faculty authors from the China Ocean University (COU) in 
Qingdao published the lead article in the 2008 issue of the COU journal under the title (Yongzhi et  
al  2008:  4):  “A Comprehensive  Study of  Discontinuous Borderlines  in  the  SCS.”  The authors 
observed that “Vietnam has already extracted one hundred million tons of oil from it oilfields in the 
Spratlys... Oil has become Malaysia's largest source of foreign exchange... It is estimated that in the 
Spratly areas controlled [by the Philippines] that there may be as much as 100 million tons of oil... 
Our country is, for various reasons, lagging behind our neighbours in exploiting [the resources] of 
the South Sea.” They reached the conclusion that “Our claims on which we have 'shelved rivalry' 
have  already  been  occupied  by  neighbouring  states...  if  this  persists  with  legal  status[,]  the 
international community will also have doubts about the [9-dashed] line. If the current situation 
persists, the [9-dashed] line will lack for any meaning altogether... Our government should... change 
the 'shelve rivalry, jointly develop' policy that cannot be the long-term plan.” (Yongzhi et al 2008: 
5). The authors further advocate for a stronger navy to back up a firmer claim.
Further hawkish sentiments are forwarded in the journals: Southeast Asian Studies (Yibo 2009: 54, 
56  & 58)  and  Southeast  Asian  Affairs (Jiang  2007:  29-31).  In  which  the  former  in  mid-2009 
indicated that the United States “is rapidly losing its influence in the Southeast Asia region, due to a 
lack of a coherent, comprehensive strategy, and policy mistakes”, asserting that Washington was 
pursuing a balancing strategy to “contain” China. The article's authors further warn that they have 
strong reason to believe that  in the near  term,  the U.S.  will  undertake to  strengthen Vietnam's 
military power and its economic strength in order to balance against China. In the later the author 
warned that the “Code of Conduct” system implemented through ASEAN is dangerously unstable 
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and could easily lead to a “warring states-type pattern.” It advocated for a more robust Chinese 
military presence in Southeast Asia to balance the U.S. presence, the author indicates the “China 
Threat Theory” will exist no matter what, so that such concerns should no longer restrain Chinese 
policy.
In an interview of Peking University Professor Li Shaoning (2011: 9), published in the July 2011 
issue of Military Digest a further hawkish viewpoint was conveyed. According to Li's assessment 
the  SCS may have untapped energy resources  equivalent  to  one  third  of  the  Persian  Gulf.  He 
suggests that Washington's primary interest is in securing the Straits of Malacca in order to exert  
pressure  on  Beijing,  but  doubts  that  Washington  would  dare  to  become directly  involved in  a 
military conflict in the SCS. He warns that Vietnam should be given a “little more time” in the hope 
that they slowly come to understand, but that if they “continue to be confused, then we have the 
means to cope with their confusion.”
In contrast more moderate assessments do balance the above mentioned positions. In an analysis in 
the  2008  issue  of  the  Ocean  Development  and  Management Journal  of  the  State  Oceanic 
Administration,  titled  “On  Seeking  Joint  Development”  the  policy  of  joint  development  is 
advocated with the understanding that it will help realize China's major objective in the SCS and 
will thus have a major significance for China's social and economic development (Goldstein 2011: 
326). Furthermore a candid appraisal is made of the reaction of the Southeast Asian states to the rise 
of China, stating: “As China's comprehensive national strength has increased along with its military 
capabilities and its  requirements for energy resources,  so ASEAN states'  anxiety about a China 
threat has been increasing by the day since independently they have no prospect to balance against 
China. [Thus, they have taken steps] to unite together in order to cope with China... [But China] has 
openly stated that it will not be the first to resort to the use of force in the SCS dispute.” Two 
meaningful points can be drawn from this perspective: (1) that ASEAN's anxieties are at least to 
some extent natural in the current circumstance; and (2) that whilst the “will not be the first resort to 
force” pledge may be propaganda, it may be taken as an institutionalized policy of caution as well.
Public  quotes  following  the  “Impeccable  Incident”  in  2009 also  provide  evidence  for  caution. 
Professor Wu Xinbo of Fudan University was quoted in the  Global Times just after the incident 
saying “This incident cannot be resolved between the two militaries, but rather can only be dealt  
with by the two national leaders and the foreign ministries... so this incident in the South Sea will 
not likely cause major damage to the bilateral relationship (Global Times 2009.). Professor Yan 
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Xuetong of Qinghua University in the same article explains that the “Impeccable Incident” is just a 
symbol of the U.S. being on guard against China... the chance of war breaking out between the U.S. 
and China is zero. Yan's position is interesting in that he is usually viewed as a 'hawk'. And a similar 
position was taken up by Professor Zhang Wenmu, known widely for being an exponent of Chinese 
naval  power,  warned emphatically  in  an interview in 2009 that  if  China engages  in  aggressive 
behaviour in the SCS that would be “permitting a leaf to obscure one's view of the mountain” 
[translated] (Yan 2008: 28-29).
4.1.3. The People's Liberation Army
As one of the primary actors in the formulation of China's SCS policy the perspectives adopted by 
the PLA offer integral incite into the nature of official policy, explaining this policy, as well as 
potential changes in policy direction.  Here the direct statements of those in uniform, published in 
official venues, alongside more nuanced Chinese military viewpoints revealed in unofficial naval 
journals  will  illustrate  a  complex  picture  where  hawkish  views  exist  alongside  more  practical, 
cautious and even enlightened views.
Within the naval-affiliated journal  Naval and Merchant Ships (2007:24) a pro-versus-con debate 
was published as a pair of articles concerning the advisability of taking “control of the Straits of 
Malacca” as a goal of Chinese naval development. The pro article constructed an argument which 
asserts that the security of the Straits of Malacca are central to China's development, the straits 
being a  maritime transport  link for trade,  especially  in energy. Thereby linking China's  Energy 
Strategy with its naval strategy in order to ensure economic security for Beijing in the twenty-first  
Century. With 'development' being the cornerstone of China's national strategy it seems only logical 
that the navy would pursue this line of argument. The the SCS is portrayed in this argument as a key 
national maritime transit route of which the Malacca Straits form but one part.
In  contrast  the  second article  takes  a  more  sceptical  view concerning China's  Naval  efforts  to 
control the waterway. Stating that there is no need and there is no ability to deploy forces to take 
control of the Straits, nor are their extant threats sufficient to block sea transport, further arguing 
that China is not building a mighty naval force for military expansion and economic plunder and 
therefore has  no need to  control  the Malacca Straits.  These two arguments  clearly indicate  the 
perceived economic reliance and potential military implications of that reliance in the waterways 
south of China, as well as the divisive opinion within the PLA.
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In the September 2009 issue of the unofficial Modern Ships journal a cautious and pragmatic tone 
was set (Yiliang & Xiaoxia 2009: 4-8). The authors here observed that the Spratly issue is wholly 
dependent on the relative balance of power between the United States and China. While Chinese 
comprehensive power has increased rapidly, there remains a gap with the U.S., at least in the near 
term. They further note that it would be a mistake for China to deal with the Spratlys in the way that 
Russia  dealt  with  Georgia.  The  authors  effectively  argue  that  whilst  China  must  protect  its 
sovereignty claims, the involvement of the U.S., whose intentions do not seem to be benign, could 
result in China paying an extreme cost for a miscalculation. The authors further explain that beyond 
the use of force, China has many means whereby it may assert its rights. These include the Fisheries 
Enforcement  and  the  Maritime  Surveillance  departments,  which  are  forms  of  civilian  law 
enforcement or white hulls.
Perspectives from the Navy's senior leadership were reported in the journal Inside Defense (2009: 
21). Admiral Zhang Deshun of the Navy Staff is quoted as saying, “Malaysia, the Philippines and 
such  countries  are  taking  this  opportunity  to  make  illegal  demands,  seeking  to  supersede  the 
legalization of our nation's maritime rights.” Admiral Huang Jiaxiang of China's South Sea Fleet 
offered the following concise appraisal: “We have the confidence and we have the ability to protect 
our  interests  in  the  SCS.” With  Admiral  Wang Dengping of  the  Navy Armaments  Department 
asserting that “Today, the challenge we face in guarding our maritime rights has historical origins [, 
including that] over a relatively long period,  our people had a weak understanding of maritime 
rights.” A clear motif is illustrated amongst the top leadership of a historically weak China with a 
relatively limited naval capacity and experience versus a modern increasingly assertive China with 
a far greater and expanding capacity.
In  an  article  entitled  “Strategic  Consideration  on  Stabilizing  China's  Maritime  Security 
Environment” published by China's most prestigious military journal,  China Military Science, in 
May 2009 the author (Liang 2009: 21), a senior captain and professor at Nanjing Naval Command 
College,  explains  the  varied  factors  weighing  on China's  approach  to  the  SCS issue:  “China's 
islands have been invaded, its sea seized, and its resources plundered... The possibility of naval 
conflict cannot be ruled out... The fundamental tendencies are: first... the continuous trend towards 
cooperation; second...  the obvious internationalization of the South Sea problem; third...  intense 
military  competition  and  increasing  military  pressure  in  the  naval  sphere;  and  fourth...  the 
possibility to increase the space for Chinese national interests as comprehensive combat capabilities 
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have increased.” The author in the final statement links the potential increase of space for Chinese 
national interests with comprehensive combat abilities. The author's ultimate recommendation is 
that China should use this strategic window of opportunity to provide an environment of peace and 
security, to guard stability, pursue military cooperation with ASEAN states, pursue breakthroughs in 
joint development, preserve a certain military presence in the South Sea and prevent damage to 
national  interests  (Liang 2009:  21).  Thus a  cautious  balance  advocating  efforts  to  both  uphold 
stability and also defend national interests is forwarded, whilst the overall tone of the article is one 
of maintaining the status quo to achieve China's aims. As this is a naval author publishing in a 
prestigious  journal,  it  may be  implied  here  that  the  military  leadership  generally  endorses  this 
cautious approach since he would have likely required some form of unofficial  endorsement to 
proceed.
In a direct response to the declared concerns of the U.S., Rear Admiral Yang Yi of China's National 
Defence University spoke to a visiting delegation of Americans and briefly addressed the SCS issue 
in  April  2010  (Wen  & Fei  2010).  Responding  to  a  question  related  to  the  2009  “Impeccable 
Incident” Admiral  Yang stated:  “I  understand very well  your  concern regarding the SCS issue. 
China is a country that promotes the freedom of maritime navigation, and we will depend even 
more on FON for our future national development, foreign trade, and energy supplies [however] 
warships may only pass through an EEZ if they cause no harm, but we cannot believe navigation 
activities involving military reconnaissance constitute harmless passage. Just imagine if China were 
to send submarines into an American EEZ. America's reaction would be even more intense.” Not 
only underlining the potential hypocrisy of action advocated by the U.S. in its “FON defence”, but 
equally advising against a “balance of terror” strategy that would see the repeat of a Cold War 
scenario.
A more  belligerent  position  was  conveyed  by  Admiral  Hu  Yanlin  (ret.)  in  an  interview  given 
following his stepping down as Chief Political Commissar for the PLA: “International anti-China 
forces are still using the rivalry over the jurisdiction of maritime rights in the Spratly Islands to 
spoil our relations with neighbouring states and further complicating the situation in the SCS… the 
United States as the fundamental anti-Chinese force... may seek to precipitate a crises, hoping that 
internal  difficulties  could  facilitate  foreign  aggression,  or  that  foreign  aggression  could  cause 
internal anxiety” (Yanlin 2010: 11). In his closing remarks in the interview Admiral Hu proposes 
that “With respect to activities in the South Sea [we need to] build the legal basis for the use of non-
peaceful means to resolve the rivalry over maritime rights. We are peace-loving... but we also need 
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to make the appropriate plans and preparations.” 
A similar tone was conveyed by Captain Li, an analyst at the Naval Research Centre in Beijing, in 
2010: “Secretary of State Hilary Clinton brazenly ran to Vietnam, declaring that the resolution of 
the South Sea dispute and FON are U.S. 'national interests' and 'foreign policy priorities', directly 
confronting China with this intervention and laying bare [the U.S.] determination to adopt a posture 
that  challenges  China's  'core  interests'”  (Jie  2010:  60).  With  his  concluding  remark  being: 
“'Struggle, but do not break' is the approach from now on in U.S. China relations, but we should 
more frequently and more insistently say 'no'… We completely have sufficient forces and effective 
military means to offer  a resolute  counter-attack.” Both of these remarks  were made following 
Clinton's speech in Hanoi in July 2010. In an evaluation of Admiral Hu's remarks Goldstein (2011: 
333) indicates that the external and internal perceived “threats” to the Chinese regime could be 
fusing in the minds of senior Chinese military officials,  transforming the SCS issue into a threat 
related to regime survival. Moreover, Captain Li's comments indicate the exception taken by the 
PLA leadership to the “intrusion” of the U.S. in what is seen as an internal, or at the very least 
regional concern to China. Mirroring perhaps the U.S. concern over Taiwan. 
4.2. China's Latent power: A reason to be worried
As indicated latent power is a function of a states level of wealth and population. With its actual 
power embedded primarily  in  its  army and the air  and naval  forces that  directly  support  it.  In 
determining  the  potential  threat  that  China  poses  as  a  rising  great  power  and  potential  future 
regional hegemon, its current and future wealth alongside its population must be examined. Table 
1:  Latent  Power  Country  Comparison compares  the  GDP,  GDP  per  capita,  population  and 
dependency on oil  imports  of the great powers China,  India,  Russia  and the U.S.A (a regional 
hegemon) over the previous five years and the projected future five years, thus covering a ten year 
period, with its locus being 2013 as the present. As Table 1 illustrates, since 2008 China has seen an 
average year on year increase of GDP of just under US$1 000 Billion47 starting in 2008 with US$4 
519 Billion GDP, by 2013 reaching US$ 9 020 Billion, and is projected to reach US$14 941 Billion  
by 2013. Over the same period the U.S. has seen an increase in just under US$2 Trillion, reaching 
US$16 237 Billion GDP in 2013,  and is  expected  to  reach US$21 101 Billion GDP by 2018, 
provided a complete economic recovery and long-term economic stability prevail. In comparison 
India and Russia, the next two regional powers in Asia are expected to see their economies each 
47 Utilizing short scale naming system.
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grow by US$1 000 Billion over the next five years to US$2 975 Trillion and US$3 181 Trillion 
respectively.
Conversely the growth in GDP per capita over this ten year period in the U.S. is expected to be 
US$16 776, in comparison with China which is expected to see a difference of only US$7 308 over 
the same period. However with GDP per capita being a function of real GDP and a states population 
(i.e.  Real  GDP/population)  China's  potential  for  growth  far  outstrips  that  of  the  U.S.  with  a 
population currently over four times greater than that of the U.S. and expected to remain so for the 
foreseeable future. 
Whilst India's population rivals that of China's, and should the current trend continue, is expected to 
surpass it, its GDP growth rate fails to compensate in the short term, and GDP per capita is expected 
to only double to US$2 246 by 2018 from its 2008 level. However over a long enough period, 
provided  strong  economic  growth  continues,  as  with  China,  India's  potential  for  growth  also 
outstrips that of the U.S., and consequently in the medium to long-term may successfully balance 
against China. In contrast to India though, Russia's population has already started to decline, but 
displaying similar economic growth to India in the short term, Russia's GDP per capita is set to 
double to US$22 906 by 2018 when compared to its 2008 level. Meaning in the short term Russia is 
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developing its future latent power at a more expeditious rate than either India or China, though due 
in greater part to its declining future latent power. Therefore as a balance to either China or India in  
the Asia-Pacific region Russia is unlikely to be effective in the short or long-term period.
By all accounts the Chinese economy will overtake that of the U.S., though predicting when enters 
the realm of speculative economics with forecasts  ranging wildly from roughly 2016 to 203048 
dependent upon which source one looks at. In either case Chinese economic output will be able to 
out  compete the U.S.  with several,  yet  obvious results.  China will  be able  to  build,  equip and 
support a larger army, and in particular build a greater number of land, water and air based military 
vehicles such as tanks, and aircraft carriers. To quote Napoleon Bonaparte: “An army marches on its 
stomach,” and China's military will never “go hungry” as it were. Furthermore China will be able to 
invest more in development of military technology, in particular missile technology, and whichever 
new technologies may present themselves.
To place within context the limited capacity that the ASEAN region has to balance against China in 
the SCS Table 2: Latent Power Country Group Comparison provides the same GDP projection as 
Table  1  for  the  ASEAN-549 and  the  European  Union  (providing  further  context).  In  2012  the 
ASEAN-5 GDP was US$1 935 Billion in comparison to China's US$8 227 Billion. By 2018 the 
ASEAN-5 GDP still will not have reached the 2008 GDP levels of China. And whilst it is unlikely 
that the European Union would become involved in any conflict in the SCS, the largest economy in 
the world has experienced significant stagnation over the last five years and is likely to be overtaken 
by the U.S. in  2015/16. Thus the strength of China's  growth relative to its  nearest  competitors 
becomes increasingly evident.
48 The Economist (The Economist website 2011) by 2021, PricewaterhouseCoopers (Hawksworth & Tiwari 2011: 3) 
by 2020, Investopedia (Investopedia 2013) by 2016, Forbes (Worstall 2013) by 2016, OECD (Moulds 2012) by 
2016, National Intelligence Council (NIC 2012: iv) before 2030, and PricewaterhouseCoopers again (Hawksworth 
& Tiwari 2011: 3) before 2035.
49 Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam – ASEAN's largest 5 economies
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4.3. China's Actual Power: Military Development
To determine China's  military strategy its  actual  power  alongside its  stated policy  needs  to  be 
examined.  In  this  regard  the  PRC has  every  four  years  published  on its  Ministry  of  National 
Defence website a White Paper detailing to the public China's defence policy. In April 2012 “The 
Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces” (The People's Republic of China 2013) White 
Paper was published. Within the preface it immediately states: 
“It is China's unshakable national commitment and strategic choice to take the road of peaceful  
development. China unswervingly pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and a national  
defence  policy  that  is  defensive  in  nature.  China  opposes  any  form of  hegemonism or  power  
politics,  and does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. China will  never seek  
hegemony or  behave  in  a  hegemonic  manner,  nor  will  it  engage in  military  expansion.  China  
advocates a new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination,  
and pursues comprehensive security, common security and cooperative security.”
If anything, the shear prominence of this statement at the outset of a White Paper on defence, can 
only  indicate  that  the  government  of  China  is  trying  to  reassure  is  neighbours  and “would  be 
competitors” of its peaceful intent.  Despite the traditional role of a White Paper on Defence to 
primarily inform the public on the government's policy and activities in defence of the nation, and 
only a secondary concern being the transparency of intentions between states, this White Paper is 
speaking more to a foreign audience and the concerns of the international community than to its 
own citizenry.  The preface  goes  onto  state  that  its  armed forces  act  as  a  guarantee  to  China's  
continued peaceful development and that such armed forces will be developed to the extent that it is 
commensurate with China's international standing, i.e. that a strong and influential state requires a 
strong military. Therefore the government of China is making clear its intentions through policy 
objectives, yet those policy objectives still include developing powerful military capabilities, and 
noting, as previously stated, that states balance against capabilities and not intentions, it is doubtful 
whether the stated intentions, whether true or not, will be found credible.
In Section I: New Situation, New Challenged and New Missions, the Paper speaks to the potential 
threats  to  its  national  unification,  territorial  integrity  and development  interests,  referring  most 
probably to the Taiwan, the SCS and Tibet. In particular referring to “some country” as having 
strengthened its Asia-Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence in the region, and 
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frequently makes the situation there tenser. With Japan explicitly referred to in the next sentence, 
“some country” must be referring to the U.S. China's cognizance of the U.S. as a potential threat is  
further emphasized in reference to “major powers” that are vigorously developing new and more 
sophisticated  military  technologies  so  as  to  maintain  strategic  superiority  in  international 
competition in such areas as outer space and cyberspace.
Though overly speculative of an innocuous policy statement,  the explicit  referral  to the aim of 
“winning local  wars under the conditions of informationization and expanding and intensifying 
military preparedness” can potentially be a reference and warning to the only ongoing conflict in 
the  region50 and  its  participants,  that  of  the  SCS.  However  there  is  a  clear  danger  of  over 
interpretation, and it is within every military's set of aims to always prevail in a conflict. However  
beyond such statements the White Paper proceeds to be highly consistent, and outlines a military 
policy that no way indicates China's aggression. If anything the White Paper strenuously asserts 
China's  right as a state to protect its  own interests,  and ensure that no force compromises  the 
“national unification, territorial integrity and development” interests of China.
China's  military  expenditure  largely  confirms  its  benign  intentions.  Though  China's  military 
expenditure has increased from US$18.336 Billion in 1989 to US$166.107 Billion in 2012 and is 
expected to continue to increase, as Chart 1: China51 indicates military expenditure in real terms has 
not kept pace with year on year GDP growth. In fact, as  Chart 2: China indicates whilst GDP 
growth has fluctuated significantly over the past two decades, military expenditure has remained 
exceptionally constant,  hovering around two percent  of GDP. With the trend-line in both cases 
indicating that military expenditure is likely to remain constant. In the case of an aggressive power 
one would expect military expenditure to keep pace with, if not exceed annual GDP growth, as the 
primary goal of the state becomes waging war,  increasingly large portions of the economy revolve 
around the military-industrial complex. This scenario is illustrated in  Chart 3: U.S.A. During the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001-2012, the rise in military expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP from three percent to five percent is irrespective of the performance of the economy.
50 The dispute over Taiwan, though ongoing, lies on the Northeast border of the region, and is considered here to be 
stable, with few variables prompting change in the status quo.
51 Data for charts 1, 2 and 3 collected from follow two sources:
• SIPRI. 2013. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2013. Internet:  http://milexdata.sipri.org/  . Access: 24 June 
2013.
• International Monetary Fund website. 2013. World Economic Outlook Database. Internet: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx. Access: 24 June 2013.
The figures for China are for estimated total military expenditure, including estimates for items not included in the 
official defence budget.
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4.4. SCS Actual Power: A String of Pearls
In determining whether the SCS is the “Apple of Discord”52 between China and the U.S. a closer 
examination of China's activity in the region and the surrounding locales must be made. To this end 
China's “String of Pearls” strategy is designed to safeguard its sources of energy and, as a result, has 
expanded China's power projection capabilities53. The “String” itself stretches from the SCS to the 
Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, including Sri Lanka and the East Coast of Africa. There are two 
bases of concern in the SCS: the Army Navy Submarine Base on Hainan Island and the Yonxing 
Island Military Airport and garrison on Woody Island (Phu Lam Island). Two further significant 
pearls are located in Sri Lanka (Hambantota commercial shipping centre) and Pakistan (the Gwadar 
Port near the Strait of Hormuz), both of which offer significant potential support for China's Navy 
as deep sea ports  (GlobalSecurity.org 2013).  Further  projects  include similar  ports  in Myanmar 
(GlobalSecurity.org 2011): the Sittwe Naval Base and a maritime reconnaissance and electronic 
52 Reference to the Trojan Cycle of Myth in which the Goddess Iris caused a dispute by tossing in the Golden Apple 
of Discord - “Apple of Discord” is thus used to signify the core, kernel, or crux of an argument, or a small matter 
that could lead to a bigger dispute.
53 Refer to Map 3: String of Pearls 
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intelligence  station  on  Great  Coco  Island  and  a  military  base  on  Small  Coco  Island;  and 
Bangladesh, and a US$10 Billion port project in Bagamoyo, Tanzania.  Most of these bases are 
unlikely in themselves to be a source of conflict, being arguably capacity supporting and defensive 
in nature, and relied upon only in the case that hostilities breakout. The SCS forms the only link in 
the chain where there is potential for hostility, where the combination of military build up, territorial 
claims, and significant resources all converge. 
Two  alternative  flashpoints  to  the  SCS  do  exist,  the  Straits  of  Malacca54 and  the  Cross-strait 
relations with Taiwan55. The former however is a solely a strategic concern in so far as it remains 
open for free trade as a route for China's oil supply from the Middle-east. Hostilities are unlikely to 
breakout in this location, but are likely to take place in the straits once hostilities do breakout, as it 
is a strategically important location or choke point. Currently no Chinese bases are located in the 
straits themselves, thou as previously indicated several are located in Myanmar, a state located at 
the northern entrance to the straits. Conversely Taiwan, a much discussed alternative flashpoint for 
hostilities between the U.S. and China holds little strategic value, however is a major source for 
tensions  in  the  form of  the  reunification  debate  concerning  the  “One-China”  or  “Two-Chinas” 
policies.  In  this  case there is  little  to  no prospect  for  an invasion  of  the mainland by Taiwan. 
Conversely the threat posed by the mainland to Taiwan is arguably significant, and held at bay 
singularly by U.S. guarantees. Therefore the potential as a flashpoint is limited to either aggression 
from the mainland, or an unforeseen incident which leads to the outbreak of hostilities. The former 
is unlikely as it requires the intention to start a war, and the later is indeterminable by its very 
nature, the summary conclusion reached here is that neither of these two alternatives is persuasive 
as a flashpoint for Sino-U.S. Conflict.
54 Significant research has been undertaken on this topic, including but not limited to:
• Jarocki, M. 2012. Indian Strategy towards the Strait of Malacca. In South Asia Journal, 4
• Freeman, D.B. 2003. Straits of Malacca: Gateway or Gauntlet?. Quebec City: McGill-Queen's University Press
• Mokhzani, Z. & Basiron, M.N. 2005. The Strait of Malacca: The Rise of China, America's Intentions and the 
Dilemma of the Littoral States. In Maritime Studies, 141(March/April 2005): 24-26.
• Further authors: Robert Potter, Hamzah Ahmad, Ganesh Sahathevan, Jae-Hyung Lee, Eric Watkins
55 Significant research has been undertaken on this topic, including but not limited to: 
• Glasser, B.S. & Billingsley, B. 2011. Taiwan's 2012 Presidential Election and Cross-strait relations. In Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies, PacNet #66.
• Brown, D.G. 2003.  Democratization and Cross-strait  Relations. Atlantic Council Asia Papers.  Washington, 
D.C.: Atlantic Council
• Jinghua, L. 2011. Taiwan's role in the breakout of the Taiwan Strait Crises. Nacka: Institute for Security and 
Development Policy.
• Further authors: Arthur S. Ding, Alan M. Wachman, Martina Klimesova, Sangsoo Lee, Yuexue Chen.
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4.4.1. Zonal Defence and Hainan Naval Base
China's Naval strategy and force capability in the SCS56 is based on  Liu Huaqing's57 concept of 
Zonal Defence that would provide a zone of protective maritime space for the navy's expansion 
(Buszynski 2012: 146). Zonal Defence was a Soviet Naval Defence Theory developed in 1946 by 
Admiral  Vladimir  Alafuzov that  stated that  due to the advent  of mines,  submarines,  and naval 
aircraft  surface warships had become largely task-specific in their  primary capabilities (Herrick 
1988). As a result the sea may be divided into a number of zones in which the potential of using a  
fleet as an integrated whole to employ all of its elements will not be identical. Consequently the 
overall power of a fleet will vary depending on the particular zone in which it is operating, and the 
suitability of the various types of naval forces available for sustained and effective operations in 
that zone58. Three different zones in which a fleet's power would vary are described:
• the zone in which “large surface ships and submarines can be employed far from their base 
without diminution of their capabilities (as in the case of larger surface ships it is made clear 
that their operations should be conducted with combat air cover provided in the open ocean 
by aircraft carriers)
• the zone in which medium and small craft become effective as the scene of action comes 
closer to the base area, and so do bombers and torpedo-carrying aircraft.
• The zone in which land-base fighter aircraft and light surface-torpedo craft can be used as 
one comes closer yet.
Alafuzov stated: “. . . [E]ven a very strong fleet, operating close to the enemy's coast, may lose its  
advantage and not have the relative strength to carry out its mission. If one's coast is favourably 
configured and if there are islands extending out from the coast on which naval and air bases may 
be  set  up,  then  the  zone over  which  even quite  a  weak fleet  may  still  remain  "master  of  the 
situation" can be quite extensive. In a concrete situation then, one must consider not an abstract 
comparison of the capabilities of the opposing fleets but their capabilities for the use of the forces 
from the point of view of the missions they are assigned” (Herrick 1988). Alafuzov carries on to 
56 Note that China's true force capability will be covered in the next Chapter in the form of a military to military  
comparison  with  U.S.  forces.  The  focus  here  is  China's  force  capability  specifically  in  the  SCS,  which  as  
demonstrated here includes a tactical dimension in addition to specific technological advancements that together  
provide a force capability that exceeds the mere sum of the total deployable forces; and thereby justifies a separate  
analysis in this section.
57 Commander of the PLA from 1982-1988 and considered responsible for its modernization, in particular the vision  
that China's Navy should have a global reach.
58 For  more  information  on  this  theory  please  refer  to:  Herrick,  R.W.  1988.  Soviet  naval  theory  and  policy: 
Gorbachev's inheritance. Rhode Island: U.S. Naval War College
49
explain that a weaker fleet  may through “adroit  utilization of its  resources” expand its  zone of 
control, and if assisted by land-based air power dramatically increase that zone of control.
Under Liu, Chinese naval strategy shifted from offshore or coastal defence to ‘‘near seas defence,’’ 
which covers an area up to the ‘‘first  island chain59.’’ This stretches from Japan to the Ryukyu 
Islands to the Philippines and to the SCS; a second island chain is farther out into the Pacific and 
stretches from Japan to include Guam. Since its formulation two decades ago, the island chain 
concept continues to shape Chinese naval thinking as a way of identifying and demarcating zones of 
interest. The first island chain concept includes Taiwan, the Yellow and the SCS as safe sanctuaries 
for basing naval platforms as well as their safe passage to the open sea (Buszynski 2012: 146). 
Zonal Defence, however, demands that the U.S. Navy be kept at bay and at a sufficient distance so 
it can not interfere with Chinese naval deployments in the area, and as such has resulted in the 
development of the ASBM60. 
The Hainan Yulin Naval Base near Sanya serves as the SCS sanctuary (Kaneda 2013: 4). According 
to Sinodefense.com (2009) Yalong Bay (where the Naval base is located) has an average depth of 
15 to 20 meters, suitable for berthing large combatants and submarines. The facilities consist of a 3 
200m and a 1 300m breakwater, a surface fleet base located on the Northeast bank of the bay, and a 
nuclear submarine base on a peninsula at the eastern part of the bay. The facilities possibly became 
operational in 2001 to 2002.  The surface fleet base consists of two finger piers about 1 000m in 
length,  both  capable  of  berthing  surface  combatants,  amphibious  warfare  ships,  larger 
replenishment oiler ships, and potentially aircraft carriers if necessary. Currently the base is the 
home port of the 9th Destroyer Flotilla of the South Sea Fleet. The facility consists of three finger 
piers  for  berthing  nuclear  submarines,  an  underground  submarine  facility,  and  a  submarine 
demagnetisation facility located on the southern tip of the peninsula. The underground facility has a 
large entrance about 3m wide, enough to accommodate large nuclear-powered missile submarines. 
Federation  of  American  Scientists  (FAS)  claimed  that  a  Type  094  Jin  class  SSBN 61 is  now 
permanently based here, but this cannot be confirmed (Sinodefense.com 2009). 
As Hainan develops as a naval base, the Paracel Islands to the south assume an important role in 
providing  air  cover  and  sea  protection  for  Hainan.  This  explains  Chinese  sensitivity  to  U.S. 
surveillance vessels and why five Chinese naval vessels confronted the USNS Impeccable on 9 
59 Refer to Map 5: Geographic boundaries of the First and Second Islands Chains
60 This will be covered in the next section
61 U.S. Navy designation for a Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine.
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March 2009. The protection of Hainan is one thing, but assured access to the open sea for carriers 
and SSBNs is another. For this, China requires control over the Spratlys, or at least the ability to 
prevent  external  powers  from interfering with China’s  naval  movements  in  an  area that  would 
extend to the Strait of Malacca (Buszynski 2012: 146). The military airport on Woody Island, that 
enables the PLA to conduct air patrols over the area, serves this purpose, and supports Chinese 
fishing vessels,  demonstrating China’s sovereignty over the SCS. 
Though largely indeterminate, the following is a brief breakdown of the ships known to be based in 
Hainan and form part of the South Sea Fleet: five modern DDGs (missile destroyers) and three 
nuclear submarines; a Chinese-built 22 000-ton  Fuchi-class replenishment ship the AO 887; the 
First and the 165th marine brigades and their associated amphibious vessels; the only two 1 250-ton 
Qiongshi hospital ships in the PLA Navy, joined in 2008 by a new 23,000-ton Type 920 hospital 
ship with a helicopter deck (this shows that PLA planners expect combat casualties); several of the 
newest  054A frigates,  with  combat  systems  previously  found  only  on  DDGs;  as  well  as  the 
Liaoning aircraft carrier is expected to be based in Hainan, along with its potential battle group 
support  of  two destroyer  divisions  (Bussert  2009).  In  sum  the newest  and most  effective  PLA 
DDGs, SSBN, Landing Platform/Docks (LPD) and replenishment naval forces have been station in 
Hainan.
4.4.2. Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles
Area denial weapons are weapons that prevent area access to potential adversaries. In the particular 
case of ASBMs area access is prevented to ships on the high seas via threat of attack by an ASBM 
that is safely located on the mainland. This is of particular relevance to aircraft carriers which form 
the core of a great powers naval projection. To deny access to an aircraft carrier and its escorting 
Carrier Strike Group effectively undermines and reduces the power projection capabilities of the 
respective state. Alternative naval area denial weapons include conventional and nuclear-powered 
attack  submarines  and guided missile  destroyers  with long-range anti-air  and anti-ship missiles 
(Office of the Secretary of Defence 2010: 30). However these two alternatives are conventional in 
nature, form part of conventional naval combat, and are typically easier to neutralize; as opposed to 
ASBMs which are a relatively new addition to the complexities of naval warfare, being deployed 
for the first time by China in 2010.
The ASBM China is deploying is based on the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) design 
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of  the  DF-21.  The  latest  variant  of  this  design  is  the  DF-21D an  ASBM variant  employing a 
terminally guided MaRV (Manoeuvring Re-entry Vehicle)  (O'Connor 2012). The missile is a two 
stage, solid propellant, terminal guidance62 ASBM with an expected range of +/-1500km63. 
In combination with its Zonal Defence strategy, ASBMs grant China significant actual power in the 
SCS,  that  is  expected  only  to  increase,  beyond  its  actual  force  numbers.  Due  to  the  tactical 
advantages granted by Yulin Base, the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands (in particular Woody 
Island) to China's small and medium sized ships through anti-air defences, air cover in Island inlets,  
air  support and Ballistic Missile support its  unclear,  despite a significant disparity in real naval 
power with the U.S., even at present whether the U.S. would be able to establish a zone of control in 
the SCS without support from its allies in the region.
The development of the DF-21D can be potentially used to discredit China's claim of a “peaceful 
rise,”  that  it  does  not  seek to  re-order  the  international  system.  In that  the  DF-21D missile  is  
specifically designed to disable and destroy U.S. naval assets, in particular U.S. aircraft carriers. 
Such specificity in design surely indicates China's hostility to the U.S.64 However in response to 
such a claim it must be noted that the defence capabilities of a state and in particular a great power 
serve to act as a security umbrella from potential aggressors, in particular the aggressor that presents 
the greatest  potential  threat,  hence why states balance.  Such a concept  would be self-defeating 
should China's security umbrella have “U.S. shaped holes” in it. No state indicates that it plans to 
defend itself against all but one state, and China is no exception. However this does not preclude the 
potential for a technology based arms race, in fact it promotes the likelihood of one, as the U.S. will 
continue to attempt to overcome China's A2AD capabilities.
4.5. Regional tensions with Japan and India
In September 2012 seventy-five Taiwanese fishing vessels were escorted by ten Taiwanese Coast 
Guard vessels to the area around the Senkaku Islands clashing with Japanese Coast Guard ships. 
With military escalation continuing into 2013, Japanese Defence Ministry Officials announced that 
62 Terminal guidance refers to a guidance system that is active during the terminal phase (the point at  which the 
missile impacts with the target).  This is  particularly relevant  with relation to moving targets such as  ships,  as  
opposed to fixed targets.
63 For a detailed map of Ballistic Missile ranges refer to Map (No.): Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic 
Missiles
64 This position is contrary to Offensive Realism which states that there are no “good” or “bad” States. Only States 
that lack perfect knowledge of the intentions of other States, that therefore assume the worst and therefore balance 
against the capabilities of potential aggressor States.
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a skirmish between a Chinese frigate and Japanese destroyer nearly broke out on two occasions in 
January  when  the  Chinese  frigate  directed  weapons-related  fire-control  radar  at  the  Japanese 
destroyer (Herman 2013). 
India's naval presence in the SCS has equally exacerbated relations with China. In a statement given 
by India Navy Chief Admiral D.K. Joshi (Reuters 2012) he said that while India was not a claimant  
in the dispute over territorial rights in the SCS, it was prepared to act, if necessary, to protect its  
maritime and economic interests in the region. “When the requirement is there, for example, in 
situations where our country's interests are involved, for example [India state-run Oil and Natural 
Gas Corp] we will be required to go there and we are prepared for that...Now, are we preparing for  
it? Are we having exercises of that nature? The short answer is yes.” 
Any peace, security and stability within Asia is dependent upon a cooperative security structure or 
understanding within Asia, which is in turn based upon the three major powers of Asia: China, India 
and Japan. However despite China having resolved seventeen of its twenty-three territorial disputes, 
making substantial concessions in most of these settlements, usually receiving less that 50 percent 
of  the  contested  land  (Fravel  2005:  46),  its  remaining disputes  are  with  India  and Japan (and 
Bhutan), excluding the Spratlys, Paracel and Taiwan disputes. India, over Aksai Chin and Arunachal 
Pradesh; Japan, concerning the Senkaku Islands, excluding the EEZ dispute over Okinotorishima. 
The  political  significance  of  these  claims  in  terms  of  public  perception  and  prestige  makes  it 
difficult to compromise in any resolution to the dispute for fear of being perceived as weak and 
appeasing a potential rival; and serves further as a potential source for tension.
Joshy Paul (2010: 9), adhering to Offensive Realism, states that great powers tend to favour “buck-
passing” over “balancing” and that it is this strategy that China has employed with both Japan and 
India through the intermediaries of North Korea and Pakistan respectively. With tacit approval from 
Beijing North Korea tested its Teopodong I and II missiles over the Sea of Japan in 2006, eventually 
forcing Japan to depend on the U.S. for its  security  rather  than its  own defence infrastructure. 
Prime-minister Yukio Hatoyama, during his tenure from 2009 to 2010, used North Korea's attack on 
the South Korean naval ship the Cheonan as a pretext for ensuring that the U.S. Marine Corps Air 
Station  Futenma  remained  in  Okinawa  (Satoko  2011).  Hatoyama  thereby  utilized  regional 
uncertainty to effectively “pass the buck” to the U.S., which as an offshore balancer was happy to  
do so. Furthermore Beijing was reluctant to accept the findings of the investigation of the sinking of 
the Cheonan, which was conducted by a Multi-National Joint Civilian Military Investigation group.
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Concerning  India,  China  has  provided  military  technology  and  various  other  types  of  military 
hardware to Pakistan to help it attain parity with India in Southeast Asia. Even pledging a civilian 
nuclear  deal  to  Pakistan  along  the  lines  of  the  Indo-U.S.  Nuclear  deal  based  on  the  logic  of 
“restoring nuclear balance in South Asia” (Sreenivasan 2010).
Conversely,  or perhaps in response to and in an effort  to balance China,  Japan and India have 
developed closer ties, culminating in 2006 in a Joint Statement on Bilateral Defence Cooperation, 
which set forth the following objectives: Defence exchanges to enhance mutual understanding and 
promote wide-ranging cooperation; service-to-service exchanges, including capacity building which 
could lead to cooperation in disaster relief  and maritime security;  exchange of information and 
experiences in tackling regional and global issues; and cooperation in technical areas. By 2008 the 
two  countries  were  referring  to  each  other  as  “Strategic  Global  Partners”  and  enjoy  a 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement that liberalizes bilateral economic activity. And 
since 2006 India and Japan have held annual Prime Ministerial level talks – a privilege afforded by 
each to no other state (in Japan’s case, even the United States) (Panda 2012).
The likelihood of settling the Sino-Indian and Sino-Japanese disputes seems remote. As the April 
2005  Chinese-Indian  agreement  on  principles  for  settling  their  dispute  demonstrates,  external 
factors are likely to play a stronger role in this conflicts final settlement, even though the parameters 
of  the  compromise  were  established  decades  ago.  As  regards  the  Senkaku  Islands  and  the 
Okinotorishima EEZ dispute there exists  no incentive to  compromise over  sovereignty because 
these islands cost little to dispute. As Fravel (2005: 82) indicates the dispute may yield a strategic or 
economic  advantage  in  the  future,  particularly  regarding  potential  concessions  in  the  SCS. 
Undoubtedly Beijing is keeping its options wide open.
5. United States Intervention
The central elements defining the “Rise of China” is its focus on economic development and the 
maintenance of China's Core interests (that of Tibet, Taiwan and the SCS65). Further the rise of 
China  has  been  defined  as  “peaceful”  by  both  academics  and  government  officials  alike66. 
65 There is debate as to whether the SCS is a “core” interest. As there has been no official statement contradicting the  
treatment of the SCS as a “core” interest,  it  is  taken,  in this paper,  that  the PRC government is  content with  
concerned states treating the issue as a “core” interest of China.
66 Refer to 
• Yue, J. 2008. Peaceful Rise of China: Myth or Reality? In International Politics, 2008(45): 439-456.
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Supposedly distinguishing it from the Western model of development, which understood in such a 
context, is considered not to be peaceful. However in candid appraisals of China's development, as 
indicated above, anxieties by ASEAN states are at least to some extent considered natural. It is this 
anxiety that forms the core tension regarding U.S. policy in East Asia as a whole and Southeast Asia 
in particular. To this extent it is a well excepted truism that Asian countries want to have good 
relations  with  the  U.S.  and  with  China.  That  from China  they  want  the  benefit  of  economic 
engagement and a reduction of tensions. From the United States, they want a security hedge should 
ties with China go sour. As Bush (2012) points out following President Obama's tour of East Asia in 
November 2011 both former South Korean president Lee Myung-bak and former Japanese prime 
minister Noda, both ardent U.S. allies, travelled to Beijing; and PRC vice-president Xi Jinping was 
welcomed to Thailand (a U.S. ally) and Vietnam. Whilst Asian countries may desire to use the U.S. 
to balance the rise of China militarily, they do no not want to be caught in a confrontation between 
the two giants. Thus emphasizing the importance of the U.S. stance.
To this extent the foreign policy intentions of the U.S need to be understood. In particular (1) the 
reasoning behind the change in geopolitical emphasis, i.e. why the “pivot” to Asia; (2) to what 
extent is the U.S. policy in the SCS “constructive engagement”; (3) or “containment”, and thus 
whether the U.S. is internally balancing with its actual power; and (4) what role does the U.S.  
interaction  with  India  and  Japan  play,  and  therefore  is  the  U.S.  buck-passing  and  externally 
balancing?
5.1. Domestic Politics and the Pivot to Asia
What is the Pivot to Asia? In an Op-Ed piece submitted to Foreign Policy Magazine on 11 October 
2011, Hillary Clinton stated: 
“As the war in Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the  
United States stands at a pivot point. Over the last 10 years, we have allocated immense resources  
to those two theatres. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we  
invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership,  
• Xia,  M.  2007.  “China  Threat”  or  a  “Peaceful  Rise  of  China”?  Internet: 
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-china-politics-007.html. Access: 30 June 2013
• Bijian, Z. 2005. China's “Peaceful Rise” to great power Status. In Foreign Affairs. September/October 2005.
• Grant, C. 2010. China's Peaceful Rise Turns Prickly, 22 January 2010. Centre for European Reform. Internet: 
http://www.cer.org.uk/insights/chinas-peaceful-rise-turns-prickly. Access: 30 June 2013.
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secure  our  interests,  and  advance  our  values.  One  of  the  most  important  tasks  of  American  
statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment --  
diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise -- in the Asia-Pacific region.”
The U.S. “Pivot” to Asia is a “re-orientation” of the United State's foreign policy from the Middle-
East to the Asia-Pacific region via diplomatic, economic, strategic and other necessary means. The 
declared reasoning behind this re-orientation being to sustain U.S. leadership, secure U.S. interests 
and advance U.S. values in the region, and on a global scale. This raises the two further questions 
relating to the U.S. policy of constructive engagement: 1) why is the Asia-pacific region a key 
driver  of  politics;  and 2)  how or  through what  mechanisms will  the  U.S.  utilize the region to 
maintain U.S. leadership and its corresponding interests and values?
The  pivot to or  rather  development  of  the  U.S.  foreign  policy  for  Asia,  was  a  track  that  was 
developed during the 2008 presidential campaign, in particular by Pres. Obama who stated during 
the  April  2007 Democratic  campaign  debate  that  China  is  “neither  our  enemy nor  our  friend. 
They're competitors. But we have to make sure that we have enough military-to-military contact 
and forge enough of a relationship with them that we can stabilize the region.” Later that same 
month, before the Chicago Council on Global Affairs he stated that he will “forge a more effective 
regional framework in Asia," building on "our strong bilateral relations and informal arrangements 
like  the  Six-Party  Talks"  on  North  Korea  (CFR  2013a).  With  Hillary  Clinton  defining  the 
importance of that relationship more clearly the following year stating as a candidate that the U.S. 
relationship with China will be the most important bilateral relationship in the world in this century 
(Kessler  2009).  With  her  appointment  as  Secretary  of  State  she,  and  President  Obama,  would 
continue to be the driving forces behind this policy. 
Key here is understanding the context in which the 2008, and later 2012, presidential campaigns 
took place in. With the Democratic Party being the party of “escape” and “normalization” from the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Promoting a return to an assertive yet non-military centric foreign 
policy that would restore U.S. prestige internationally. In contrast the Republican Party was placed 
on the proverbial “back foot”, defending the prior eight year foreign policy focus on the middle-east 
that saw a decline in U.S. leadership and strength in both soft and hard power terms in the form of 
deteriorating  prestige  and  an  exhausted  military.  In  contrast  to  the  rhetoric  of  the  Democratic 
candidates, the Republican nominee for the 2008 presidential race Sen. John McCain stated policy 
towards China was a continuation of the status quo, i.e. McCain supported the U.S. policy that will  
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“hedge” against China's growing global influence. “That doesn't imply an effort to oppose China's 
emergence as an influential power, but it does mean maintaining our military presence in East Asia, 
strengthening our alliance with Japan and our relations with other Asian countries, and working 
through groups like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum to further American 
interests and values” (CFR 2013b). In contrast McCain's proposed policy towards the Middle-east 
was  far  more  comprehensive  and  expanding  (a  generic  position  held  at  the  time),  particularly 
towards democracy promotion across the region, uncompromising support for Israel, and a focus on 
tackling counter-insurgency efforts  (CFR 2013b).  Therefore with the victory of  the Democratic 
Party in the 2008 elections U.S. foreign policy was re-orientated towards a U.S. “rejuvenation” 
internationally. With the perceived means being that of becoming a more proactive actor in the 
Asia-pacific region. 
With  the  origins  of  the  pivot  explained,  why is  the  Asia-pacific  region a  key driver  of  global 
politics? It has become a truism that China is rising. According to the evaluation given by former 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the reasons are based upon the centrality of the Asia-pacific 
region in terms of the global economy and the geopolitical considerations that accompany the rise 
to great power status of a state. With the Asia-pacific “stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the 
western  shores  of  the  Americas,  spanning  two  oceans,  the  Pacific  and  the  Indian,  which  are 
increasingly linked by shipping and strategy.”  Further “It boasts almost half the world's population. 
It  includes  many of  the  key engines  of  the  global  economy,  as  well  as  the  largest  emitters  of 
greenhouse gases. It is home to several of our key allies and important emerging powers like China,  
India, and Indonesia” (Clinton 2011). What is meant by the term “strategy” is open to interpretation, 
however it most likely refers to the region in both geopolitical terms, in the context of such features  
as the Malacca straits, SCS and the proximity of emerging powers (who are involved in a territorial 
dispute); as well as the fact that any potential future effort to maintain or promote global leadership 
must necessarily deal with a rising China. Without over emphasizing the importance of Clinton's 
comments  the  linking  of  shipping  and  strategy,  whilst  being  an  obvious  allusion  to  the  U.S. 
promotion of FON, draws similarity from evaluations made by PLA officers on the connection 
between the economy, military security and political influence within the region, mirrored by the 
three investments Clinton indicated would be made by the U.S. into the Asia-pacific region. 
Clinton  (2011)  describes  the  regional  strategy  as  “forward-deployed”  diplomacy.  This  strategy 
proceeds  along  six  lines  of  action:  (1)  strengthening bilateral  security  alliances;  (2)  deepening 
working relationships with emerging powers,  including with China;  (3) engaging with regional 
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multilateral  institutions; (4) expanding trade and investment;  (5) forging a broad-based military 
presence; (6) and advancing democracy and human rights. Since 2008 the key developments that 
encompass points 2, 3, 4, and 6 in this strategy are: (1) the establishment of the U.S. China Strategic 
and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) on 1 April  2009;  (2)  the signing of the Treaty of  Amity and 
Cooperation on 22 July 2009; (3) the U.S.-ASEAN dialogue on 15 November 2009; (4) joining the 
East Asian Summit in Indonesia on 19 November 2011; and the (5) hosting of the APEC meeting in 
Honolulu from 12 to 13 November 201167 Together these institutions constitute the multilateral 
component of the U.S. East and Southeast Asian framework. Whilst the treaty alliances with Japan, 
South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and Australia encompass largely points 1 and 5; these are in 
addition  to  developing relations  with  the  emerging powers  of  particularly Indonesia  and India. 
According  to  Clinton  (2011)  these  alliances  “leverage  our  regional  presence  and  enhance  our 
regional leadership at a time of evolving security challenges” and “... working with more allies and 
partners will provide a more robust bulwark against threats or efforts to undermine regional peace 
and stability.”
Thus the “pivot” to Asia is a means to maintain U.S. leadership in what, at least according to the  
Democratic Party, is the geopolitical theatre that will occupy the position of greatest political and 
economic importance. And that, as such, the U.S. must be involved in this region if it wishes to  
maintain  its  global  leadership.  The  aforementioned  alliances  alongside  multilateral  institutions 
constitute the regional framework the U.S. has included itself in.
5.2. Constructive Engagement
However, whilst the above indicates the importance of East Asia as a whole, the U.S. requires a  
stronger motivation to involve itself in the political tension of a particular sub-region. What is the 
underlying motivation for the increased U.S. involvement in the SCS? Historically, since the end of 
WWII East and Southeast Asia have comprised a zone of U.S. hegemony in so far as underwriting 
security and stability are concerned68. This status was maintained by the U.S. through its treaty 
67 For more information on these regional topics: http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/index.htm 
68 For more information on U.S. hegemony please refer to:
• Van Ness, P. 2001.  Hegemony, not anarchy: Why China and Japan are not balancing US unipolar power. 
Working Paper 2001/4. Canberra: Department of International Relations, Australian National University
• Bandow,  D.  2009.  China's  Military  Rise  Means  end  of  US  Hegemony?  CATO  Institute.  Internet: 
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/chinas-military-rise-means-end-us-hegemony.  Access  4  July 
2013
• Rubinovitz, Z. 2012. The US vs. the East Asian rising powers: Can the US stay on top? 22Nd IPSA World 
Congress, Madrid, July 8-12, 2012.
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alliances with Japan, South Korea,  the Philippines,  Thailand, Taiwan and,  as a final guarantee, 
Australia (a WWII ally), alongside its military deployments in South Korea and Japan. However in 
strategic terms the U.S. involvement in East and Southeast Asia remained static as the U.S. became 
somewhat disillusioned with active involvement beyond the concerns of its allies and foreign policy 
focus following the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Focus progressively shifted towards concerns 
in  the Middle-east  (with the exception of the normalization of relations with the PRC in 1978 
following the Sino-Soviet  split,  a  continuation of  the Cold War),  specifically:  the Egypt-Israeli 
Peace  (1979);  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan  (1979-1989),  the  Gulf  War  (1990-1991),  the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991), the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process (~2000~); the Wars in 
Iraq (2003-2011) and Afghanistan (2001-present). 
The current consensus and position elaborated on by the U.S. government states that in order to 
maintain  American  relevancy and more  specifically  leadership  in  global  politics  the  U.S.  must 
become more proactive in the politics of East and Southeast Asia. This position however does not 
explain its ultimate policy goal in respect to China and more specifically how it would react should 
tensions escalate in the SCS. The positioning of the U.S. in the region can be interpreted as both 
benign or belligerent: a policy of “constructive engagement” or “containment”. 
Therefore the respective and potential policies of “containment” and “constructive engagement” 
must  be  investigated.  The  stated  concern  of  the  U.S.  in  the  SCS conflict  is  that  of  FON and 
protection of maritime law. The “depth” of this position will be first investigated in the context of 
the potential of the U.S. to be pursuing a policy of “constructive engagement.” The evidence for a  
policy of “containment” will be examined in the following two sections. 
5.2.1. Freedom of Navigation
As indicated above, in the context of maintaining peace and security, defending FON in the SCS 
ranks with countering the proliferation efforts of North Korea and ensuring the transparency of 
military activities  within the region.  Accordingly U.S. defence of maritime law and FON have 
served as the spearhead for U.S. involvement in the SCS dispute and its stated aims of maintaining 
its future leadership. However what does FON imply? And by ensuring continued FON, according 
to  the  U.S.  definition,  does  it  promote  constructive  engagement  and  revival?  What  are  the 
implications of curtailing claims of sovereignty and therefore limitation of FON over the water 
ways of the SCS? And therefore how has U.S. involvement promoted security in the region in 
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general as opposed to promoting security for its allies only? And to what extent is the U.S. invested 
in peace in the region? The argument being that a policy of constructive engagement, aside from its 
economic dimension, underwrites security and ensures that conflict is undesirable for all parties. 
Moreover it serves to not intimidate potential aggressors. Or limit the scope for action by either 
China or its SCS counterparts. This includes bandwagoning and balancing actions.
Noting that the U.S. has signed, but not ratified the UNCLOS III treaty, citing objections to Part XI 
which establishes a regime governing the mining and exploration of minerals on the seabed outside 
any state's territorial waters or EEZ. The U.S. has expressed agreement to the remaining provisions 
of the conventions and therefore accepts all but Part XI as customary international law, with all its 
accompanying authority on U.S. policy. 
The remarks entitled International Straits and Navigational Freedoms presented by Rear Admiral 
William L. Schachte, Jr. (1992: 6) of the Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Navy, presented to 
the 26th Law of the Sea Institute Annual Conference in Genoa, Italy 1992 addresses the issue of 
FON  and  its  importance.  Though  the  statement  at  the  time  was  addressing  issues  of  bridge 
construction  across  international  straits,  the  statement  also  addresses  the  importance  and 
implications  of  FON  and  logical  coherence  from  customary  law.  Demonstrating  U.S.  policy 
consistency over a 20 year period. Schachte states: 
“Even before the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference first convened in the early seventies, the  
critical importance and unique nature of international straits was recognized. These choke points  
form the lifeline between high seas areas. In order for the high seas freedoms of navigation and  
overflight to be preserved in international straits which would be overlapped by 12 mile territorial  
sea claims (displacing the earlier recognized 3 mile territorial sea norm), the navigational regime  
in  international  straits  would  have  to  share  similar  basic  characteristics  with  these  high  seas  
freedoms. General support existed in the Conference for a 12 mile territorial sea. Such support  
depended,  however,  on  ensuring  that  in  international  straits  less  than  24  miles  wide  at  their  
narrowest point, an adequate navigation regime be preserved to ensure essential elements of the  
right of FON and overflight. The lesser navigational right of non-suspendable innocent passage  
was simply not enough. Reality,  in terms of fundamental international commerce and security  
interests,  required open access through international  straits.  Regardless of the breadth of  the  
strait, whether 5 or 24 miles, certain freedoms had to apply, such as continuous and expeditious  
transit in, under, and over the strait and its approaches. Any codification of the law of the sea had  
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to  reflect  this  state  practice  and political  and military reality.  Before we proceed further,  it  is  
important to underscore that the regime of transit passage is crucial to the maintenance of world  
peace and order. By relieving littoral states of the political burdens associated with a role as gate  
keepers,  the  transit  passage  rules  minimize  the  possibility  of  straits  states  being  drawn into  
conflicts.” 
Two points require emphasis: (1) to continued maintenance of international commerce and security 
requires FON and (2) the political and military responsibility of littoral (coastal) states of securing 
access to territorial and EEZ waters is implied to be a potential source of conflict, presumably in  
terms  of  capacity,  diplomatic,  political,  economic  and  strategic  concerns.  By  rendering  the 
responsibility of “gatekeeper” obsolete this particular source of conflict is remedied. To date the 
U.S. maintains this particular policy consistency, with the Dept. of State stating that the United 
States will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide 
basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the Law of the Sea 
(LOS) Convention. And further the United States will not acquiesce to the unilateral acts of other 
states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and 
overflight and other related high seas uses (U.S. Department of State 2013). The U.S. FON Program 
operates on a triple track of diplomatic representations, operational assertions by U.S. military units 
and bilateral and multilateral consultations. Meaning that the U.S. will potentially deploy its naval 
units to a disputed environment as a means of asserting the primacy of international and customary 
law.
To this end the U.S. has demonstrated remarkable consistency with respect to challenging excessive 
maritime claims that hinder its interpretation of FON in respect to both neutral and treaty alliance 
states, particularly in the SCS (Under Secretary of Defence for Policy 1991 – 2012). The U.S. has 
challenged all four of its treaty allies in the region on excessive maritime claims: Japan (in 1999, 
2010, 2012), South Korea (1999), the Philippines consistently from 1993 to 2010 and 2012, and 
Thailand (1995, 2011). The regional powers of Malaysia (1999 to 2003 and 2007 to 2012), Vietnam 
(2000, 2010 to 2012) and Indonesia (2000 to 2012). India (1992 to 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999 to 2003, 
2007 to 2012) with whom the U.S. is seeking closer relations. And China (1992 to 1994, 1996, 
2000, 2007 to 2012)69.
Without  engaging  in  an  elaborate  discussion  of  the  UNCLOS  treaty  the  reasons  for  these 
69
61
“excessive” maritime claims comes down to a matter of interpretation regarding the term “peaceful 
use” of the littoral state's EEZ. The activities causing such disputes are primarily military surveys, 
military  manoeuvres,  military  reconnaissance  activities  and  other  activities  not  having  a  direct 
bearing on passage or overflights conducted by foreign military vessels and aircraft in the EEZ and 
in the air space above it. Littoral states hold that these activities are encroachments on their national  
security  because they are an electronic prelude to  invasion and thus  a threat  to  use force,  and 
therefore not a “peaceful use” of the sea (Xiaofeng & Xizhong 2005: 143), thus violating their 
sovereign rights and exclusive jurisdiction. The United States however insists on two principles. 
First, military activities should be defined with navigational and overflight freedoms in an EEZ, and 
such freedom should not be impeded by littoral states. Second, military activities and hydrographic 
surveys should be distinguished from Marine Scientific Research (MSR) (Part XI of UNCLOS III) 
and thus should not be regulated under the MSR regime (Fang 2010: 8). Further the U.S. defines 
“international waters” as including all waters seaward of the 12 nautical mile territorial sea in which 
FON and overflight are preserved (U.S. Department of Navy 2007: 1-9), as opposed to the EEZ or 
continental shelf.
Policy consistency does not imply equitable or altruistic policy goals. Objections to U.S. policy 
consistency and interpretation of the UNCLOS III treaty relates to the bias that the treaty may have 
towards states with global power projection, enabling the maintenance of global hegemony at the 
expense of rising and regional powers, in this particular case China. And in relation to this point  
explains the regions relative consistency in interpretation of the UNCLOS III treaty in asserting 
military jurisdictional sovereignty over navigational maritime claims requiring the littoral state's 
permission to enter the concerned territorial waters. Despite this argument the core policy position 
espoused by Rear Admiral Schachte remains consistent with the maintenance of peace that would 
prevent  littoral  states  being  drawn  into  otherwise  avoidable  conflicts.  And  long  term  policy 
consistency before the “pivot” does indicate a lack of prejudice towards any particular party on the 
part of the U.S., which in addition to the active and consistent advocacy of the policy over the 
intervening 20 years reinforces the claimed “motivation factor” that the U.S. truly believes in its 
“peace  promoting”  qualities,  or  at  the  very  least  “stability  promoting”  (and  therefore  system 
maintaining) qualities. Thus lending credence to the claim that the U.S. is in fact motivated by an 
interest in FON and the potential for it to promote peace. 
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5.2.2. Bilateral and Multilateral promotion of Constructive engagement
If the U.S. position is to be believed as sincere, then it must compensate for the negative opinion 
created, through diplomatic efforts to allay the fears and objections of China and its neighbours in 
the SCS. Whilst advocacy of “FON” does justify the U.S. “proximity” (in addition to its pursuit for 
continued relevancy/leadership) to the conflict in an attempt to mitigate the threat to peace that 
territorial claims over international straits and waterways may present, it does not address the core 
issue  surrounding  the  territorial  claims,  that  of  the  land  masses  themselves.  Constructive 
engagement in the SCS Conflict requires more than advocacy of the central of aim of FON, no 
matter  how central  to  peace  the  U.S.  determines  it  is.  Therefore  it  is  within  this  context  that 
deepening working relationships  with emerging powers and engaging with regional  multilateral 
institutions comes into play. Whilst interdependence is largely a question of economics, the degree 
of stability and longevity of that cooperation is based on security and strategic cooperation. Just as 
sovereignty and independence are the first concerns of a state, so security cooperation is the final 
and highest form of cooperation and indication of trust.  Efforts towards this  end signal mutual 
understanding and commitment to peace. In this regard the establishment of the S&ED forms the 
core trust building effort between the two states, which is underpinned regionally with the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation,  U.S.-ASEAN dialogue and the ASEAN Regional Forum. What the U.S. 
needs to demonstrate is that through its involvement in the East Asian community, the U.S. position 
is motivated by the potential to maintain and secure peace. 
The S&ED is a high-level dialogue for the United States and China to discuss a wide range of 
bilateral,  regional  and  global  political,  strategic,  security,  and  economic  issues  between  both 
countries. Moreover both Pres. Obama and now Fmr. Pres. Hu Jintao, following the establishment 
of  the  dialogue mechanism,  recognize  it  as  the  highest-level  and largest  circle  of  participation 
jointly between the two countries with the aim of promoting understanding, expanding consensus, 
managing differences,  improving mutual  trust,  and increasing  cooperation  (U.S.  Department  of 
State  2012a).  The  “Strategic  Track”  is  co-chaired  by  the  U.S.  secretary  of  state  John  Kerry 
(formerly  Hillary  Clinton  until  2012)  and  Chinese  State  Councillor  Dai  Bingguo  (up  to  and 
including 2012), whilst the “Economic Track” is co-chaired by the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury 
and the Chinese Vice Premier. 
In 2012 the S&ED took stock of the outcomes derived from the four rounds of the “Strategic 
Track.” The establishment of the Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD) at the S&ED of 2011 provided 
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for the first time a forum for civilian and military representatives from the U.S. and China to discuss 
the most strategically sensitive issues in their relationship, the two issues highlighted being cyber-
security  and  maritime  security.  The  SSD  as  a  result  acts  as  the  metaphorical  “red  phone”  in 
understanding  each  states  policy  and  is  defined  as  being  “essential  to  mitigating  the  risks  of 
miscalculation and fostering a clearer understanding of policies on both sides” (U.S. Department of 
State 2012b). The S&ED Strategic Track has further enabled substantial cooperation in areas as 
diverse as regional security and proliferation issues in Iran and North Korea and the crises taking 
place  in  Sudan,  South  Sudan  and  Syria;  human  rights  and  peacekeeping  missions  worldwide; 
energy  and  environmental  issues;  as  well  as  18  separate  partnerships  between  state  and  local 
governments, businesses, and communities to support a wide range of energy and environmental 
goals, from conservation and river basin management to bio-gas utilization pilot projects. Signalling 
a  high  degree  of  investment  in  terms  of  time,  personal,  funds,  expertise  transfer  and  policy 
coordination and cooperation. 
The S&ED strongly indicates that both parties are acting in good faith. At the fourth round of the 
S&ED in 2012 the U.S. and China both recognized that the breadth and depth of their nations' 
interests and cooperation proves that the two countries have a stake in each other's success (U.S. 
Department  of  State  2012b).  Even  indicating  that  “habits”  of  cooperation  have  and  are  being 
developed. Only time will allow the gauging of the effectiveness of these efforts, but in the interim 
the  U.S.  is  demonstrating  a  definite  attempt  at  justifying  and  mitigating  the  ill  effects  of  its 
involvement in the SCS.
This bilateral cooperation is underpinned by the cooperation that has been undertaken regionally, in 
addition to the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the APEC which focus on economic cooperation, 
through the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the U.S.-ASEAN dialogue. Of the five chapters 
of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation Chapters two through four are respectively titled: Amity, 
Cooperation, and Pacific Settlement of Disputes. With Chapter one article one stating: “The purpose 
of this Treaty is to promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation among their peoples 
which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship” and article 2 outlining 
the principles as: mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and 
national  identity  of  all  nations;  the right  of  every state  to  lead its  national  existence free from 
external interference, subversion or coercion; non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; renunciation of the threat or use of force;  
effective  cooperation among themselves  (United Kingdom 2012:  4).  More a  symbolic  act  than 
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anything else, ASEAN recognizes the treaty as a code of conduct for inter-state relations, the U.S. 
signed it on 26 July 2009 as a start to its “pivot” to Asia. China signed the treaty in 2003.
The U.S.-ASEAN dialogue, initiated in 1977, deals with political and security, economic and trade, 
social and cultural, and development cooperation. The principle role of the ASEAN-U.S. security 
dialogue  is  to  determine  the  role  of  the  U.S.  in  maintaining  peace  and  stability  in  the  region 
(ASEAN  Secretariat  2012a).  Other  areas  of  mutual  interest  include  nuclear  non-proliferation, 
regional security issues and the Korean Peninsula. To quote the ASEAN Secretariat “in 2009, [the] 
ASEAN-US relationship underwent a 'seismic' change, when the Leaders of ASEAN and the US 
met at the first ASEAN-US Leaders' Meeting in Singapore on 15 November 2009.” At the meeting, 
ASEAN  and  the  U.S.  committed  to  enhancing  ASEAN-U.S.  collaboration  in  the  areas  of 
educational  exchanges,  science  and  technology,  labour,  development  cooperation,  cooperation 
against international terrorism, efforts in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
narrowing the  development  gap,  nuclear  non-proliferation  and disarmament,  the  protection  and 
promotion  of  human  rights  in  the  region,  research  of  climate  impacts  and  development  and 
implementation of appropriate policies and measures. Pres. Obama announced the U.S. policy of 
enhancing engagement with ASEAN which it regards as a key partner in the promotion of peace, 
stability and prosperity in the Asia Pacific region. The 15 November 2009 marked the first time that 
a U.S. president had met with all ten ASEAN leaders. Further, in the Joint Vision Statement on the  
ASEAN-US Enhanced  Partnership,  the  U.S.  gave  support  to  the  ARF as  the  premier  regional 
political and security forum in the Asia-Pacific region with ASEAN as the driving force (ASEAN 
Secretariat 2012b). Which though accepting that bilateral and alternative multilateral dialogue does 
and must take place, this statement ties the ASEAN community into any peaceful settlement of 
disputes, by  de facto excluding any agreement that may preclude ASEAN. It is through the ARF 
that the U.S. works to reinforce laws and norms, utilizing annual meetings on maritime security and 
legal seminars in the UNCLOS.
Therefore the U.S. has demonstrated remarkable consistency with respect to the law of the sea, even 
in respect to its allies, and that therefore no prejudicial policy exists with respect to China, in terms 
of  the  advocacy  of  FON  in  the  SCS.  However  the  system  maintaining  qualities  of  the  U.S.  
interpretation of FON is potentially prejudicial  to rising great powers such as China in what is 
considered it's sphere of influence. Indicating an over-arching policy that maintains U.S. leadership. 
As far as constructive engagement is concerned, its clear that the U.S. has entrenched itself in this 
process, participating in multiple bilateral and multilateral processes and institutions. Whilst this 
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does  indeed  promote  cooperation  between  the  parties,  and  moreover  the  inclusion  of  these 
multilateral institutions, it also limits the scope for unilateral action that a rising power traditionally 
undertakes. However considering that the strategies for gaining power tend towards coercion and 
ultimately  war,  this  trend  indeed  supports  the  claim that  the  U.S.  is  following  a  constructive 
approach to the Rise of China.
5.3. The Containment of China
The (alleged70) policy of containment by the U.S. is a political term referring to the claimed goal of 
U.S. foreign policy to  diminish the economic and political  growth of the People's  Republic  of 
China. The term hearkens back to the policy of containment the U.S. pursued against the Soviet 
Union to prevent the international spread of communism71. Within a modern political context the 
policy of containment is derived from the geopolitical observation that U.S. allies and bases form a 
semi-circle enclosing and thereby hindering Chinese maritime and diplomatic expansion. And that 
the further diplomatic efforts of the U.S. are aimed at a complete encirclement of China. 
According to  Prof.  Alexey Pilko (2012) of  the  Global  Centre  for  Research  based in  Montreal, 
Canada, the U.S. policy of containment has at least three lines of strategic deterrence located all 
over the Pacific Ocean. The first is based on U.S. military bases and infrastructure on the Japanese 
mainland, South Korea, Okinawa and Taiwan. The second line is Guam and Hawaii and the third 
according  to  Pilko  is  California  and  Alaska.  This  military  aspect  is  further  complimented 
diplomatically via establishment of close ties with India and Southeast Asian states in conjunction 
with  its  already strong alliance treaties  with  Japan,  South Korea,  Australia  the Philippines  and 
Thailand in aid of the creation of what is described as an anti-China coalition. Pilko further includes 
the tactical dimension of controlling the transit  routes through which China receives  its  energy 
resources, i.e. the Malacca straits and via its northern border with Russia. Which would explain the 
deployment of the U.S. littoral warships to Singapore in April 2013.
Whilst the policy of containment may incline towards eccentricity, it has effectively formed part of 
the public perception regarding the U.S. policy towards China and is justifiably a real concern for 
Chinese politicians. From China's perspective the U.S. has involved itself in issues that are “core 
70 No official document, representative of government or any individual or institution with representative capacities 
within the U.S. government has validated the claim or indicated that a policy of containment towards China exists.
71 For more information on the Cold War U.S. policy of containment refer to: 
• Office of the Historian. 2013. A Short History of the Department of State. U.S. Department of State. Internet: 
http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/containmentandcoldwar. Access 4 July 2013.
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interests” to China, whilst simultaneously encircling the country in diplomatic-military partnerships, 
further limiting the list of potential Chinese “friends.” In examining the veracity of this policy a 
military-to-military  comparison between  China  and the  U.S.  needs  to  be  made  and  second an 
understanding of the diplomatic developments that are occurring between the U.S. and regional 
states, in particular the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in relation to China.
5.3.1. Military Strength and base distribution – Actual Power and internal balancing
As  of  28  February  2013  the  armed  forces'  strength72 of  the  U.S.  consists  of  540  743  Army 
personnel, Navy 317 464, Marine Corps 195 129, Air Force 334 197 with a total of 1 387 493 
servicemen excluding the Coast Guard, that totals 42 252 (Department of Defence 2013: 1). The 
end-strength of these branches is augmented by the reserves and national guard reserves of which 
the 2011 population within the Army National Guard is 361 561, U.S. Army Reserve 204 803, Navy 
Reserve 64 792, Marine Corps Reserve 39 772, Air National Guard 105 685, Air Force Reserve 
(USAFR) 71 321, for a total of 847 934 (Office of the Under Secretary of Defence 2011: 4). The 
personnel end-strength of the U.S. military is therefore 2 235 427, and for ground forces (Army + 
Marine Corps + ARNG + USAR + USMCR) is 1 342 008. 
In contrast the PLA ground forces73 consist of 1.25 million active personnel out of a total of 2.3 
million troops in the combined Army, Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Corps (Office of the 
Secretary of Defence 2013: 7574). Reserve forces contribute an additional 800 000 men and a further 
10 million from the militia, though the degree of professionalism and training of the militia is of a 
low quality (Sinodefence website 2012). Excluding the militia, the end-strength of the armed forces 
is 3 100 000 troops. 
The U.S. Navy Combatant Force Structure75 consists of 11 CVN (Carrier Vessel, Nuclear powered), 
88 Large Surface Combatant vessels, 52 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), 48 nuclear powered attack 
72 Refer to  Table 9:  Active Duty Military Strength Report  for February 28, 2013  in Appendix 2 for a complete 
breakdown of officers and service men for the year 29 February 2012 to 28 February 2013 for all four U.S. armed  
services.
73 Refer to Table 7: Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces in Appendix 2 for a complete breakdown of PRC 
and ROC ground forces.
74 Unless otherwise stated all information regarding the military strength and force deployment capacity of the PRC is  
sourced from: 
• Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense.  2013.  ANNUAL REPORT TO  CONGRESS:  Military  and  Security 
Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense.
75 Refer  to  Table 8:  U.S.  Naval  Combatant  Force Structure for  a  complete  breakdown of  the  U.S.  Naval  Force 
Structure for the years 2010 and 2012.
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submarines  (SSN),  12  nuclear-powered  ballistic  missile-carrying  submarines  (SSBN),  33 
amphibious ships [11 Landing Helicopter Assault/Dock ships (LHA/LHD), 11 amphibious Landing 
Platform/Docks and 11 Landing Ship/Dock (LSD)], 29 Combat Logistics Forces [17 Fast Combat 
Support (AOE) ships and 12 T-AKE Supply Ships], 10 Spearhead class Joint High Speed Vessel 
(JHSV), 2 LCC Command ships, 2 AS Tender class ships, 8 ARS/ATF Salvage ships, 5 T-AGOS 
Surveillance ships and 6 Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) ships; for a total of 306 ships (Office 
of the Chief of Naval Operations 2013: 3). Of which 211 are combatant vessels, including aircraft 
carriers. A decrease of 13 from 224 combat vessels.
The  PLA naval  forces  consist  of  1  aircraft  carrier76,  23  Destroyers  (Large  Surface  Combatant 
equivalent), 52 Frigates (LCS equivalent), 29 Tank Landing Ships, 26 Medium Landing Ships, 49 
Diesel Attack Submarines, 5 Nuclear Attack Submarines, 85 Coastal Patrol (missile) vessels (U.S. 
equivalent being the coast guard); for a total of 270 vessels and 216 combat ships, including Coastal 
Patrol Vessels (Office of the Secretary of Defence 2013: 76)77.
In real terms China's military forces outnumber that of the U.S., by an inconsequential number in 
the navy, and by a significant number in ground forces. However the U.S. technological advantage 
far out paces China's development. The pros and cons of which Friedman (2011) points out are that 
nuclear powered craft are far more operationally effective and enable far superior power projection, 
in contrast with diesel powered craft which are far more cost effective and therefore potentially 
allow numerical superiority in any particular theatre in which a friendly naval facility is present. 
With the PLA navy being largely diesel powered, and the U.S. navy largely nuclear powered the 
effects of the technological disparity are particularly evident. U.S. aircraft carriers, as the prime 
example,  are  all  nuclear  powered  versus  the  single  diesel  powered  Liaoning. Equally  US 
submarines are  all  nuclear  powered versus  the diesel  powered PLA fleet.  Similarly U.S.  Large 
Surface Combatants and LCS ships are technologically far in advance of their Chinese counterparts 
in terms of communications, radar systems, precision weapons, engineering systems, anti-aircraft, 
anti-submarine,  and  anti-ship  protective  measures  and  propulsion  systems  (Navy  Recruiting 
Command 2013, Avio 2012). As a whole the force projection of the U.S. navy far outstrips China's 
PLA capabilities, enabling it to operate in regions as far a field as the SCS with limited impact on 
the operational effectiveness of its forces. Though it should be noted that in a naval conflict in the 
76 Former Soviet aircraft carrier  Varyag launched 1988. Retrofitted and refurbished as the  Liaoning in 2012, diesel 
powered.
77 Refer to Table 9: Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces for a complete breakdown of PRC and ROC naval 
forces
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SCS, China will have the advantage of employing its entire fleet, in contrast with the U.S., which 
will at any one time have only a portion of its fleet deployed in the Asia-pacific theatre.
The reasoning behind the technological gap and the U.S. pursuit of military superiority is made 
clear by two particular trends in U.S. policy, that of the capacity for force projection and the “shift  
from West to East.” According to in the Department of Defence (DoD) submission:  Sustaining U.S.  
Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defence, it is stated that “In order to credibly deter 
potential adversaries and to prevent them from achieving their objectives, the United States must 
maintain  its  ability  to  project  power in  areas  in  which  our  access  and freedom  to  operate  are 
challenged” (DoD 2012a: 4). A2AD technologies include but are not limited to electronic and cyber 
warfare,  ballistic  and  cruise  missiles,  advanced  air  defences  and  mining.  The  submission 
particularly identifies China (and Iran) as a state that pursues these asymmetric means to counter 
power projection capabilities. The U.S. military response is to invest in projects that continue to 
ensure it projection capabilities. 
The  most  assertive  response  to  A2AD actions  and capabilities  is  the  Joint  Operational  Access 
Concept (JOAC) developed by the Department of Defence. This includes implementing the JOAC, 
sustaining undersea capabilities, developing a new stealth bomber, improving missile defences, and 
continuing efforts to enhance the resilience and effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities 
(DoD 2012a: 5). Eleven such precepts are proposed (DoD 2012b: ii):
1. Conduct operations to gain access based on the requirements of the broader mission, while 
also designing subsequent operations to lessen access challenges. 
2. Prepare the operational area in advance to facilitate access. 
3. Consider a variety of basing options. 
4. Seize the initiative by deploying and operating on multiple, independent lines of operations. 
5. Exploit advantages in one or more domains to disrupt or destroy enemy anti-access/area-
denial capabilities in others. 
6. Disrupt enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts while protecting friendly efforts. 
7. Create pockets or corridors of local domain superiority to penetrate the enemy’s defences 
and maintain them as required to accomplish the mission.
8. Manoeuvre directly against key operational objectives from strategic distance. 
9. Attack  enemy  anti-access/area-denial  defences  in  depth  rather  than  rolling  back  those 
defences from the perimeter. 
10. Maximize surprise through deception, stealth, and ambiguity to complicate enemy targeting. 
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11. Protect space and cyber assets while attacking the enemy’s cyber and space capabilities. 
The JOAC is a direct effort to frustrate and/or overcome the anti-access and area-denial challenge 
that weapons such as ASBMs present. The mere existence of the JOAC makes clear that the U.S. 
does not, in principle, accept limitations to its navy's operational access in any theatre including the 
SCS. Thus resulting in a process of “one-upmanship” between the U.S. and its  competitors78.
Similarly, the White Paper National Security Strategy 2013, in acknowledging the shift from West 
to East, states: “The major trend inherent in [the fluctuating international system] reflects the rise of 
both China and India. Their rise results primarily from developmental catching-up inevitable in the 
globalising world. As massive populations in both of these countries come out of poverty, both 
China  and  India  continue  to  experience  relatively  strong  economic  growth,  despite  the  global 
financial crisis. In addition to growth, these countries are advancing technologically and militarily. 
It is unavoidable then, assuming these trends persist, that our relative power will decrease and that  
global influence will shift from West to East. The United States will continue to have absolute 
advantage  in  critical  areas  of  national  power”  (United  States  2013:  2)  The  U.S.  further 
acknowledges  that  the  change  in  regional  dynamics  could  present  an  opportunity  for  regional 
stabilization that would relieve some of the burden on the U.S. However the last sentence of this 
statement  is  of  particular  interest.  For  whilst  the  policy  makes  the  pragmatic  observation  of 
developmental catch-up, it  also states the strategic objective is to retain its  absolute advantage, 
making the U.S. a victim of the “red queen effect.79” The difficulty of maintaining its technological 
advantage will become greater the longer China's, and the developing world's, development runs a 
pace. 
In combination with its policy of force projection U.S. base distribution represents the most far-
flung military in the world, with the DoD operating 662 overseas foreign sites80, the majority of 
these are located in Germany (218 sites), Japan (115 sites) and South Korea (86 sites) (Office of the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defence 2010: 9). The sites in Japan and South Korea are highly varied, 
78 Note that due to the tactical and technological nature of this competition the U.S. and its competitors compete in 
“one-upmanship” with the emphasis on technology and innovation first and quantity only as a secondary priority.  
This is in contrast to an arms race, in which the emphasis is on quantity of arms and technology and innovation as a 
secondary priority. 
79 Taken from Lewis Carroll’s  Through the Looking Glass. The Red Queen: Now,  here,  you see,  it  takes all  the 
running you can do, to keep in the same place.
80 A site is defined as having a minimum of 10 Acres (≈ 4 hectares) and plant replacement value of US$10 million, 
according to the Department of Defense Base Structure Report Fiscal Year 2010 Baseline (A Summary of DoD's  
Real Property Inventory).
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including army, naval, marine corps and air force sites. Beyond these two states, the Naval Medical 
Research Unit 2 (NAMRU-2) Pacific operates a laboratory out of Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and 
studies infectious diseases; and the Singapore Area Coordinator was established in 2007 to provide 
comprehensive shore support services to the U.S. Fleet. The Singapore site in total comprises under 
9 hectares. Beyond these areas no U.S. military sites are present in Southeast Asia, except in Guam 
a U.S. territory. The U.S. presence in Japan was officially established under Japanese permission 
following WWII with the Japan-America Security Alliance of 1951. Similarly, in South Korea, the 
U.S. military presence was formalized with a military alliance following the signing of the armistice 
agreement  “ending”  the  Korean  War  in  1953.  Currently  38  000  military  personnel,  43  000 
dependants, and 5 000 DoD civilian employees are stationed in Japan, and 28 500 personnel in 
South Korea. 
The proof of a strategy of encirclement would be an upward scaling of U.S. military capacity that 
corresponds in an opportune manner to the rise of China. Meaning that as China's military capacity 
has developed, so the U.S. military capacity and presence in the region should have developed. 
However, as Table 8: U.S. Naval Combatant Force Structure indicates, the U.S. Naval Combatant 
Force Structure has actually decreased from 2010 to 2012. And therefore in a military to military 
comparison  evidence  for  an  encirclement  and  therefore  policy  of  containment  is  limited, 
particularly considering the relatively late rise of China to the now six decades of military presence 
in both Japan and South Korea, that was initially and still is intended as a deterrent to North Korea 
in  North  East  Asia,  and  only  in  a  speculative  and  auxiliary  manner,  intended  to  deter  China. 
Furthermore U.S. military bases have not proliferated to include its other two allies, Thailand and 
the Philippines, in the region, as they otherwise should of in an encirclement strategy. However the 
U.S.  does  perceive  China  as  a  challenge  to  its  military  supremacy  and  therefore  is  actively 
promoting a policy to ensure that its force projection cannot be countered by China. Therefore in 
strictly innovative and technological terms the U.S. is attempting to maintain its military advantage 
in  respect  to  China.  However,  taken as  a  whole  to  include base  proliferation,  combatant  force 
structure and active military strength, the evidence does not corroborate the claim for a U.S. policy 
of containment in terms of internal balancing. 
5.3.2. Australia, India and Japan - buck-passing and external balancing
A relic from the Cold War, Asia's security architecture in East and Southeast Asia has developed 
around a “hub and spoke” model, with the U.S. as the “hub” and the “spokes” representing a series 
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of bilateral alliances with states that did not necessarily cooperate much with each other (Gates 
2009).  The  reorientation  driven  by  the  Obama  administration  advocates  greater  multilateral 
cooperation, stating in the National Security Strategy 2013 (:4) “Our strategy invites new influential 
players  into  multilateral  institutions,  to  both  lessen  our  burden,  and  ensure  long-term stability, 
prosperity,  and  the  diffusion  of  democratic  values.”  Understanding,  as  noted  above,  that  the 
combined economies of the ASEAN-5 have a limited capacity to balance against China and that the 
security arrangement in South East Asia has remained unchanged since 195481;  the potential for 
“buck-passing” and “external balancing” lies largely with the regional great powers of Japan, India 
and Australia. Thus the “U.S.-Japan-Australia Security Dialogue” and the “U.S.-Japan-Australia-
India  Quadrilateral  Security  Dialogue”  are  the  primary  mechanisms  through  which  successful 
balancing may be attempted.
The trilateral dialogue between the United States, Japan and Australia began at the level of senior 
officials in 2002. In a joint statement on 18 March 2006 the foreign ministers of Australia, Japan 
and  the  U.S.  expressed  that  as  long-standing  democracies  and  developed  economies  the  three 
countries share common cause in working to maintain stability and security in the Asia Pacific 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2006). As both Japan and Australia are U.S. allies, a natural 
progression was the constitution of the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation 
on 13 March 2007. Based upon the same respect for shared democratic values, mutual respect, deep 
friendship,  and shared strategic  views;  the  declaration  sets  out  the  priorities  of  co-operation in 
counter-terrorism activities, maritime security, border protection and disaster relief (BBC website 
2007). The agreement stops short of a defence treaty as neither country is required to come to the 
other's defence 
The initial improvement of U.S.-Indian relations began in 2005 when the U.S reversed its long-
standing  non-proliferation  policy  with  the  civil-nuclear  agreement  between the  U.S.  and  India. 
Designed to allow peaceful nuclear cooperation, the accord also enabled the beginning of a strategic 
partnership (Kurtz-Phelan 2013). In 2009 the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue was initiated, resulting 
in cooperation in combating terrorism and in nuclear non-proliferation. By 2013 the Dialogue has 
expanded to include  military-to-military dialogues, exercises, defence sales, professional military 
education exchanges, bilateral defence trade, and cyber-security (Office of the Spokesperson 2013). 
In testimony given by the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs 
81 The Manila pact of 1954 ensures mutual defence for its members, in particular Thailand and the Philippines in  
South East Asia.
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Robert  Blake  (2013)  to  the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  Subcommittee  on  Asia  and  the 
Pacific in 2013, Blake described India as “one of [the United States'] most trusted and valuable 
partners in the region,” estimating that by 2025 India will become the world's third largest economy. 
As previously indicated India and Japan have already developed a bilateral defence cooperation 
agreement.  Meaning  that  bilateral  defence  cooperation  agreements  exist  between  Japan  and 
Australia, Australia and the U.S., the U.S. and Japan, Japan and India, and India and the U.S. As of 
2013 Australian-Indian defence cooperation was limited to a 2006 Memorandum of Understanding, 
and a Joint Declaration on Security Co-operation in 2009. However on 5 June 2013 Indian Defence 
Minister A.K. Antony visited Australia and met with his counterpart Stephen Smith. The agreement 
that was reached includes exchanges between the defence establishments and the Armed Forces of 
both sides, including through the regular conduct of the Defence Policy Dialogue, Armed Forces 
Staff Talks and professional military exchanges; to continue ongoing bilateral Naval exchanges to 
build confidence and familiarity between Navies and work towards a bilateral maritime exercise in 
2015; to continue to cooperate in the Asia-Pacific region bilaterally and through various multilateral 
fora including the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ 
Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus); and to promote the sharing and exchange of professional knowledge 
and  experiences  through  participation  in  training  courses  in  each  other’s  military  training 
institutions (Smith 2013). Thus completing a complex web of bilateral security cooperation.
However as Offensive Realism points out (Mearsheimer 2001: 156) external balancing is often slow 
and inefficient. And in the absence of a definite threat, pre-emptive balancing is near to impossible. 
Such is the case with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. The Security Dialogue was formed in 
2007 after Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe82 proposed that India join the U.S., Australia and 
Japan in the Trilateral Security Dialogue. Since that point onwards the Dialogue has experienced 
significant  “birthing  pains”  resulting  in  Australia  unilaterally  withdrawing  in  2008  under  the 
administration of  Kevin  Rudd (Sheridan 2008) and returning under  Julia  Gillard in  July  2010. 
Though India joined the Trilateral Security Dialogue in 2006 (against Australian wishes), both India 
and Australia fear the potential instability of an “axis” against China and as such the Dialogue has 
effectively stalled (Pandit 2013). With Rudd's return to the position of Prime Minister in June 2013, 
it is unlikely that the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue will develop significantly.
82 Shinzō Abe is the current Prime-Minister of Japan, assuming office 26 December 2012. Abe served as Prime-
Minister previously from 26 September 2006 to 12 September 2007.
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Despite  significant  and  arguably  effective  efforts  to  reconcile  Australia  and  India,  the  most 
significant of which was convincing Australia to overturn its ban on selling fissile material to non-
signatories  of  the  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Treaty  (NPR)  (Choudhury  2011);  the  failure  to 
multilateralize the bilateral Strategic Dialogues in Southeast Asia, represents a major failing of the 
U.S. led Asia-pacific security framework. However the continued maintenance and development of 
strategic partnerships based on shared democratic principles and economic cooperation in the SCS 
and surrounding regions is a clear sign of an attempt at “external balancing.” And if viewed in 
parallel with its constructive engagement reflects a policy of “hedging one's bets.” Should a full 
scale conflict break out and breach the peace, the existing bilateral security dialogues and shared 
democratic culture significantly increase the likelihood that Australia, India and Japan will support 
the U.S., enough to make a pariah state of China.
Whilst  evidence  for  U.S.  internal  balancing  is  limited  at  best;  due  to  its  diplomatic  efforts, 
significant evidence exists to indicate that the U.S. is pursuing a policy of encircling China through 
external  balancing.  Within the context  of  these bilateral  treaties  the U.S.  need not increase the 
number of bases in Southeast Asia through force distribution and projection, provided these states 
will support it should conflict emerge. It need but maintain its relative military strength (which will 
prove increasingly difficult in the coming decades). By this argument the U.S. is also inadvertently 
“buck-passing”: by assisting Australia, India and Japan to develop their offensive capabilities it is 
allowing these three states to shoulder significant responsibility, as they proceed to develop their 
own security arrangements independent of the U.S., although based upon a common threat.
6. Tension in the SCS
Utilizing Offensive Realism several dichotomized points of interaction are revealed at the National 
Opinion level, the strategic level and the tactical level83: the U.S. maintenance of global leadership 
through its “pivot” to Asia versus the SCS as a regional PRC core interest,  Operational Access 
versus A2AD capabilities, the external balancing of the U.S. versus the latent power threat of China, 
the  policy  of  containment  of  the  U.S.  versus  China's  string  of  pearls,  and  U.S.  constructive 
engagement versus China's natural rise as great power. 
83 Due to the utilization of Offensive Realism as the guiding theory, Economic and Resource interests  occupy a  
marginal concern alongside the dominant factors that determine state behaviour and therefore, as with the rest of  
this paper, receive limited attention and are not included in this breakdown. The exception to this perspective is 
when economic interests are perceived in terms of latent power.
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The  psychologically/ideologically84 influenced  national  opinion  level  is  the  perspective  or  lens 
through which China and the U.S. perceive each other. Thus indicating the level of aggressiveness 
they have for one another, their perceived interests in each other's success, and the right of either 
one to involve itself in the SCS. The greater the divergence or conflicting opinion towards one 
another and their respective involvements in a particular concern or zone of influence, the greater 
the potential there exists for conflict.  Conversely the greater the congruence in perspectives the 
greater the likelihood that conflict  will  be avoided.  States that experience “complete” or “near 
complete” psychological/ideological agreement are highly unlikely to enter into conflict, since at 
the psychological level they are not in competition with each other, and they perceive each other's 
success as mutually beneficial. Importantly two regional hegemons cannot exist within this state 
because they are in direct competition with each other for power, the competition between the U.S. 
and U.S.S.R. being the prime example. However states such as the U.S. and U.K. may exist within 
this state as the U.K., as a lesser power, is not in competition with the U.S. and both find mutual  
gain in their cooperation with each other, especially as the U.S. acts as an offshore balancer. This 
allows the two states to be sure of each other's intention within the limited context of establishing 
whether the opposing state is either an imminent threat or a latent threat. Moreover, as Mearsheimer 
(2001: 367) indicates, such a relationship, in its extreme form, represents the strongest challenge to 
realism through the Democratic Peace Theory. 
The contention here however is still founded upon Offensive Realism since states that experience 
psychological and ideological congruence exist within the particular architecture of the international 
system, i.e. multipolarity, bipolarity or unipolarity, wherein the great power or regional hegemon 
will have satellite states that possess significant congruence with the hegemonic state, in contrast to 
the  rising  power  and  status  quo  power  that  are  likely  to  have  a  diverging  psychological  and 
ideological image of each other. The concern is what the divide is currently, and what  the future 
trend of that divide is likely to be85.  Moreover whilst no state may be certain of another state's 
84 Either  term utilized  in  isolation  does  not  adequately  meet  the  unit  of  analysis  discussed.  A state  may  have  
significant ideological  coherence through a belief in a liberal  democratic system, however may simultaneously 
harbour a  deep psychological  resentment towards another  state,  such as the historical  competition that  existed  
between France and the U.K. Conversely psychological  congruency alongside ideological disparity is  common 
throughout history, such as between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. during the later part of WWII. The concern here is that  
when combined an outlook or perception of another state is developed that either produces amicable or hostile 
perceptions  of  one  another.  As  noted  below  this  analysis  may  be  significantly  complex,  and  a  purposefully 
simplified position, based upon the analysis of previous variables, is adopted here; a simplified methodology that  
largely falls within the Realist tradition. Furthermore the author acknowledges that significant additional variables 
exist that influence national opinion, and that national opinion may be significantly diverse and far from coherent. It 
is enough here though to establish whether a positive or negative relationship exists in terms of state competition, 
i.e. does public and government opinion point to friendly competition or nascent threat.
85 Note that the author is aware of the difficulties in evaluating the psychological disparities that exist between states,  
however the level of analysis that is utilized has already been discussed in significant detail in the previous chapters 
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intentions,  and thus must act  against  all,  a state that shows obvious signs of aggression should 
immediately raise “red flags” as an imminent threat, as opposed to the grouping of states as threats 
in general.
Two parties may however harbour  significant ambivalence towards each other.  Wishing for the 
competing  state  to  succeed in  one respect,  but  fearing the  consequent  relative power gain  that 
success brings. In this case further levels of analysis are required to determine the likelihood of 
conflict occurring. Thus the strategic86 level, or method by which determined end goals are pursued, 
must be analysed. Since the aims and therefore intentions of a state beyond survival are largely 
unknowable, the strategies employed must be analysed. in order to counter the potential aggression 
of any state. Strategies that hinder or otherwise limit the power projection and capabilities of a state  
can be interpreted as aggressive action and therefore result in an increase of tension. Due to the 
anarchic structure of the international system the strategic level operates largely independent of the 
psychological/ideological level due to the self-help nature of the system. However, provided the 
psychological/ideological level does not present any significant trend indicating a trajectory towards 
conflict or peace, the strategic level offers a more tangible analysis of state behaviour and policy 
that can more readily be juxtaposed in determining the future potential for conflict.
The tactical level87 represents the immediate and physical presence of a states power projection in a 
given region, the presence and utilization of military assets, i.e. the number of port facilities and 
naval ships present or near to a particular region. Thus the tactical level represents the most obvious 
result of the competition that occurs between states. It is the tactical level that produces the fear that 
leads to arms races and the immediate build-up of and relaxing of tensions. The type of competition 
on this level indicates the greatest potential of a region to act as a flashpoint for the outbreak of 
hostilities. But equally represents the preparation that a state is undertaking in the expectation of 
peace or war, in its effort to counter or gain advantage from the successes or failures of a particular 
state. 
regarding domestic politics, whilst this chapter serves purely to directly juxtapose what has already been discussed.  
Moreover the purposes of this paper, in determining the likelihood of conflict in the SCS, requires a sweeping 
analysis of several variables, that are articulated within Offensive Realism. To provide too great an emphasis on a 
psychological or sociological analysis would be diverting from both the intentions of this paper and the principles  
and framework provided by Offensive Realism.
86 The Oxford English Dictionary definition of “Strategy” is adopted here: a plan of action designed to achieve a long-
term or overall aim. Source: Oxford Dictionaries. 2013. Definition of Strategy in English. Internet: 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/strategy. Access: 16 July 2013.
87 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary definition of “tactics” is adopted here: the art or skill  of employing available 
means to accomplish an end. Source: Merriam-Webster. 2013. Dictionary: Tactics.  Internet:   http://www.merriam-  
webster.com/dictionary/tactics. Access: 18 July 2013.
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This level is the most far removed from official and transient policy statements; as it is based upon 
basic power dynamics and the potential threat that peer competitors may represent, as opposed to a 
tangible  policy decision.  This does not exclude the likelihood that the policy and tactical level 
converge  or  inform one another,  but  rather  that  the tactical  level  is  primarily  informed by the 
anarchic nature of the international system, and only secondarily informed through policy decisions. 
As  such  it  is  erroneously  utilized  as  a  rebuttal  to  the  sincerity  of  a  stated  government  policy 
positions, i.e. “if you are a peaceful state, why are you building weapons?” This argument is flawed, 
as every state has the right, and obligation to its citizenry, to provide a defensive umbrella against  
all states in an anarchic system. However this is not withstanding when the armed forces of two 
states with differing psychological/ideological or strategic positions are in close proximity to one 
another.  Where  the  potential  for  misunderstanding  or  the  rapid  escalation  of  tensions  become 
concentrated.  Therefore  the  measures  taken  by  either  state  to  counter  each  other's  military 
capabilities  must  be  taken  into  consideration  in  determining  whether  a  particular  region  is  a 
potential flashpoint for conflict.
6.1. National Image Level
In the previous chapters it was demonstrated that for China (1) the leadership/administration change 
is likely to not impact meaningfully on SCS policy, (2) that the debate that occurs below the top 
leadership may significantly influence policy decisions,  and (3) that  this  debate is  significantly 
diverse and varied, particularly within the PLA. That the primary goal for China is the security of 
its  development,  and  that  China  guards  against  any  threat  to  this  security  tenaciously.  That 
furthermore,  whilst  its  neighbouring  states  in  the  SCS  are  perceived  as  illegal  occupiers,  and 
minimal threats in the military sense, it is the U.S. that is perceived as the greatest threat to the rise 
of  China  and  that  it  may  assist  these  regional  neighbours  should  conflict  breakout.  Therefore 
significant posturing, particularly amongst retired senior officers, on China's preparedness to engage 
the U.S. is present.
For the U.S. it was demonstrated that the “pivot” to Asia is a means for the U.S. to maintain its 
leadership in the geopolitical theatre that will occupy the position of greatest political and economic 
importance in the coming years. That its ideal relationship is that of constructive engagement that 
maintains U.S. leadership; but is preparing through a internal, technological balancing and external 
balancing strategy should conflict become unavoidable. This strategy is however more aimed at the 
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general policy of assured U.S. hegemony, than being specifically targeted at China.
This illustrates a generally ambivalent image of each other between the two states. The first image 
is peace promoting: China's pursuit of economic development, which naturally includes the U.S. 
and the cooperation of developed market economies (such as the OECD grouping of states) as both 
potential markets for goods and sources of investment. Moreover the official ideology of China is 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics based upon scientific socialism (Zhou 2011: 10). China, 
accordingly, in its transition from Capitalism to Communism, is in the “primary stage of socialism” 
which essentially requires the development of a market economy in order to modernize88. Therefore, 
whilst China maintains a “Democratic Centralist” political model, it is largely pursuing Capitalist 
market reforms for its economy. Thus emulating the example of the U.S. and OECD states as it  
integrates  into  the  global  economy.  For  the  U.S.'s  part,  it  intends  to  take  advantage  of  the 
exceptionally  large  market  that  China's  billion  strong  population  represents89.  There  is  mutual 
dependence and benefit in China's economic rise, which has the effect of reducing the potential for 
conflict.
The second image is tension promoting: The U.S. involvement in East Asian, and thus China's, 
regional concerns is an attempt to maintain U.S. regional and global leadership, which as a matter 
of cause and effect is  aimed at  preventing its  nearest  rival  from replacing it.  The nearest  rival 
happens to also be China. Thus the U.S. is weary of the capabilities of a rising China, and the threat 
that it may pose to its global leadership. Naturally China perceives the U.S. political involvement in 
East Asia and the SCS as interference in China's sphere of influence and as an extension of a U.S.  
policy that is designed to circumscribe or retard China's rise. As Table 3: National Opinion Effect  
on Tension indicates the National Opinion Image of the two states is  ambivalent  and therefore 
88 For more information on “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” and China's transition to a market economy refer 
to:
• Zhou, S. 2011. Changes in the Official Ideology in Contemporary China. In Regional Outlook Paper: No 29, 
2011.
• Eby, A. 2006. Communist Ideology in China Since Mao: Evolutionary, Not Revolutionary. In Journal of 
Interdisciplinary Studies. Available at: 
<http://academia.edu/462447/Communist_Ideology_in_China_Since_Mao_Evolutionary_not_Revolutionary>
• 17th National Congress of the Communist Part of China. 2007. Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. 
Internet:  http://english.people.com.cn/90002/92169/92211/6275043.html  . Access: 13 July 2013.
89 For more information on the significance of market size refer to:
• Aspremont et al. 2003. Competition for market share or market size: oligopolistic equilibria with varying 
competitive toughness. In International Economic Review, 48(3): 761-784.
• Berry, S. & Waldfogel, J. 2010. Product Quality and Market Size. In Journal of Industrial Economics, 58(1): 1-
31.
• Gal, M.S. 2001. Size does matter: The effects of market size on optimal competition policy. In University of 
Southern California Law Review, 74: 1437-1478.
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requires further investigation at the strategic level.
Table 3: National Opinion Effect on Tension (Summary of the National Opinion Level)
National Opinion
China Effect on tension United States
Economic Development Decrease (-)
Decrease (-) Economic Benefit
U.S. involvement in Regional 
concern perceived as hindering 
China's rise
Increase (+)
Increase (+) Weary of Rising China
Capitalist Market Reform Decrease (-)
Net Effect on Tension
Decrease in Tension (-)
This  position  is  further  validated  in  various  polls90 conducted  relating  to  Sino-U.S.  relations. 
According to the US/China Public Perceptions Opinion Survey 2012 (Committee of 100 2012: 33, 
40-43)  economic issues dominate US-China concerns, with the top two U.S. concerns being loss of 
jobs to China and the U.S. trade deficit with China. And the top two Chinese concerns being China's 
exchange rate policy and the U.S. trade deficit. Whilst the same poll sites common interest areas as 
also being potential conflict points, where U.S. respondents indicated that trade is the most likely 
source of conflict,  Chinese elites consider security in the Asia-Pacific as the greatest  source of 
potential conflict.  Similarly both the U.S. and China respondents cited each other as their most 
important partners; whilst simultaneously demonstrating that the American public is evenly divided 
on whether China should be trusted, with elites leaning towards less trust, and the Chinese public 
and elites showing equal division on whether or not to trust the U.S. (Committee of 100 2012 33, 36 
& 37). 
With regards to military concerns (Committee of 100 2012: 33, 36 & 37) 73% of the U.S. public 
90 For a full list and visual illustration of the selected results refer to:
• Committee of 100. 2012. US/China Public Perceptions Opinion Survey 2012. New York: Committee of 100.
Similar results to these were also found by the Pew Research Center, Gallup, and PollingReport.com
• Pew Research Center. 2013. U.S.-China Relations: Key Data Points from Pew Research. Internet: 
http://www.pewresearch.org/key-data-points/u-s-china-relations-key-data-points-from-pew-research/. Access: 
13 July 2013.
• English, C. 2012. American, Opinion Leaders See U.S.-China Ties as Friendly. Gallup Politics. Internet: 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/152618/americans-opinion-leaders-china-ties-friendly.aspx. Access: 13 July 2013.
• PollingReport.com. 2013. China. Internet:  http://www.pollingreport.com/china.htm  . Access: 13 July 2013.
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and 68% of U.S. business leaders view China's military power as a potential threat and a majority of 
elites believe the U.S. political  involvement and military presence in the Asia-Pacific will  both 
maintain security  and create  tension among stakeholders,  with the clear  majority  of  the  public 
believing that at least part of the consequence of the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific will result in 
an increase in tension. With similar results occurring with China's respondents.
6.2. Strategic Level
The strategy adopted by China in the SCS can best be described as a “delaying” strategy. Two 
significant trends form part of this strategy: first, the current and future potential latent power of 
China.  Given enough time the Chinese  economy is  expected  to  out  pace even the U.S.  As its 
economy grows, so will its latent power; and the potential growth of the Chinese economy indicates 
that it will eventually have far greater latent power than the U.S. However at the moment the U.S. 
economy is  still  larger,  and though the U.S.  population  is  smaller  its  latent  power  is  currently 
greater than China. Therefore in terms of the current status of the SCS, and generally all areas of 
tension between China and the U.S., it would be undesirable to enter into conflict with the U.S. 
irrespective of policy91. The second trend, which is an extension of the first, is China's increasing 
military  expenditure  which  has  kept  pace  with  the  annual  expansion of  the  Chinese  economy, 
consistently  maintained  at  two  percent  of  GDP92.  Which  considering  the  annual  average  GDP 
growth of China93 represents a significant absolute growth in military expenditure over the past two 
decades94. 
Moderate views on China's defence spending indicate that Beijing's leaders have boosted military 
spending  for  precisely  the  reasons  that  they  have  stated:  to  compensate  for  inflation  and  past 
neglect, consolidate funding into a unified budget, and improve capabilities to address outstanding 
territorial and maritime claims (Alastair Johnston95). According to Andrew Nathan96 China's defence 
missions are very large and in this sense the expenditure is not over-sized. Moreover despite its 
growing military power, it  is important not to exaggerate the immediate Chinese threat. Having 
acquired new technology, Beijing still requires time for those technologies to be integrated into its 
91 Refer to Table 1 and 2.
92 Refer to Chart 1
93 Refer to Chart 2
94 Taken from the base year of 1989 (see Chart 1 and 2).
95 Alastair Johnston. 8 July 2013. Email Interview.
96 Andrew Nathan. 4 July 2013. Email Interview.
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existing force structure before they are fully operational (Ralf Emmers97).
Conversely more hawkish views indicate that there can be no certainty over the true size of China's 
military expenditure, indicating that it might be significantly greater than the best estimates (Robert 
Ross98).  Carl  Thayer99 indicates  that  there are  two  sets  of data,  (1) the official  Chinese figures 
(which omit ballistic missile and research and development) and (2) estimates by the Pentagon. The 
latter are around double the Chinese estimates. Absolute Chinese defence spending has been rising, 
but  defence  spending  as  a  percentage  of  central  government  expenditure  has  remained  steady. 
China's  defence  spending  is  tied  to  economic  growth  and  though  currently  Chinese  defence 
spending is but a fraction of US defence spending, given enough time China's actual power will cost 
the U.S. its military superiority and projection capabilities in the SCS and to a lesser extent the 
Asia-Pacific. But it will take many decades for China's defence spending to exceed that of the U.S. 
and currently China's capabilities fall short of denying regional access to the U.S.
In addition to these two trends are the regional balancers of India and Japan. Neither India  nor 
Japan  are  committed  to  specific  claims  in  the  SCS.  Their  official  interest  lies  in  FON,  and 
specifically  that  commercial  transit  remains  open  (Michael  Swaine100).  According  to  Brigadier 
Mandip Singh101 the issue of the SCS is a “sovereignty” issue, one that India is not a party to,  
explicitly  indicating  that  India's  External  Affairs  Minister,  Salmon  Khurshid  stated:  “there  are 
fundamental issues there, that do not require India's interference.” India's interests in the region are 
purely commercial and aimed at energy exploration. 
However  relatively  benign  concerns  may  ultimately  result  in  intervention  by  India  and China. 
Masafumi Iida102 indicates that the most important interest for these two countries in the SCS is to 
maintain the stability and safety of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in the SCS. On which 
the  Japanese  economy is  especially  heavily dependent.  For  this  reason,  preventing China from 
taking assertive behaviour in the SCS is also in their common interest. As Ankit Panda103 indicates 
Chinese  claims  on  the  SCS  (notably  the  9-dash  line)  create  anxieties  in  both  countries  about 
navigation and trade. In particular the Indian strategic community's obsession with China's "string 
97 Ralf Emmers. 4 July 2013. Email Interview.
98 Robert Ross. 2 July 2013. Email Interview.
99 Carl Thayer. 19 July 2013. Email Interview.
100 Michael Swaine. 8 July 2013. Email Interview.
101 Mandip Singh. 8 July 2013. Email Interview.
102 Masafumi Iida. 17 July 2013. Email Interview.
103 Ankit Panda. 10 July 2013. Email Interview.
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of pearls" in the SCS and Indian Ocean. And to this extent Japanese Prime-Minister Shinzō Abe 
sees ASEAN and India as components of a values-based cooperation network in the Asia-Pacific. 
Japan's approach to security has been driven by developments in the region, viz. the nuclear crises 
in the North Korea Peninsular, China's rapid military modernization programme and the relative 
strategic decline of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region (Paul Joshy104). China's attempts at seeking 
great power status have driven India and Japan to work together and prompted thoughts of an Asian 
security architecture. Paul Joshy105 indicates that India and Japan are likely to balance against China 
to keep it in check before it can establish a regional hegemony, that the combined strength of India 
and Japan can effectively counter China's possible pursuit of regional hegemony, and that a strategic 
partnership, as opposed to a military alliance, is sufficient to restrain China from seeking revisionist 
tendencies.
Though difficult to determine their exact effect on the SCS specifically, it is clear that China has 
sought  to  neutralize  these  actors  with  alternative  security  concerns,  specifically  the  threats  of 
Pakistan and North Korea respectively. These security concerns act as a means to waylay India and 
Japan,  and  in  addition  to  various  territorial  disputes  (Aksai  China,  Arunach  Pradesh,  and  the 
Senkaku Islands), are “bargaining chips” in case an agreement can potentially be reached. These 
factors together indicate that at  least  for the short  to medium term China's strategy is to avoid 
conflict.
The U.S. in contrast has adopted a dual strategy. As indicated by their policy pronouncements, the 
U.S. is keen to constructively engage with China in its rise, however it is simultaneously concerned 
with the consequences of that rise, should China become a potential threat. Therefore the U.S. is 
pursuing a strategy of “constructive engagement” through which it may benefit economically from 
the rise of China, whilst at the same time, and potentially in conflict with the former, pursuing a 
strategy  whereby  the  leadership  of  the  U.S.  in  the  international  system  is  maintained.  The 
constructive engagement track includes bilateral and multilateral cooperation through such forums 
as  the  S&ED,  ASEAN  Regional  Forum,  the  East  Asia  Summit  and  APEC.  These  enhance 
cooperation and mutual understanding, and as indicated above have the potential to defuse a period 
of heightened tension during which conflict may breakout. 
The second track is a strategy aimed at the maintenance of the status quo. By pursuing FON as a 
104 Paul Joshy. 9 July 2013. Email Interview.
105 Paul Joshy. 9 July 2013. Email Interview.
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“national interest,” the U.S. is able to utilize the SCS as a means by which it may involve itself in  
the affairs of Southeast Asia. Thus FON really has become a symbol of U.S. concerns over China's 
military strength. Despite the utilization of FON as a means to remain relevant in the region, there is 
a  valid  argument  that  the  advocacy of  FON is  a  peace  promoting  policy,  and not  a  means of 
challenging China's influence in its home region. This coupled with the lack of evidence for internal 
balancing suggests relatively benign intentions. And when considering that the disagreement over 
FON is a matter of interpretation it appears on the surface that the U.S. is pursuing  maintenance of 
specifically  political  leadership  by  ensuring  that  its  own  narrative  or  ideological  perspective 
becomes the norm. If the U.S. can force the adoption of a Western Liberal Democratic interpretation 
of international law and philosophy, which has already found significant consensus in Europe, a 
significant step towards the maintenance of the current international system will  be made. This 
argument  carries  added  weight  with  the  U.S.  understanding that  China's  future  potential  latent 
power will ensure that it  will  have few if any significant competitors in the long term, and by 
engaging China now the U.S. may benefit economically whilst simultaneous converting China to a 
Western conception of international relations. 
However Offensive Realism clearly indicates that great powers prefer “buck-passing” to balancing. 
And the U.S. promotion of strategic  partnerships between Australia,  India and Japan is  a  clear 
indication of buck-passing, alongside a limited degree of external balancing largely due to the lack 
of a functional multilateral agreement.  Buck-passing has the effect of transferring responsibility 
from one  state  to  another,  and  thus  has  a  tension  reducing  impact  upon  relations  specifically 
between the U.S. and China and a tension increasing effect between China and the buck-catchers. 
The sum of the U.S. strategy is that its “constructive engagement” and “buck-passing” strategies 
reduce tension, whilst its strategy to maintain the status quo serves to increase tension. This is in 
addition to China's  “delaying” strategy which reduces tension. These trends are illustrated in Table 
4: Effect on Tension by Strategy.
A superficial  view  of  the  Chinese  and  U.S.  strategies  does  indicate  a  tension  reducing  trend. 
However the involvement of the U.S. in the SCS deserves additional weighting in any analysis 
when determining the potential  for conflict.  However  it  is  clear that both parties  will  find any 
conflict undesirable: for China because it is unprepared, and the U.S. because it would prefer to 
“buck-pass” and not become directly involved.
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Table 4: Effect on Tension by Strategy (Summary of Strategic Level)
Strategy
China Effect on tension United States
Strategy of Delay Decrease (-)
Increase (+) Maintenance of Status quo and 
involvement in SCS
Decrease (-) Constructive Engagement
Decrease (-) Buck-passing to India and 
Japan
Net Effect on Tension
Decrease in Tension
Strategically the U.S. advocacy of FON has the greatest destabilizing effect. Since the “Impeccable 
incident” both sides are avoiding dramatic confrontation for fear of a major incident over a minor 
problem, with the U.S. staying out of coastal EEZs (Womack 2013106). The two sides agree on the 
general idea of "FON" but not on what "FON" means. The US claims that FON allows its naval 
ships to collect intelligence within another country's EEZ while the Chinese disagree. According to 
Andre Nathan107 if the Chinese tried to use force to expel U.S. Navy ships from their claimed EEZ 
waters the US ships would respond with force. But insists that this won't happen. This position is  
confirmed  by  Robert  Ross108 who  indicates  that  an  attempt  by  China  to  restrict  the  U.S. 
interpretation of FON would elicit a major crises and would be an act of war. The U.S. is uncertain 
over Beijing's commitment to the FON principle in disputed waters and consequently Washington 
has responded by reinforcing its defence relations with the Philippines and deepening bilateral ties 
with  Vietnam  (Ralf  Emmers109).  A more  moderated  position  is  adopted  by  Michael  Swaine110 
indicating that if FON is by China limited the U.S. would likely: a) deploy naval forces in the area 
China was seeking to limit access into; and b) exert strong diplomatic pressure on Beijing to relent. 
6.3. Tactical Level
As previously indicated the tactical level is largely a function of the presence and utilization of 
military assets in a particular region. And is thus the primary factor determining the likelihood of an 
international incident occurring and acting as a flashpoint. The tactics adopted in the SCS revolve 
106 Brantly Womack. 2 July 2013. Email Interview.
107 Andrew Nathan. 4 July 2013. Email Interview.
108 Robert Ross. 2 July 2013. Email Interview.
109 Ralf Emmers. 4 July 2013. Email Interview.
110 Michael Swaine. 8 July 2013. Email Interview.
84
around two key concerns: access to naval and port facilities in the South China and the competition 
between “operational access” and “A2AD” technologies.  
The tactics adopted by China can accurately be described holistically as a “string of pearls.” The 
two parts to the “string of pearls” concept is the perceived tactical advantage granted by nearby 
naval bases and land-based military facilities, through the concepts of “Zonal Defence” and “A2AD 
technology”  respectively.  These  enhance  China's  power  projection  capabilities  and  reduce  the 
relative power advantage of technologically more advanced fleets such as the U.S. Navy. These two 
concepts are epitomized by the development of Hainan Naval Base and the pursuit of acquiring 
further  islands  for  base development  in the SCS (e.g.:  Woody Island),  which enhances combat 
vessel effectiveness in the region within a specific zone of control; and the development of the DF-
21D ASBM,  which  significantly  neutralizes  the  operational  access  and  effectiveness  of  “large 
surface ships” with significant power projection capabilities. This effectively means that China is 
deploying  power  projection  capabilities  into  the  SCS  that  increase  its  military  presence  and 
establishes a zone of influence in which significant control is exerted.  
The tactics adopted by the U.S., although off-set by U.S. buck-passing, are nevertheless present and 
also revolve around access to naval and port facilities and operational access, and thus these tactics 
are described here holistically as Operational Access Assertion111 (OAA). The three parts to OAA 
are access to naval and port facilities to maintain operational access, assertion of operational access 
to counter A2AD tactics and operational assertion of FON rights. The Singapore Area Coordinator 
in the South of the SCS provides comprehensive shore support services to the U.S. fleet and serves 
as a geographical opposite to Hainan Naval base in the north. This base provides support to combat 
vessels  through maintenance  and  resupply  services,  thus  enabling  U.S.  ships  to  maintain  their 
operational presence for longer periods. The deployment of U.S. littoral ships to this region further 
enhances U.S. power projection and operational access in a region that has a significant number of 
disputed land masses. The U.S. JOAC is an effort developed to specifically overcome the A2AD 
technologies  and  tactics  developed  by  China.  The  U.S.  is  also  engaging  in  the  tactic  of 
“brinkmanship”  that  asserts  its  FON rights  in  the  SCS.  The most  pertinent  example  being the 
deployment of the USNS Impeccable to the region despite full knowledge of China's objection to 
intelligence gathering activities in its EEZ. In this way the U.S. may gauge the commitment of 
China to its interpretation of FON, whilst simultaneously asserting its perceived rights, however this 
111 Operational Access Assertion is a concept developed by the author to explain the tactical movements engaged in by 
the U.S. The author takes full responsibility for the creation and usage of this term in this paper.
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is done at the cost of provoking China's hostility and the potential for retaliation. The effect on 
tension within the region is indicated in Table 5 below.
Table 5: Effect on Tension by Tactics (Summary of Tactical Level)
Tactics
China Effect on tension United States
Zonal Defence Increase (+)
Increase (+) Naval and Port facility access in 
SCS region
A2AD Technologies Increase (+)
Increase (+) Operational Access
Use of Civilian Law 
enforcement vessels (White 
Hulls)
Decrease (-)
Increase (+) Operational Assertion of FON
Net Effect on Tension
Increase in Tension
China's  efforts  to  limit  traditional  U.S.  power  projection  capabilities,  which  historically  have 
received limited contest, in the Asia-Pacific region has developed into mutual competition on the 
tactical level. As China develops a means to limit U.S. operational access, so the U.S. develops a 
means to reassert its operational access and effectiveness and potentially neutralize China's A2AD 
capabilities. This, as indicated, has resulted in a trend of “one-upmanship” that is playing out in the 
SCS.  As  Robert  Ross112 indicates  the  impact  of  high-technology  on  the  Chinese  side  is  the 
development of advanced targeting technologies that may make large surface ships, such as aircraft 
carriers, increasingly vulnerable. To counter, and thus attempt to neutralize this technology, “non-
kinetic" defences have been developed such as electronic warfare, obscurants and decoys. And to 
reassert operational access the U.S. has developed drones that allow for equally effective yet also 
smaller,  faster  and less  expensive  platforms  that  can  replace  carriers  in  addition  to  Unmanned 
Underwater  Vehicles  (UUVs)  for  anti-mining,  Anti-Submarine  Warfare  (ASW)  and  anti-ship 
capabilities which should be available within 10 years (Robert Ross113). However the development 
of the Liaoning aircraft carrier by China is a move towards developing power parity, as opposed to 
regional  advantage,  over  the  U.S.,  and  as  Ralf  Emmers114 indicates  this  will  further  shift  the 
112 Robert Ross. 2 July 2013. Email Interview.
113 Robert Ross. 2 July 2013. Email Interview.
114 Ralf Emmers. 4 July 2013. Email Interview.
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distribution of power to its advantage vis-à-vis the other claimant states and decrease the gap in 
relative power between China and the U.S., particularly if further carriers are developed. 
Mandip  Singh115 conceptualizes  this  competition  of  “local  wars  under  hi-tech  conditions”  even 
further to include the PLA “Three Warfares” concept. The “Three Warfares” concept consists of 
Psychological Warfare, which seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations 
through operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy military personnel and 
supporting  civilian  populations;  Media  Warfare,  which  is  aimed  at  influencing  domestic  and 
international public opinion to build support for China’s military actions and dissuade an adversary 
from pursuing  actions  contrary  to  China’s  interests;  and  Legal  Warfare,  uses  international  and 
domestic law to claim the legal high ground or assert Chinese interests.  It can be employed to 
hamstring an adversary’s operational freedom and shape the operational space. Legal warfare is also 
intended to build international support and manage the possible political repercussions of China’s 
military actions (Walton 2012: 4).
As Masafumi Iida116 indicates, it is difficult to predict the effect of this competition on the balance 
of power in the SCS because the advantage is continually in flux, as it passes briefly from one party 
to the other. James Bussert117 goes so far as to indicate that hi-tech weapons are unlikely to decide 
the outcome of future conflicts any more than in the many post-WWII world ventures where the 
U.S. had high technology military assets at its disposal but did not win very often and outright lost 
many times. The most notable examples being the Vietnam war, the Iraq war and the conflict in 
Afghanistan, all of which had unexpectedly long durations against relatively less technologically 
capable adversaries118. 
Andrew Nathan119 throws into doubt the whole question of balance of power in the SCS since the 
ships and planes that are being deployed by all sides are relatively small and any armed clashes that 
have taken place or will take place in the foreseeable future are going to be small scale. China 
purposefully uses civilian "maritime protection" vessels instead of their "high technology" warships 
to remain less provocative and keep from escalating tensions, a key advantage of utilizing "low" 
115 Mandip Singh. 8 July 2013. Email Interview
116 Masafumi Iida. 17 July 2013. Email Interview.
117 James Bussert. 9 July 2013. Email Interview.
118 Further examples include the Korean conflict (U.S. invasion of the North was repelled. Eventual stalemate ensued), 
the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba (1961), Lebanon (1982), and Somalia (1993).
119 Andrew Nathan. 4 July 2013. Email Interview.
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technology versus high technology in any regional dispute (James Bussert120). In contrast American 
tools in the region are almost entirely military based, meant for the prevention or winning of war. 
The U.S. has no similar regional “white hulls” and to use the U.S. Navy to counter an action by 
China’s civilian law enforcement vessels would be escalatory (Peter Dutton121). 
The importance of naval facilities also occupies a key factor in the SCS. The construction of an 
underground nuclear submarine base near Sanya on Hainan Island will significantly expand China’s 
strategic presence in the SCS by enabling increased Chinese submarine activity in the disputed 
waters (Ralf Emmers122). The build up of naval facilities in the SCS will enable China to enforce its 
claims along the 9-dash line. And the establishment in the Sansha prefecture of a Military Area 
Command123 on Yongxing (Woody) Island is a step in that direction, that will allow for refueling 
and supply. It is also intrinsic to its A2AD strategy of denying access and freedom of movement in 
the SCS in the event of any hostile intent (Mandip Singh124 and Ankit Panda125).
Whilst China has acquired and developed its own port facilities and strategic assets under Chinese 
jurisdiction in the SCS, the U.S. has sought access to ports through the circle of countries enclosing 
the SCS. According to Carl Thayer126 the ports are important to the United States for two reasons. 
First,  the U.S. wants access so it  can remain “on station” in the SCS ready to respond to any 
contingencies that arise. Subic Bay in the Philippines is important in this regard. Second, the U.S.  
would like to arrange voyage repairs in SCS ports rather than return to the U.S. for minor repairs. 
Up to five, and possibly more, USNS Military Sealift Command vessels, for example, have been 
repaired at the commercial port facilities in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam.
7. Conclusion
The three levels of interaction each indicate a net increase or decrease in tension.  The national 
opinion level indicates the level of aggression and therefore desirability of each state to enter into 
conflict with the other, and conversely the lengths each state is willing to undertake to reduce or 
increase tension. At the national opinion level there is a clear net decrease in tension. Meaning that 
120 James Bussert. 9 July 2013. Email Interview.
121 Peter Dutton. 18 July 2013. Email Interview.
122 Ralf Emmers. 4 July 2013. Email Interview.
123 Includes an airport, sea port and future plans for a garrison.
124 Mandip Singh. 8 July 2013. Email Interview.
125 Ankit Panda. 10 July 2013. Email Interview.
126 Carl Thayer. 19 July 2013. Email Interview.
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the perceptions and understanding of China and the U.S. towards one another at the ideological, 
psychological and cultural  level contribute towards peaceful co-existence.  However this  surface 
reading of national opinion is misleading if taken as a mere sum of results. The clear contributor 
towards a decrease in tension is economic cooperation. And the very economic growth that has 
brought the U.S. and China closer together has resulted in a level of weariness by Washington in the 
rising capability of Beijing. Which in turn has resulted in China's own scrutiny of U.S. involvement 
in  what  is  perceived  as  Beijing's  sphere  of  influence  and  regional  concern.  The  so-called 
internationalization of a regional issue. Therefore whilst an understanding between the two states is 
developing,  the analysis  undertaken here clearly indicates ambivalent  results  and a relationship 
defined by mutual  necessity  through economic gain.  And thus whilst  a  preference for  peaceful 
relations exists to a limited degree, should the mutual interest that exists come to an end and the 
interests of one or both parties be infringed upon by the other, there is little that either state will do 
to prevent the escalation of tensions that could lead to war.
The strategic level is the method or plan of action that is designed to achieve a long term aim. Since  
the core aim of  every state  is  survival  and the best  way to ensure survivability  is  through the 
limitation of a potentially threatening state's abilities, strategy is a clear indicator of aggressive 
action and consequently results in an increase or decrease of tension. At the strategic level a net  
decrease in tension is evident. Most notable between the two states is the level of consistency in 
strategy. Beijing's strategy in the region is remarkably consistent, and can be reduced to that of a 
“strategy of delay” or avoidance of conflict until a more ideal point in the future. In contrast the  
U.S.  strategy  is  far  more  complex  and  ambiguous,  consisting  of  a  dual  track  strategy:  the 
maintenance of the status quo and constructive engagement. The U.S. is therefore engaging in a 
productive relationship with China whilst simultaneously “hedging its bets” in case the relationship 
breaks-down; with buck-passing acting as a corollary to the maintenance of the status quo, but 
through other means.  The key variable  in this  equation is  China's  strategy. For whilst  the U.S. 
strategy illustrates both tension increasing and decreasing features; as long as China is unwilling to 
engage in aggressive behaviour conflict will be avoided and tension will decrease or at minimum be 
maintained at current levels.
At the tactical level a clear increase in tension is evident, diverging significantly from the national 
opinion and strategic level trends. As indicated, the tactical level is the most significant variable in 
determining the  risk that  a  region poses  as  a  flashpoint  for  conflict.  The  competition  between 
Washington and Beijing on this level is a clear promoter of tension and therefore indicates that the 
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SCS, as a region for interaction between the U.S. and China, poses significant potential to act as a 
flashpoint for conflict. That all activities at the tactical level, with the exception of one, is tension 
promoting is of particular concern. Both states are securing, through different means, naval and port 
facility access that promotes power projection.  Both states are  competing over area access and 
denial  technologies  and  their  accompanying  tactics.  This  competition  possesses  all  the 
characteristics of a general arms race in which the competing states in their pursuit of security are  
engaging in the development of ever more technologically advanced weapons, which results in the 
build-up of tension and ultimately greater insecurity due to the proliferation of arms. However this 
particular arms race must be understood within the context of regional competition, not global, and 
between  two  actors  with  significant  actual  power  and  latent  power  disparities.  Therefore  the 
competition is over regional advantage in the SCS, and acts as backdrop to the already tense SCS 
dispute, thus greatly increasing the volatility of the dispute and the importance of its outcomes.
The  one  trend  at  the  tactical  level  that  decreases  tension  is  the  use  by  China  of  civilian  law 
enforcement vessels to assert its claims or defend its interpretation of international law. This is a 
significant variable at the tactical level as the use of “white hulls” prevents the potential escalation 
of a skirmish into an international crises. In contrast to a skirmish between “grey hulls” which form 
part of the armed forces of a state, are armed with sophisticated weaponry, and engaging them is 
tantamount to war. The primary example being the use of white hulls to obstruct the progress of the 
USNS Impeccable in 2009, which despite the presence of a PLA Navy surveillance ship, actual 
engagement  was  undertaken  by  a  Bureau  of  Maritime  Fisheries  Patrol  Vessel,  a  State 
Oceanographic Administration patrol vessel and two Chinese-flagged naval  trawlers. This same 
scenario is a reflection of the U.S. tactic of asserting its right of FON by deploying intelligence 
gathering naval ships to the region, an innately tension promoting activity. Despite the increase of 
tension  between Washington and Beijing  during  this  episode,  the  use  of  white  hulls  by  China 
ensured that the incident did not escalate to that of an international crises.
This  tactic  is  a  reflection  of  Beijing's  strategy of  delay.  Despite  the  region holding significant 
potential as a flashpoint for conflict, any skirmish that occurs in the SCS is unlikely to escalate to an 
international crises. And should it reach that point it is still unlikely that conflict and especially war 
on any significant level would occur. This is primarily because China's strategy of “delay” implies 
that the aim of China is to avoid or delay conflict, even at the regional level, with the U.S. The 
implication being, in purely strategic terms, that it is not yet prepared. The U.S. strategy in contrast 
is prepared for either eventuality: peace and cooperation or conflict. As such there appears little 
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incentive either way for the U.S. on this level to maintain peace.
Should a crises occur in the SCS the uncertainty or ambivalence of the U.S. strategically means that 
the national opinion images become integral as a final barrier in determining the likelihood of an 
escalation to war. As indicated it is this level that determines how aggressive each state is towards 
the other and therefore the lengths each state is willing to undertake to prevent war. In this case  
China is still the state with the most to lose in terms of the development of its latent power. Until the 
potential of the Chinese economy reaches at least parity with that of the U.S. the emphasis is on 
Beijing in preventing a war. However this is not withstanding U.S. concerns. Washington still has 
an interest in maintaining peace, even if it is currently less than Beijing's.
The  potential  for  a  flashpoint  on  the  tactical  level  is  particularly  high,  which  explains  the 
international angst that surrounds the region. However as the strategic and national opinion levels 
clearly indicate, conflict is highly undesirable. Thus despite the high potential for small skirmishes 
to break out, any conflict is likely to be resolved very quickly for fear of escalation. To utilize both a 
western metaphor and Chinese metaphor, the relationship between the U.S. and China in the SCS is 
not a “duel” representing absolute gains and losses whereby the first to “blink, is shot.” Rather the 
relationship  between  Washington  and  Beijing  is  a  sophisticated  and  strategic  game  of  Go127. 
Whereby each is trying to outmanoeuvre the other. Both Beijing and Washington are competing for 
influence, both at times making gains and loses. But ultimately they require each other to continue 
the game, at least for the time being.
Offensive Realism poses  the  following questions:  (1)  is  China's  potential  versus  current  power 
cause for concern, (2) does the U.S. aim to maintain its leadership and hegemony in the face of a 
potential peer competitor,  (3) is China engaging in strategies to gain power and (4) is the U.S. 
engaging in strategies to maintain power in the region? China's current power is set to develop 
drastically in the coming decades as its potential power is slowly converted into economic latent 
power and actual military power. The sheer potential of that growth is evident in the fact that the 
population of China is over four times the size of the U.S. Within the Asia-Pacific region only India 
127 Go [圍棋] commonly meaning “encircling game” is a board game for two players that originated in China more 
than 2 500 years  ago. The objective of the game is to encircle  more territory than one's opponent,  ultimately 
resulting in local battles that may result in the expansion, reduction or wholesale capture and loss of a contested 
area. The game is noted for being rich in strategy despite its relatively simple rules. According to chess master  
Emanuel Lasker: “The rules of  Go are so elegant, organic, and rigorously logical that if intelligent forms exist 
elsewhere  in  the  universe,  they  almost  certainly  play  Go.”  For  more  information  on  Go please  refer  to 
<http://www.britgo.org/> 
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has a population significantly large enough to balance China, however its economy and therefore 
latent power is far weaker, and therefore is unable to balance by itself the rise of China. With no 
potential  candidates that can individually balance against  China,  Beijing is  poised to become a 
regional hegemon and therefore a peer competitor to the U.S. As such China's  potential  versus 
current power is cause for concern to the U.S.
The U.S. policy shift or “pivot” to Asia, following its declining role in the Middle-east, is a clear 
indication of a growing U.S. concern over the rising prominence of China in global economics and 
politics.  The  U.S.  is  indeed,  as  former  Secretary  of  State  Clinton  indicated,  being  smart  and 
systematic about where it invests its time and energy to sustain its leadership, secure its interests 
and advance its values. In Offensive Realism terms the U.S., as a status quo regional hegemon, will 
attempt to prevent a peer competitor, in the form of another regional hegemon from emerging that 
may challenge or undermine its global leadership. The U.S. strategy of constructively engaging 
China  is  highly  emblematic  of  the  actions  that  a  regional  hegemon  might  undertake  to  both 
circumscribe the actions of a potential peer competitor within a regional framework of multilateral 
and bilateral forums that force it to conform to rules and processes that the status quo regional 
hegemon  has itself had a hand in developing. This serves to restrict the scope of the potential peer 
competitor's  actions to  the prescribed norms of the regional  hegemon within its  own sphere of 
influence. Though these norms will not tangibly restrict the actions of either the regional hegemon 
or  its  potential  competitor,  should  these norms be  violated  by any party  within  the  region the 
political repercussions may significantly damage international support for that state, and thereby 
effect the future structure of balancing coalitions in the region. Washington's involvement in the 
Asia-Pacific  directly  undermines  Beijing's  modus  operandi,  which  would  prefer  bilateral 
engagement with its regional neighbours where it might bring the full weight of its latent and actual 
power to bear on negotiations. Thus there is a clear indication that the U.S. is attempting to maintain 
its leadership and hegemony without peer competitors.
Offensive Realism indicates that the primary strategies to gain power are war, blackmail, bait and 
bleed, and bloodletting. None of these have occurred between the U.S. and China. However they 
have occurred on a low level between the rival claimants in the SCS dispute with the seizure of the 
Paracel  Islands  in  1974  and  expansion  into  the  Spratly  archipelago  in  1988.  Since  this  point 
onwards China has adopted a strategy of delay whilst it consolidates its position. For China the 
competition over tactical advantage in the SCS is both an extension of this delaying strategy in the 
long  term,  whereby  China  is  not  yet  ready  to  challenge  the  U.S.  position  as  the  world's  only 
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hegemon; and preparation for regional conflict in the short term, through Zonal Defence and A2AD 
tactics, should the U.S. pre-emptively take advantage of its technological superiority and engage 
China militarily. In sum China has displayed a willingness in the past to use force to achieve its 
national interests and assert its rights, and until it has the capability to do so in the face of U.S. 
opposition, it will continue to bide its time. Thus indicating that China is engaging in a strategy that 
could eventually develop into later strategies with the aim of gaining power.
The two strategies for checking a potential aggressor are balancing and buck-passing. Although 
balancing always occurs, either externally or internally, a regional hegemon prefers to not become 
involved in a conflict that would potentially reduce its absolute power and to lay the responsibility 
of  checking a  potential  aggressor  on the  regionally located  great  powers  and hence buck-pass. 
Should the regional great powers not be able to balance against the potential aggressor then the 
regional hegemon may act as an offshore balancer to augment the actual power of the balancing 
coalition.  As indicated  the  U.S.  is  internally  balancing through technological  development  and 
regionally  through  tactical  advantage.  In  this  way  the  U.S.  has  prevented  Beijing  from taking 
assertive action where regional norms would have failed. However it also indicates that the U.S. is 
willing to act as an offshore balancer where it is failing to internally balance by developing its  
combatant  force  structure.  The  U.S.  failure  at  developing  a  balancing  coalition  through  the 
Quadrilateral  Security  Dialogue  prompted  the  U.S.  instead  to  buck-pass  by  promoting  the 
development  of  bilateral  Strategic  Partnerships  between Japan,  India  and Australia,  which  also 
happen to be liberal democratic states. Should they fail to “catch the buck” by themselves the U.S. 
may still act as a offshore balancer. The U.S. attempts at internally and externally balancing and 
buck-passing are clear indicators that the U.S. is engaging in strategies to maintain power.
Thus Offensive Realism predicts that conflict is an ever present threat in the SCS region. As a  
regional hegemon the U.S. has involved itself in the region to maintain the status quo and prevent  
the emergence of a peer competitor. And indeed both parties are countering each others action. 
However the desire of both parties to maintain peace is relatively high. This is primarily due to the 
determining factor that China is not yet ready to enter into large scale conflict and the U.S. is buck-
passing to India and Japan of which, at least India, is not yet ready to be the catcher. Once China's 
potential latent power is achieved and its actual power has increased to match, then the SCS may 
become a far more hostile environment in which the U.S. will assist India and Japan in balancing 
against China. The tactics employed by both parties form part of a broad security umbrella based on 
the  uncertainty  of  the  international  system  that  is  particularly  prevalent  during  unbalanced 
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multipolarity.
Offensive Realism makes a significant contribution to understanding the relationship that exists 
between great powers. In particular the understanding that because intentions are unknowable states 
must assume the worst of their competitors in their pursuit of survival. Therefore every state is a  
threat. However this understanding is insufficient when determining at what point in time does a 
status quo power begin to act against a potential competitor. As Offensive Realism indicates, as 
soon as a great power presents itself as a potential peer competitor to the regional hegemon, the 
regional hegemon will act to prevent the continued rise of that competitor through buck-passing and 
balancing. And whilst the U.S. has engaged in these activities, only a limited degree of aggression 
has been displayed between the two parties, even engaging each other in the S&ED in an effort 
towards insuring amicable relations. This is the stage that the U.S. and China find themselves in at 
the moment. Where Offensive Realism has failed to define the relationship between China and the 
U.S.  in  terms  of  the  relative  degree  of  threat  that  a  state  represents.  At  what  point  will  the 
psychological and ideological perspectives of these two states change, aggression become the norm, 
and a clear  path towards  regional  conflict  become evident,  if  ever? Thus the need to  establish 
whether a state continues to remain a “general threat,” or whether it has become an “imminent 
threat.”  As  long  as  China  remains  a  general  threat  the  risk  of  overt  conflict,  as  Mearsheimer 
predicts, remains limited and a descent into a new Cold War more likely. Economic and strategic 
cooperation  can  and  does  exist  between  great  powers  that  represent  a  “general  threat”  to  the 
survivability  of  each  other.  Thus  the  deviation  here  from  Offensive  Realism  by  taking  into 
consideration  the  images  that  the  U.S.  and China  have  of  one  another  is  used  in  determining 
“imminent” and “general” threat levels.
A short to medium term (5 to 10 years) projection of the future of tensions in the SCS is likely to 
yield to the status quo. Beijing, in accordance with its strategy of delay, is likely to continue to  
employ white hulls in the assertion of its rights in the region, as well as continue to develop its 
naval capacity and technological capabilities with a view towards limiting U.S. power projection in 
the region and infringing on what it perceives as its sphere of influence. The U.S. similarly is likely  
to continue to develop positive relations with the states surrounding the SCS in an effort to ensure 
access to port facilities and counter Chinese influence in the region, whilst continuing to assert its  
right of operational access through its defence of FON and to develop technologies that enhance 
operational access.  Due to the high potential  of the SCS to act as a flashpoint  a repeat of the 
“Impeccable” incident is  likely to occur resulting in an accompanying rise in tensions between 
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Beijing and Washington. However this type international incident is unlikely to escalate into a crises 
or outright conflict. And this trend will likely include all such skirmishes where U.S. and Chinese 
ships engage each other. Thus in the short term the SCS  is likely to remain a significant source of  
tension, whilst the potential for escalation is likely to  remain minimal.
A medium to long term (10 to 20 years) projection relies heavily on theoretical underpinnings. By 
this stage China is expected to be approaching power parity with the U.S. The U.S. would under 
these circumstances possess far less capacity to deny China its own sphere of influence. And if the 
tension in the region has not yet escalated into outright conflict before this stage, when the U.S. 
possessed the clear technological and actual power advantage, the likelihood of overt conflict will 
be significantly reduced as a far more capable Chinese military will act as a significant deterrence to 
U.S. aggression. 
The changing variable of China's military capacity is likely to illicit two results. The first is as  
Mearsheimer predicts, China's actual power is likely to keep developing until the U.S. is forced to 
accept that its operational access in the SCS and Asia-Pacific to a lesser extent is no longer tenable. 
China will likely follow the U.S. example and issue an Asian equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine in 
an  attempt  to  dominate  the  Asia-Pacific,  either  through  a  formal  public  policy  declaration  or 
through  the  sheer  pressure  and  weight  of  its  military  which  may  eventually  overwhelm  the 
operational effectiveness of its competitors. The second result is likely to be the strengthening of 
ties between the U.S., Japan, India and Australia in an effort to balance against the threat of China. 
This  equation however  is  complicated by the rise of India,  which in itself  may illicit  a hostile 
response  from China  and thereby drastically  increase  tension  and the  possibility  of  conflict  or 
possibly ensure continued peace in the region by preventing the emergence of an outright hegemon.
The claims in the SCS are unlikely to be resolved in the near future due both to the presence of oil  
and natural gas and owing to the nature of international law that requires the continuous assertion of 
a state's territorial claims. However, as indicated, the dispute is largely over islets, rocks and reefs 
unsuitable  for  habitation,  the  value  thereof  is  found largely  in  the  surrounding sea.  Given the 
expected growth in the actual power of China and the lack of human habitation that exists in the 
SCS,  the  potential  exists  for  the  region  to  simply  become part  of  China's  sphere  of  influence 
irrespective of true ownership, through the process of osmosis or assimilation. 
This analysis has taken significant steps towards understanding the dynamic relationship that exists 
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between the U.S. and China. It focused in particular on the security competition between the two 
states and whether the current tension may result in the escalation of a regional skirmish or incident 
towards the development of an international crises and subsequent conflict. This has been achieved 
through  the  examination  of  the  nature  of  their  interaction  in  a  particular  region  utilizing  the 
framework provided by Offensive Realism. The analysis examined three variables: (1) the mutual 
perspective that each state has of the other, (2) the security strategies employed by each party, and 
(3) the tactics that both parties have utilized within the region. 
Potential avenues for further research into Offensive Realism as a framework for understanding the 
tension between great powers include the role of “imminent threats” in the calculus of a state that 
exists in an anarchic international system, including how imminent threats may be determined. In 
terms of broader Sino-U.S. relations, a comparable study of alternative regions where Sino-U.S. 
tensions exist  can and should be made as a means of testing the validity of this  analysis.  Two 
noteworthy possibilities include the East China Sea that will allow a deeper examination of the role  
of Sino-Japanese relations, or the Indian Ocean and China's “string of pearls” with the emphasis on 
the  role  of  Sino-Indian  relations.  With  specific  regards  to  the  SCS  further  research  on  the 
relationship of ASEAN and the SCS states to the U.S. and China respectively could provide an 
invaluable contribution to understanding regional tensions.
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Appendix 1: Maps
Map 1: The SCS Detailed Map
Source: Null, S. 2010. U.S v. China: The Global Battle for Hearts, Minds, and Resources. Internet: 
http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2010/09/u-s-v-china-the-global-battle-for-hearts-minds-and-
resources/#.Uc2MOc5hOio. Access: 28 July 2013.
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Map 2: Claims and occupied features in the SCS
Source: ETH Zurich. 2013. Graphics – Asia. Internet: 
https://edit.ethz.ch/fsk/policy_consultancy/products_CH/graphics/Asien_EN. Access 28 June 2013.
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Map 3: String of Pearls
Source: Stratrisks. 2013. Is Sri Lanka becoming a key player in China's String of Pearls? Internet: 
http://stratrisks.com/geostrat/13282. Access: 28 June 2013.
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Map 4: China's Critical Sea Lines of Communication
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2006. Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic 
of China 2006. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense. (page 33)
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Map 5: Geographic Boundaries of the First and Second Island Chains 
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2006. Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic 
of China 2006. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense. (page 15)
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Map 6: Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2006. Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the 
People's Republic of China 2006. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense. (page 27)
102
Appendix 2: Tables
Table 6: U.S. Active Duty Military Strength Report for February 28, 2013
Source:  Department of Defense.  2013.  ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY STRENGTH REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 28, 
2013. Washington, D.C. Department of Defense.
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Table 7: Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces
Source:  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense.  2013.  ANNUAL REPORT TO  CONGRESS:  Military  and  Security 
Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense. (page 75)
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Table 8: U.S. Naval Combatant Force Structure*
Table 5 presents a comparison of the previous and most recent combatant force structure requirements. The associated  
notes provide justification of significant changes.
Notes:
1. Moving 4 DDG to Forward Deployed Naval Force is Rota enables fewer large surface combatants to meet the 
same level of forward presence commitment,
2. The AFRICOM presence requirement has reduced as a result of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, but is 
still more than what is currently being provided. This reduced requirement drove a reduction in the 
requirements for the Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and the supporting Combat Logistics Force.
3. Should Navy determine that long-term recapitalization of the undersea strike mission now performed by 
SSGNs is required, that recapitalization would be accomplished by equipping SSNs with an enhanced strike 
capability rather than in-kind replacement of SSGNs
4. The mission of Maritime Prepositioning Squadron T-AKE supply ships and MLP logistic ships was changed to 
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have them perform day to day operations, rather than only available for surge. This increased the overall 
requirement for these platforms. The table reflects two MLP ships modified to serve as Afloat Forward Staging 
Base (AFSB) ships.
5. An additional T-AGOS was added to meet requirements for both sustained operations and crises response in 
the Pacific.
Source: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. 2013. Naval Combatant Vessel Force Structure Requirements. Report 
to Congress, January 2013. Washington, D.C.: Navy Pentagon. (page 3)
Table 9: Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2013. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense.
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Appendix 3: List of Abbreviations
A2AD – Anti-Access/Area Denial
ABM – Anti-Ballistic Missile
ADMM-Plus – ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus
AFSB – Military Designation for Afloat Forward Staging Base
AOE – Military Designation for a Fast Combat Support ship
APEC – Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF – ASEAN Regional Forum
ASBM – Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile
ASEAN – Association of South East Asian Nations
ASW – Anti-Submarine Warfare
COU – China Ocean University
CVN – Military designation for a Nuclear Powered Carrier Vessel
DDG – Military designation for a Missile Destroyer Ships
DF-21D – Dong Feng 21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile
DoC – Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
DoD – Department of Defence
EAS – East Asia Summit
EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone
FAS – Federation of American Scientists
FON – Freedom of Navigation
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
IRBM – Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
JHSV – Joint High Speed Vessel
JOAC – Joint Operational Access Concept
LCS – Military designation for a Littoral Combat Ship
LHA/LHD – Military designation for a Landing Helicopter Assault/Dock ships
LPD – Military designation for a Landing Platform/Dock
LSD – Military Designation for a Landing Ship/Dock
MaRV – Manoeuvring Re-entry Vehicle
MDG – Millennium Development Goals
NAMRU-2 – Naval Medical Research Unit 2
NPR – Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
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OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OAA – Operational Access Assertion
PLA – People's Liberation Army
PRC – People's Republic of China
ROC – Republic of China
S&ED – Strategic and Economic Dialogue
SCS – South China Sea
SLOC – Sea Lines of Communication
SSBN – Military designation for a Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine
SSD – Strategic Security Dialogue
UNCLOS – United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
U.S.A./U.S. - United States of American/United States
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UUV – Unmanned Underwater Vehicle
WWI – World War One
WWII – World War Two
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